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2Events on the Leeward Islanda and Jamaica stations during the
period, are first described. Main interest is centred upon the attempts
to regain possession of the French colony of Guadeloupe and the long
and costly campaign in San Domingo. Underlying the narrative is an
assessment of the strategy pursued. by the various station admirals and
the problems which they faced, with the limited resources at their
disposal.
Caribbean maritime trade occupies the middle chapters. A study of
the ships and commodities involved in the trade is prefaced by a
description of the convoy system in operation. The importance of the
West India interest in London and the outports i emphasized. There
follows an account of the illicit trade in the Caribbean and the unending
struggle against the enemy privateers.
The final chapters shew how the ultimate responsibility for British
strategy in the Caribbean lay with the Admiralty and. Cabinet in London.
At the Admiralty, the differing abilities of Chatham, Spencer and
Middleten are contrasted. On the political side, it was the deliberations
of the Cabinet which shaped strategy in the Caribbean. Full prominence
has been given to the decisive part played there by the Secretary for War,
Henry Dundas.
The mph theme of the study is an attempt to shew that the station
commanders were well aware of the true situation in the Caribbean but
lacked the powers to provide a remedy. The Admiralty and. Cabinet, on
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5CHAPTER 1
TIlE LgEWARD ISLANDS STATION, 1795 - 1798
On the outbreak of the Revolutionary War in February
1793, British strategy in the Caribbean lay in the hands of
two widely-separated naval and military commands, based on
Jamaica and the Leeward Islands. The division had been made
fifty years before, in belated recognition of geographical
fact.1 Over a thousand miles of difficult waters separated
Jamaica from the Lesser Antilles, and the prevailing north-
east trade winds hampered communication between the two.
Against them, ships under sail wasted many days beating back
to windward.
The Leewards command comprised a chain of British colonies,
stretching in a seven hundred mile arc from the Virgin Islands
to Grenada in the Windwards group. The chain was broken in
three places by the French-held islands of Guadeloupe,
Martinique and St Lucia, for whose possession many of the
operations during the period were to be concerned. By their
size and weatherly position, Guadeloupe and Martinique
dominated the neighbouring British islands. Guadeloupe was
the largest in the chain and ideally situated to threaten
Antigua and St Kitte-Nevie to the north and north-west, and
1. In October 1743, the Leeward Islands became a separate
station from Jamaica, under its own commander-in-chief.
Richmond, Admiral Sir H.W.: 'The Navy in the War of
1739 - 48', vol. I, p. 241.
6Dominica immediately to the south. With Port Royal,
Martinique possessed the finest fleet anchorage in the
Caribbean, 2 and the harbour of Castries on St Lucia was little
inferior. The indented coastlines of all tbree islands
provided numerous sheltered creeks and estuaries for enemy
privateere.
By comparison, the British colonies were strategically
less favoured. Although situated well to the east of the
main chain, and therefore the most weatherly island in
relation to the prevailing winds, Barbados lacked a good
harbour. To convoys and warships coming in from the Atlantic,
it could only offer the open roadstead of Carlisle Bay,
a dangerous place f or crowded shipping during the hurricane
season. The Leewards squadron main base was at English
Harbour on the island of Antigxa. Here there were limited
dockyard facilities , but the anchorage was rather small and
hampered by an awkward approach through shallows. Moreover,
Antigua was on the extreme northern bomidary of the station
and the possession of a central naval base for the command was
only obtained after the capture of Martinique in March l794.
To protect such widely scattered possessiorwae a
2. ADM 1/316: Jervis to Philip Stephens, March 25, 1794:
the bay of Port Royal is a safe anchorage during the
hurricane months and excellent carenage; it will contain
the whole shipping of Great Britain.'
3. See p.
4. See p1, 8-9
7a constant problem for the station admiral. Nor was this
his only difficulty. Most of the Leeward Islands were small
and mountainous. The terrain limited the area o:f cultivation
to the coastal strips. The sugar cane plantations, which
gave the islands their great economic importance to Britain,
were therefore particularly vulnerable to attack from the sea.
This was especially true of the islands of Montserrat, Nevis
arid St.Christopher.
	 In every island, too, the colonists
showed little ability or inclination to defend themselves.
Pew places were properly fortified and the local militia were
poorly armed and generally untrained. The attitude of the
negro and Carib population was at best merely indifferent;
it became progressively more hostile, as the doctrine of
egalitarianism spread from the Prench islands after 1790.
Military defence of the Leeward Islands was therefore
weak and remained so until the despatch of expeditionary
forces from England. Their protection accordingly depended
very largely upon the station admiral and the ships under his
command. When the colonial governors and island assemblies
complained of its inadequacy, as they frequently did during
the war, they entirely failed to take into account the
squadron's many other duties. Between 1793 and 1798, the
navy was called upon to take part in fourteen separate campaigns







































Naval support in these amphibious operations did not
end with providing escort for the troop transports or covering
fire on the landing beaches. For weeks after the initial
landings, the station warships were fully occupied with ferry-
ing reinforcements, supplying isolated garrisons and inter-
rupting the enemy's lines of communication at sea. It was
a marked feature of the Leewards station during the period
that such prolonged assistance to the army strained the
squadron's limited sources, to the detriment of its other
responsibiliies.
5. For accounts of which, see text of this chapters .
9As is well known, trade had long been the dominant
factor in British Caribbean strategy. Protecting the islands
was not enough; the seaborne trade to and from Britain and
the local inter-island commerce had also to be safeguarded.
The value of Caribbean exports, particularly sugar, rose
sharply during the eighteenth century and the economic import-
ance of the colonies to Britain was out of all proportion to
their actual size. Prance was equally aware of their value.
Earlier in the century, during both the Seven Years War and
the War of American Independence, she had made strenuous
efforts to seize control there by frequently deepatching
raiding squadrons from Prance.
But this effort could not be repeated in 1793. The
Revolution had practically destroyed the officer cadre in the
Prench navy. Ships of the line rotted in harbour; organiza-
tion disappeared and morale was low. Without a properly
equipped fleet available for operations overseas, Prance fell
back upon waging a vigorous "guerre de course" in the Caribbean,
using smaller warships and large numbers of privateers. She
achieved considerable success with this strategy - mairing full
use of the geographical advantages the Caribbean Sea gave
to her private era and the harbours of the neutral islands as
bases. 6 The history of the Leewards commP.nd during the period
6. Especially the islands of St Eustatius, St Martin and
St Thomas. )r- rr
'to
was mainly concerned with the station admirals' efforts to
counter the enemy's "guerre de course". If all the French
islands, and therefore their naval bases, could not be occupied,
the enemy privateers should be blockaded in harbour or hunted
and taken at sea. But systematic blockade proved impossible
in an area where a thousand creeks sheltered the privateers.
The station commanders were therefore compelled to rely on a
defensive strategy - the convoy system7 and the mounting of
cruiser patrols along the sea-routes - in order to protect the
trade. Even this proved hard to achieve; the station always
had too few frigates, eloops and schooners, needed for the task.
Nor did the station commander's responsibilities end with
protecting the islands, their seaborne trade and giving aniphi-
bious support to the army, He was continually faced with the
administrative problem of keeping the squadron fully effective.
On a station four thousand miles from England, the maintenance
of his ships greatly depended on the efficiency of the local
dockyards and their personnel - storekeepers, victualling
agents and naval commissioners. Before the outbreak of war,
the state of the dockyard at English Harbour, Antigua, was
shewn to be far from satisfactory. In 1788 the Government
published a report on the overseas establishments of the Navy
and Victualling Boards	 Amongst its findings was evidence
7. See chapter 3.
8. Ninth report upon foreign establishments of the Navy and
ictualling department. May 1788.
11
that the officer in charge of the Antigua yard had defrauded
the Boards of over £3,000 by false entries in the store
accounts.9
One result of the Government enciuiry was to institute
the appointment of regular commissioners to administer the
overseas yards.'° A start was made on these lines under
a commissioner at English Harbour, but as with all the foreign
yards the fluctuations of business in time of war and peace
necessitated constant changes.
The facilities available at the Antigua yard were as
much a problem as its administration. Because there was no
dry-dock, warships had to be laboriously heaved-down before
a survey of underwater damage could be made. What this meant
in terms of expense and time may be gauged by the repairs to
the 50-gu.n ship Trusty in 1794.11 These took fifty-one days
to complete with the existing faóilities at English Harbour
at a cost of £1,400, in order to undertake two days work under
her bottom. In September 1795 the yard submitted an estimate
of £12,000 for the construction of a dry double-dock, big enough
to hold a ship-of-the-line and a frigate together.12 The
9. Anthony Munton was appointed naval, officer, muster-master
and storekeeper at English Harbour yard in 1778. The fraud
occurred in 1782,
10. Ninth report upon foreign establishments of the Navy and
victualling department. May 1788.
11,12. Navy Board Papers. ADM 106/1985. Naval officer,
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proposal was not approved by the Navy Board until the war
was over.
To some extent the difficulties at Antigua were solved
by the capture of Martinique in March 1794, which gave the
squadron the magnificent fleet anchorage at Fort Royal.
Nevertheless, it had also to be properly equipped and maintained
there is plentiful- evidence thereafter of quarrels between
the officers of both yards as they competed for the limited
naval stores available. 13
 By 1801, the establishment at
the Martinique yard had risen -to 130 against 109 at Antigua.14
But the increase in numbers had little effect upon the
frequent lapses which occurred in ship repairs and arrangements
for victualling the fleet.
	 '... the ships come out of
English Harbour in general so badly fitted they are not able
to keep the sea in fine weather and if it blows a little they
are springing their masts and yards and splitting their sails
several anchors were lost at Surinam, by cable -that had been
surveyed at English Harbour and not condemned ••,,15
The perennial problem of manning the squadron was
accentuated by conditions in the Caribbean: the climate, the
wastage of crews by yellow fever and the impossibility of
13. Navy Board Papers. ADM 106/1985. John Martyr, naval
officer, Martinique to the Navy Board, December 23, 1797.
14. Nat. Mar. Mus.: Establishment of Foreign yards, 1801 - 1802.
15. Navy Board Papers: ADM 106/1985. Commodore Samuel Hood
to -the Navy Board, May 30th, 1804.
141g.
obtaining replacements in the islands. The traditional
remedy of the press-gang met bitter opposition from colonial
governors, merchant ship captains and the entire West India
interest. The station admirals therefore resorted to
obtaining seamen either from new ships joining the command
or from prize crews. 16
 The number of the former however
never approached the wastage on station. Nor did the system
of repatriation of men by cartel prove very satisfactory.
Although the Navy bad ever since l76l been given control
of prize crews overseas, the privilege paid poor dividends.
Colonial governors resented the navy's exercise of a monopoly
which had once been theirs. Flag-of-truce duty was carried
out by frigates and sloops and proved an unnecessary waste
of the squadron's limited resources. Moreover, the enemy
stood to gain more by the cartel system. Although privateer
ships were plentiful, the French found it increasingly difficult
to man them. They welcomed therefore an arrangement whereby
privateer crews were continuously returned under flag-of-truce.18
The problems of the Leeward Islands station which have
been outlined were reflected in the kdmlralty'a Orders and
Instrnctions, issued to each station admiral before his
16, 18. See article by Richard Pares: 'Tha Manning of the
Navy in the West Indies'. Trans. R.U.S. (Fourth Series)(1937) vol. XX, pp. 31 - 60.
17. By an Order in Council, dated March 1761.
15
departure from England to take up the command. 19
 However,
the resemblance ends there. The great distance between
England and the West Indies imposed a communications' delay
of at least six weeks, sometimes much longer, which seriously
weakened the force and relevance of the Admiralty instructions.
Although, therefore, strategic policy lay in the hands of
Admiralty and Cabinet, 20
 much depended on how it was carried
out by the commtnders on the station. This is made clear
by a study of events in the Leeward Islands, between the
outbreak of war and its eclipse as a theatre of major
operations in 1798.
Vice-Admiral Sir John Laforey was in comm.nd of the
station in February 1793, having nearly completed the
appointment for the norma]. term of three years. An officer
with wide experience of the Caribbean, he had served under
Rodney off Martinique in 1762 and later became a naval
commissioner at Antigua. 21 Peace-time conditions had reduced
his squadron to the pitiful level of one small fourth-rate
and three frigates, 22 with which, Laforey had, since 1790,
19. See for example: ADM 2/123: to Rear-Admiral Gardner,
March 10, 1793: Admiralty Orders and Instructions.
20. See chapter 6, p. 271
21. Biographical details in D.NIBS xl, 396; Ralfe 1, 231 - 8;
Charnock vi, 319 - 26; Naval Chronicle, xxv, 177.
22.ADM 8/68: Admiralty Office: Ship disposition lists show
the station strength on January 1, 1792 as:- Trusty, 50; two
32-gun frigates - Blanche, Solebay; one 28, Froserpine; and
sloop Pair r , 16. The same source shows that the Perseus, 24,
was added in April, 1792 but the Solebay and Proserpine left
the station in June and July respectively.
16
watched an alarming growth of naval and military power on the
French islands. A revolt in sympathy with the republican
movement in Prance broke out on Martiniq .ue in October 179023
and was only put down after the arrival of a strong royalist
squadron the following March. 24
 An even more serious civil
war began on San Domingo in August 1791 and spread to Guadeloupe
and Martinique later that year. During 1792, French forces
in the Antilles rose to two naval squadrons, including five
ships-of-the--line, and over 2,000 troops.25
With France and England s-till at peace, there was no
question at this time of a direct clash between these forces
and Laforey's squadron.
	 ut their presence provided a menace
which would become very real once war was declared. Without
a squadron strong enough to undertake more than routine station
work and an occasional token cruise, Laforey did well to prevent
the unrest spreading to the British colonies. An incident
on the island of Dominica at the end of 1792 was typical of the
23.ADM 1/315: Laforey to Stephens, October 29 and
November 16, 1790.
24. ADM 1/315: Laforey to Stephens, March 15 and May 17, 1791.
The royalist Squadron under Admiral Girardin comprised L'Eole, 74
La Pirme, 74; and eight frigates.
25.ADM 1/315: Laforey to Stephens, August U, 1792 and
January 19, 1793. The French squadrons under Admirals
Girardin and de Riviere were seldom both in the Caribbean at
the same time. They -took turns at cruising in North American
waters as far north as Virginia.
17
situation. Placed mid-way between Guadeloupe and Martinique,
Dominica attracted refugees fleeing the civil war from both
islands. Its governor became alarmed at the evidence of
French naval strength in the vicinity and asked Laforey for
help. After some delay, the admiral reluctantly agreed to
station one of his few frigates off Dominica.26
The declaration of war upon Prance on February 1st, 1793
glaring exposed the weakness of the Leewards squadron.
Although four second-line ships were hurriedly sent out during
the month, 27
 no substantial naval reinforcements caine until
the arrival of Laforey's successor in May. For the first
five months of the war therefore the Leeward Islands were
vulnerable and must have sue cunibed had the enemy been free
to act.	 But the struggle between the royalists and republicanE
in the Prenoh colonies continued unabated; the military and
naval forces were turned against themselves and not against
England. In January, f or instance, one of the French squadrons
comnided by the royalist Admiral Rivire sailed to Trinidad
to offer its services to Spain.28
26.WO 6/7: Brigadier-General Bruce (governor of Dominica)
to Laforey, December 2, 1792.
27.ADM 8/68: Admiralty Office: Ship lists. February 1793.
One fourth-rate, Centurion, 50 and two fifth-rates,
Experiment and Woolwieh, 44s, sailed from England for the
Leeward Islands on Pebruary 26. The sloop Nautilus, 16,
sailed on February 6 for the same destinatioii.
28.ADM 1/315: Laforey to Stephens, January 19, 1793.
18
The revolt in the Prench islands prompted the British
government to act in the Caribbean. Here was an opportunity
to regain the British colonies ceded at the end of previous
wars29 and perhaps to seize the Prench possessions. The
moment seemed opportune in March, since Laforey was able to
report that: '... La Plicitê3° with some small armed vessels
is the only sea-force belonging to Prance in these seas at
present'. 31	Initially, however, only operations within
the compass of the small local forces could be contemplated.
Tobago was chosen as the first objective, for political and
strategic, rather than economic reasons. It was the only
British West Indian island, lost during the American War of
Independence, which had not been restored at the Peace of
Versailles. Lying to windward of Spanish-held Trinidad, it
commnrided the sea-passage between Grenada and the mainland.
On April 12th, 500 troops under Major-Genera]. Cuyler
embarked on transports at Bridgetown, Barbados, set sail under
the escort of Laforey's sq.uadron and tl:iree days later landed
at Great Courland Bay, Tobago. They met little enemy
29. St Lucia - conquered during the Seven Years' War and
returned to Prance at the Treaty of Paris, 1763.
Tobago - retained by Prance at the Peace of Versailles, 1783.
30.& frigate.
31. ADM 1/316: Laforey to Stephens, March 14, 1793.
19
resistance and the campaign was over in two days. 32 In
character It was quite unlike the amphibious operations which
were to follow. The Prench inability to intervene, the
entirely local composition of the expedition and its easily-
won success, gave a false sense of optimism for the future.
For the moment, however, Rear-Admiral Alan Gardner's
arrival at the end of April to take over the conimand seemed
to promise further successes. He brought with him from
England a powerful squadron of seven ships of the line and
three frigates, 33
 which at once altered the naval balance of
power in the theatre. Gardner was an experienced commander,
a .ineniber of the Board of Admiralty and knew the Caribbean as
well as his predecessor. 34
 He shared the Government view
that such a force could take advantage of the Prench unrest
to seize the first major objective, the island of Martinique.
The Governor of Barbados, Lieutenant-General Bruce, who had been
chosen military commander of the expedition, was also at first
optimistic of the outcome.
Two other circumstances favoured the enterprise.
32. There are accounts of the campaign in:- Cardew, P.G.:
'The Taking of Tobago, 1793'. J.R.U.S.I. LXX (1925), 411-5.
and William James: The Naval History of Great Britain(1837), vol. 1, p. 127.
33. ADM 8/69: Admiralty Office. List Book: May 1793.
Gardner's squadron comprised: the Queen, 90 (flagship);
Duke, 90; Culloden, Hector, Hannibal, Monarch, and Orion,
74's; and three frigates: Herniione, Sólebay and
Iphigenla, 32's.
34. Biographical details in: D.N.B. vii, 870; Ralfe i,
407-12; Charnook vi, 583.
20
Late in Pebruary the Admiralty learned that an enemy squadron
was about to sail from Brest, with Martinique as its most
probable destination. The intelligence was an additional
reason for the despatch of Gardner. Admiral de Sercey
however did not leave Brest until April 8 and he steered for
San Domingo. 35
 Although Gardner on passage across the
Atlantic happened to make distant contact with the enemy ships,
neither on this occasion nor indeed until June 1794 did a French
squadron appear in the Leeward Islands. 36
 The second bonus
oame from an unexpected quarter. Having failed to come to
terms with the Spaniards at Trinidad, the royalist Admiral de
Rivire suddenly appeared off Barbados early in May with an
offer to surrender his squadron. After an exchange of letters
between Gardner and de Riviere, it was agreed that the royalist
ships should fight alongside the station squadron provided they
retained their separate identity.
In spite of such an auspicious opening, the expedition
against Martinique was doomed to failure. The cardinal error
was made of supposing that a large well-garrisoned island could
be conquered and held, without the use of a considerable number
35. Six, Georges: 'Diotionnaire Biographique ... Amiraux
Prançaie ... ' (1792 - 1814), ii, 448 - 9.
36. ADM 1/316: Gardner to Stephens, April 29, 1793.
The frigate Iphigenia reported sighting an enemy squadron in
mid-Atlantic on Aril 17.
21
of troops. No expeditionary force could be expected from
England for many months. If the attack, therefore, was to
be made before the enemy had had time to recover, it would
have to be delivered by Gardner's squadron and the small
local forcea. It was hoped also the task would be made
easier by support from the Prenoh royalist exiles and by
disaffection on Martinique itself.
Gardner gave no indication in print of his feelings
about the expedition. But the ]aok of protest in his journal
in which as a member of the Admiralty Board he could have
expressed himself forcibly - suggests that he believed naval
superiority alone would be sufficient. Understandably the
military commander, General Bruce, was less confident and
asked for warships to be sent to scour the islands in the
hope of recruiting more soldiers. Gardner gave his reluctant
consent, but the results proved very disappointing. 37 Great
reliance had therefore to be p]aced on the Prench royalist
auxiliaries, who comprised nearly half the military force.
Their leaders, notably the untrustworthy CharmiUy, had first
encouraged the British Government to attack Martinique, even
suggesting that eight hundred troops would be sufficient for
the purpose. The local oomm-nders in the Caribbean certainly
did not share the confidence which Dundas, the Secretary for
37. ADM 1/316: Gardner to Stephens, May 16, 1793.
22
War, placed in the royalists.38
Events fully justified their doubts. Nineteen hundred
troops landed at Martinique on June 14, their transports
having been escorted from Barbados by Gardner's squadron
without incident. But in the face of determined resistance
by the repablican garrison, supported by negro ]evies, the
royalists turned and fled and the operation was completely
abandoned after eight days. 39
 The repulse permanently
discredited the royalists and gave the first warning of the
climate's effect upon the fighting capabilities of the British
troops. It showed, too, the immense value of negro auxilia-
ries, whose resistance to climate and fever more than compen-
sated for their lack of military training.
The naval aspect of the operation also gave little cause
for satisfaction. On two occasions Gardner found his ships
unable to silence the fixed enemy batteries by bombardment.
The smaller vessels carried guns of insufficient calibre,
while the size and unmanoeuvrability of the ships-of-the-line
in restricted waters offered easy targets. Several were
damaged, particularly in the rigging, and their speedy repair
was no easy matter from the limited facilities of the Antigua
38. Portescue ... History of the British Army, vol. iv (part 1)
p. 34.
39. The fullest contemporary description of the Martinique
campaign is in: Cooper Willyains': 'An account of the campaign
in the West Indies in the year 1794 ... ' (London 1796).
23
yard. 4° But the main lesson of the operation was the need
for bomb-vessels. Of shallow draught and mounting two mortars
amidships, they were the ideal weapon against shore batteries.
On the other hand, their specialized function and slow speed
discouraged their general use on overseas stations. The
mortars could only be operated by trained artillerymen and each.
bomb needed a tender to carry its ammunition; both factors
which made their maintenance a problem for local yards. Bomb-
vessels in fact did not appear in the Leeward Islands, until
expeditionary forces were specifically assembled and sent from
England.41
Pollowing the failure against Martinique, Gardner was
made the scapegoat of the Government's mistakes. After less
than five months in command, he was ordered to return home
with the trade convoy on August 1st. 42 Late in the day, the
Government had begun to realize that only the despatch from
England of a large expeditionary force, well equipped in
every department, would gain the objectives they sought. The
officer chosen to lead the naval part of the expedition and
to succeed Gardner, was Vice-Admiral Sir John Jervis. 43 He
40. q.v. ante, pp. 11.12.
41. See pp. 2 (Jervis expedition); 33 (key to map 1).
42. ADM 2/124: Admiralty Orders and Instructions.
Stephens to Gardner, July 1, 1793.
43. Biographical details in: Tucker, J.S.: 'Memoirs of
the Earl of St. Vincent' (2 vole.; 1844); D.N.B., x, 792 -
800; Ralfe 1, 277 - 318; Charnock, vi, 406 - 416.
24
had already given proof of great ability and it was during
his command of the Leewards station, November 1793 to November
1794, that a series of striking successes were obtained.
Many difficulties had first -to be overcome however, which
were only solved by the joint determination and co-operation
of Jervis and his colleague in charge of the military Throes,
Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Grey. Prom the outset they
had to contend with delay and muddle in organizing the
expedition at Portsmouth and Spithead. The original intention
was that it should sail at the beginning of October, soon
after Gardner's arrival back in England. In this way campaign-
ing in the West Indies could have begun at the best time -
during the cool season and when the risk of hurricanes was
over. But events in Europe not only delayed -the start of
the expedition but substantially reduced its numbers. 44 As
a result, although Jervis hoisted his flag at Portsmouth on
October 3rd, the main expeditionary force did not sail for the
West Indies until November 26th, and the stragglers until early
in December. 45
 Moreover, although Grey had originally been
promised 14 regiments, which with the flank companies and
artillerymen amounted to nearly 11,000 men, by the time
44. See chapter 6, pp. 2823.
45.ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, December 12 and 14, 1793.
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the needs of the operations in Flanders and at Toulon had
been satisfied, 46
 only 6,000 remained for the Caribbean
expedition.47
Nor were the difficulties only military; Jervie was
equally perturbed about the size and composition of the naval
force. 48
 After Gardner's return to England with praotiaally
his whole squadron, only the Experiment, 44, the frigates
Beaulieu and Blanche and sloops Rattlesnake and Solebay
remained in the Leeward Islands. Although French naval
strength had indeed declined there, Jervis rightly felt that
the scale of the forthcoming operations entitled him to have
under his command a squadron at least equal. to the seven ships-
of-the-line which his predecessor had had. Owing to commit-
ments elsewhere, the Admiralty could only give him three, or
46. See chapter 6, pp.
47. 'Facts relative to the conduct of the war in the West
Indies; collected from the speech of the Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas
in the House of Commons on th April 1796...' (London;
J. Owen; 1796)
- Appendix No. 1: 'Account of men for Grey's expedition
14 regiments @ 600 rank & file each = 8,400





- Appendix No. 4 shows that only 6,118 troops actually
sailed in Toveiber.
48. ADM 8/69: Admiralty Office-list books: November 1793 -
show that Jervis ultimately sailed with 3 ships-of-the-line,
2 44's, 2 frigates, 2 sloops, a storeship and a bomb-vessel
under his command. One more frigate - the Blonde, 32 - joined
the convoy off Falniouth.
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possibly Thur. Jervie at first refused to proceed on this
basis and only ultimately did so after receiving a categorical
undertaking ±'rorn the First Lord of the Admiralty that the
difference would be made good. But the promise was never
kept and Jervis' own words beet show how badly he was let down:
'When the West India expedition caine into discussion at the
Admiralty in October 1793, Lord Chatham pledged himself to me
that Rear-Admiral Gell, 49
 with one second-rate and two 74-gun
ships should join me at Barbados, and that the Leviathan, after
being new copper-sheathed ... should follow. This assurance
caused my taking a very strong part with Sir Charles Grey,
against the unanimous opinion of all the principal land officers
who maintained that our force was inadequate for the reduction
of Martinique. I never received a letter from Lord Chatham,
or the Secretary of the Admiralty, to inform me that these
ships were countermanded	 Many of the difficulties
which arose during the later months of his comm-'id stemmed
from the numerical weakness of the squadron.
?urthermore, Jervis noticed as regards the composition
of the squadron, what little attention had been paid to the
conditions likely to be met with during the campaign. The
49. At that time in command of four ships-of-the-line and a
frigate in the Mediterranean and wearing his flag in the
St. George, 98. DNB vii, 994.
50. Tucker, J.S.: 'Memoirs of ... the Earl of St. Vincent';(2 vole.; 1844) - I, 103 - 105 reproduces this passage in
a memorandum by Jervie to the Admiralty, which is undated.
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lessons of Gardner's failure at Martinique did not seem to have
been learned. Only after the greatest difficulty was a bomb-
vessel, the Vesuvius, 8, attached to the squadron. Jervis
also discovered that none of the transports were big enough
nor properly equipped with platforms to carry and disembark
field artillery. Against bitter opposition be managed to have
two converted, so that their deoke were strengthened and stern-
ports widened. 51 He was more fortunate on the personnel side,
being able to enlist a number of specialists in transport,
ordnance and supply. The most valuable was the resourceful
Captain John ScharL1, 52 destined -to play an important part in
the forthcoming campaign.
Having set sail from England, the expeditionary force
arrived piecemeal at Barbados during January 1794, with the
loss of only two transports en route. 53 But aboard the troop-
ships twelve hundred men were down with scurvy and there was
no hospital-ship with the convoy. Before the expedition
sailed, Grey and Jervis had agreed upon a joint plan of action.
Successive assaults against Martinique, St Lucia and Guadeloupe
51. ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, November 6, 1793.
52. Sohank's mechanical ingenuity earned him -the nickname "Old
Purchase" in the Navy. Among many achievements was the
development of vessels with sliding-keels, notably the survey-
ship Lady Nelson. DNB xvii, 897 - 898.
53. See Capt. Thomas Southey: 'Chronological History of the
West Indies' (3 vols; Longmans; 1827) vol. 111. Footnotes
to pp. 74 - 75 list Jervie' expeditionary force in detail.
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should be made without delay, before the enemy had time to
retaliate and before the expedition's strength and mobility
were reduced by yellow fever and hurricanes. The objectives
seemed well within the capability of a force which possessed
temporary but overwhelming naval and military superiority in
the area.
All at first went according to plan. The campaign opened
on Pebraary 3rd as the transports with 6,000 troops aboard stood
out from Carlisle Bay, Barbados, under the watchful escort of
Jervis' squadron. 54
 On the 6th three landings were made on
Martinique, which the few French warships in the vicinity - one
frigate at Fort Royal and one corvette at St Pierre - were
powerless to prevent. Bat the small island garrison put up
unexpeotedly stiff resistance. The squadron became fully
involved in supporting the landings, engaging the enemy batteries
and ferrying supplies, while some of the ship's crews were put
ashore to drag the artillery up the steep hill-sides. Captain
Schank's platforms for disembarking ordnance proved highly
successful in operation. The fiercest fighting centred around
the enemy shore batteries defending the main harbour of Port
Royal, vthioh proved impregnable to assault by land. 55
 Their
54. ADM 1/316: Jervie to Stephens, February 11, 1794.
55. Port Royal was protected by two fortifications of considerable
strength: Port Bourbon with entrenchments and batteries on high
ground at the rear of the town; Port Louis with shore batteries
on the sea front blocking the entrance to the 'carenage' and
dockyard.
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guns were spiked only after the sloop Zebra had forced her way
into the harbour under heavy fire •56 Martinique finally
capitulated on March 22nd, giving Jervis possession of Port
Royal, the finest naval base in the Caribbean.
The operation took nxu.ch longer than expected and six weeks
of the short campaigning season had gone. The next objective,
St Lucia, was strategically important because of its fine
harbour of Castries. The island was captured at the beginning
of April, although once again, the smallness of the enemy
garrison did not prevent a bitter struggle for control of its
main defences on the heights of La Morne Fortune. There
remained only the large island of Guadeloupe. Repeating the
methods successfully used in the earlier operations, 3,000 soldiei
were embarked at Port Royal on April 8th. Against slight enemy
resistance, both halves of the island - Grande Terre and Basse
Terre - were invested in succession end occupation completed
on April 21st.57
On that day Jervis wrote triumphantly to the Admiralty:
'I have now the greatest satisfaction in informing you of the
entire reduction of the Prench in these seas •,,,58 it was
56.An exploit made famous by the gallantry of her commander,
Commander Robert Faulkner. See Edward Fraser: 'Pamous
Fighters of the Fleet' (Macmillan; 1904), pp. 172 - 194.
57. See Cooper Willyams': 'An account of the campaign ...'
58. ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, April 21, 1794.
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indeed a remarkable achievement, due to both commanders'
campaigning abilities, the strength of the forces under their
command and the enemy's corresponding inability to retaliate.
April/May 1794 was unquestionably the high-water mark for
British arms in the Leewards Islands during the entire period
between the outbreak of war and the Peace of Amiens.
The triumph however was very short-lived, only to be enjoyed
for seven weeks. Basic elements of strategy, disregarded in
the heat of action, had lain neglected beneath the surface.
Now they rose to assert themselves, first to influence and
ultimately to dominate the situation. Jervis' squadron was
so absorbed in supporting the army in amphibious operations
that its other vital functions were not properly carried out.
The routine of cruiser patrols was seriously interrupted. It
is significant in this connection that the early months of 1794
first witnessed growing activity by enemy privateers. Moreover,
while Jervis was compelled to concentrate his squadron in oxder
to support the attack on each Prench possession, there was every
chance of enemy warships entering the area undetected and
unchallenged.
The time taken to complete the campaign was an additional
undermining factor, which affected the expedition in different
ways. As the weeks went by, Jervis became increasingly restive
at the squadron's exclusive employment in amphibious operations.
Grey found his men exhausted after two months in the tropics and
31
their numbers dwindling from the ravages of yellow fever.
The military oommrnider of Guadeloupe, Lieutenant-General Dundas,
was among the many hundreds who succumbed. With hardly any
reinforcements being sent from England, 59
 the difficulty of
retaining possessions tbtsize of Guadeloupe and Martiniq.ue was
becoming very apparent. Nor was the danger appreciated at
home. In April, Grey was instructed to detach two of his
battalions to Jamaica, for garrison duty at the newly-won base
of Mole St Nicolas on San Domingo.60
The available evidence gives no indication whether Grey
and Jervis realized how insecure were the foundations upon which
their achievement rested. They saw the strength of the military
forces being sapped daily and the squadron's limited resources
squandered. But they did not believe the enemy was capable
of tkfng advantage of these wea]messes. Otherwise, there is
59. Only 2,800 men were despatohed to the station, in the twelve
months, November 1793 - 1794:- 'Facts relative to the conduct
of the war in the West Indies ...' (London; J. Owen; 1796).Appendix 4: Return of men despatched from Europe and America
to the West Indies between January 1793 & April 1796: (extract)
1794.	 March	 2,377April 1 and 28 320
October	 100
In December 2,219 troops were detached from the garrison at
Gibraltar.
60. WO 6/7: Dundas-Grey correspondence, April 12 - May 6, 1794.
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no satisfactory explanation for the complacency which marked
both commanders' ensuing conduct.
At the end of May 1794, Grey and Jervis began a leisurely
tour of the station on board Jervis' flagship, the Boyne, 98,
with the Vengeance, 74, and NautIlus, 16, in company.6'
Instructions were left with the seoond-In-comm,-rid, Rear-Admiral
Charles Thompson, for safeguarding the station with the rest of
the fleet during their absence. 62
 These were unsatisfactory in
several ways • The hurricane season was approaohIng and Thompson
was rightly ordered to keep the main units at safe anchorage In
Trois Islets, Martinique. But no less than thirteen out of the
squadron's remaining twenty-three smaller warships were allowed
to proceed beyond the boundaries of the station on various
duties. A contemporary map of the squadron's dispositions on
June 4th clearly shows the unfortunate results. 63 In particular,
Guadeloupe in the centre and St Vincent, Grenada and Tobago to
the south, were entirely devoid of naval protection.
That day - June 4th - Grey and Jervis had reached St Kitts
on their tour, and the two ships-of-the-line lay quietly at
anchor in Basse-terre roads. The tranquility was shattered by
61.ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, May 25, 1794.
62. Nat. Mar. Mae.: Thompson Papers (THO/4): Original letters
and orders received (November 1793 - December 1794) - Jervis to
Thompson, May 26, 1794.
63. See map 1, overleaf, which is based on the table of squadron
dispositions, attached to Jervis' report to the Admiralty:
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MAP 1. Dispositions of Leewards Squadron.
June 4, 1794
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the arrival of the sloop Resource hastily despatohed by
Thompson from Martinique. It brought news that on June 3rd
a French squadron with transports in company had suddenly
appeared off the coast of Guadeloupe. Fifteen hundred troops
had disembarked and finding no opposition, captured two important
positions on the island. 64
 They had been carried in three
transports and two large ships "en flate", under the weak escort
of two frigates, Thetis and Pique, and one corvette, which had
together sailed from Rochefort on April 23rd. The event showed
what risks France was prepared to take in order to regain
Guadeloupe; the enemy force would certainly have been destroyed
had it been intercepted.
Jervis reacted vigorously to the news; sailing immediately
with the Boyne arid Vengeance from St Kitts, and 'pushing with
press of sail' for Basseterre, Guadeloupe, where he ordered
Thompson to join him with the main squadron from Martinique.
But it was already too late. On arrival off Pointe 'a Pitre,
the combined squadron discovered the enemy safely at anchor in
the inner harbour, sheltered beneath the guns of the Fleur
d'Epe batteries.65
The enemy's descent upon Guadeloupe had the most serious
64.(WO 6/7: Grey to Thindas, (4 despatohes), June 11 - 14, 1794.
(ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, June 13, 1794.
65. ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, June 13, 1794.
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consequences. On board the frigate Thetis was the mulatto
Victor Huguee, appointed commiider of the expedition. In the
months ahead it was his rutbiessnees and fanatical zeal for the
Republican cause which reversed many of the gains which the
British forces had made in the theatre. The strategic results
were equally serious. The enemy force had achieved complete
surprise. Although its wea]mess in fire-power prevented any
challenge to the station's naval superiority, the fact that
Guadeloupe had been invaded so easily demonstrated the ineffect-
iveness of the cruiser patrol screen. Clearly, unless the
station's number of frigates and sloops was greatly increased,
the enemy could repeat the procedure with impunity. Moreover,
Victor Hugues' presence in force on Guadeloupe was as dangerous
a threat to the islands recently captured as to those which had
long been in British possession.
Por the next six months Jervis and Grey tried without
success to dislodge the Prench from their hold upon Guadeloupe.
The initiative had passed to Victor Hugues, whose republican
propaganda found a ready response amongst a negro population,
eager for independence and ready to serve as auxiliaries.
As flugues' military power rose, the fortunes of the British
expeditionery force declined. Yellow fever and dysentery
ravaged the isolated garrisons, until by the end of July only
4,500 men out of the original force of 7,000 remained fit for
36
duty. 66
 In the squadron, the strain of continuous service was
beginning to tell and many of the ships were long overdue for
refits, which could not be carried out by the local yards. No
reinforcements, naval or military, arrived from England during
this period and Grey wrote home, complaining bitterly: '... you
seem to have totally forgotten us' •67
At the beginning of July 1794, the Grande Terre half of
the island had to be evacuated and Grey set up a fortified camp
at Berv-ifle, on the narrow isthmus connecting it with Basse Terre
But the ground was marshy and myrlads of mosquitoes brought
heavy casualties to the fever-ridden garrison. The shallowness
of the coastal waters made supply by sea a hazardous undertaking
for the Navy. By September the camp bad been cut off from the
sea. Although Jervis continued to ferry in supplies by small
craft, the enemy retorted by placing a chain of gunboats across
the shallow bay. 68
 On October 6th the Berville camp was over-
run and ten days later the whole island was in French hands,
with the exception of an isolated and strategically unimportant
garrison at Port Matilda, which held out until December.69
The loss of Guadeloupe proved a turning-point in the war
in the West Indies. As the enemy's last remaining possession
66. Portescue ... History of the British Army, vol. IV (part 1)
p. 385.
67.WO 6/7: War Office Papers. Grey to Nepean (2 letters),
July 18 and 19, 1794.
68. ADM 1J316: Jervis to Stephens, September 26 and October 2,
1794.
69.WO 6/7: Grey to Dundas, October 16 and 24, 1794.
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in the Leeward Islands, it soon became the focus of Prench
resistance and remained in their hands until 1810. It was
from G.uadeloupe that Hugues launched his attempts to gain control
of neighbouring British colonies in 1795 and 1796.70 Even more
important, the island was for many years the main base of the
enemy's privateers. 71 In terma of commid of the sea, the
significance was also far-reaching. Events in the Caribbean
during previous w ars had shown that islands changed hands with
great freq.uency and it might be argued that such losses were
inevitable. But here there was a difference. The harsh truth
had to be faced in 1794 that, in spite of British naval supre-
macy in the area an inferior enemy force had succeeded in
reaching Guadeloupe undetected, landed and taken complete
possession. Unlike earlier wars, Prance did not need to send
a fleet to ensure success; because the seas were wide, the
islands numerous and the patrolling cruisers too few, the door
was wide open to all who came.
Before the evacuation of Guadeloupe, both Jervis and Grey
had given up their commands and returned to England. Jervis
did so partly on health grounds but both had become involved
in a bitter quarrel over the requisition of property at the time
of the occupation of Martinique. Their successors, Vice-Admiral
70. Q.v. post, pp.
71. See chapter , pp. 248-9
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Sir Benjamin Caldwell 72 and Lieutenant-General Sir John Vaughan
were of lesser calibre. Caldwefl was a morose and taciturn
officer, who ever since the action of the Glorious First of
June 1794 had nursed a grievance at being omitted from the
official despatohes. Vaughan stifl carried the stigma of
having been implicated with Rodney in t he confiscation of
property during the capture of St Eustatius in 1782. Neither
of the two new commanders proved capable of restoring the serious
situation which greeted their arrival at Barbados in November 1794
Jdthough Caldwell brought from England a powerful squadron
of nine ships-of-the-line, four more than. Jervis had returned
with, the fire-power of their broadsides was not the answer to
the situation. Only frigates and sloops in large numbers could
protect the trade and check the increasing depredations of enemy
privateers. But Caidwell found almost all the smaller warships
left on the station to be in a desperate condition. 73 Most
needed major refits beyond the capacity of the Antigua yard and,
through disease and desertion amongst their crews, were grossly
undermanned. Vaughan, too, was dismayed to find there remained
only two thousand fit troops under his command, just at the
moment when Victor Hugues was preparing to take the offensive.
72. Biographical details in: DNB III, 700; Ralfe I, 384 - 6;
Naval Chronicle XI, 1.
73. Nat. Mar. Mae.: Caldwe].l Papers (Cal/108): Caldwell's
Journal, November 26, 1794.
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xcept for a email detachment from Gibraltar, 74 no military
reinforcements were forthcoming and the Government continued to
ban the raising of negro regiments.
Caldwell tried to overcome his difficulties in two ways.
He fully appreciated the vital importance of Guadeloupe, as the
main enemy privateer base and the hub, from which the spokes of
Hugu.es' attacks upon the neighbouring islands would radiate.
Since lack of troops prevented its military reoccupation,
blockade by sea was the only alternative. If successful, the
privateers would be hemmed in, the supplies to the island stopped
and the enemy offensive stillborn. In January 1795, therefore,
Caidwell and Vaughan is sued a joint proclamation, which placed
Guadeloupe and the surrounding French-held islands of Deseada
and Marie Galante under close blockade. 75 Neutral vessels
were prohibited access to the area on pain of seizure and cruiser
patrols were sent out to girdle the three islands.
Secondly, Caidwell endeavoured to improve the disposition
of the equadron, to prevent the enemy penetrating the cruiser
screen with the same ease as in June 1794. Unlike Jervis, he
opposed scattering his forces in every civarter of the station,
but preferred concentration around the centre of the island chain.
74. 2,219 troops raised from the garrison. See: 'Facts
relative to the conduct of the war in the West Indies ...'
(London; J. Owen; 1796) appendix 4: 'Return of men from
Europe and America to the West Indies . ..'.
75.Nat. Mar. Mae.: Caidwell Papers (Cal/l08): Caidwell's
Journal, January 29, 1795.
4.0
To some extent, the fact that more ships of the line were
available to him added weight to this plan. A map, based on
the dispositions of the squadron on January 5th 1795, clearly
shows Caidwell's intentions. 76 Concentration, however, was not
the answer. It might have been, had Caidwell become engaged in
a main fleet action; but in fact he faced an elusive opponent
able to inflict a thousand pinpricke, by means of widely-
scattered privateer attacks. The chronic shortage of frigates
and sloops on the station was the real stumbling-block.
Thus neither of Caidwell's solutions succeeded in practice.
Effective blockade proved beyond the capacity of a equadron in
poor condition and without enough ships. Caidwell was soon
pointing out plaintively to the Admiralty that at least six
warships on permanent patrol were needed for auadeloupe alone.77
With little hope of reinforcements from England, he turned in
desperation f or some contribution from the British colonies.
The island legislatures were each asked to fit out at the public
expense: 'a copper-bottomed vessel from sixty to one hundred and
twenty tons, arra'd with ten or twelve guns and carrying thirty
76. ADM 1/317: Caidwel). to Stephens, January 5th, 1795,
enclosing a disposition plan with the report. See map 2.
Compare with Jervis' dispositions six months before (map 1),
when almost the same number of warships were available.
Caldwell's preference for concentration is very apparent.
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to forty men' ,78 for auxiliary service with the Guadeloupe
cruiser patrol. But the request opened up fresh problems.
The colonial assemblies would only subscribe to the protection
of their own islands and did not understand the strategic
importance of blockading Guadeloupe. Moreover, they jibbed
at the expense and disliked the prospect of parting with vessels
which might never return. Only the islands of Antigua and
Barbados made any contribution at all, and the few brigs and
schooners they supplied were too small and lightly-armed to be
of much use. 79 Perhaps Caidweil should have tried to have them
converted in the yards at English Harbour and Fort Royal, but
be was aware of the Navy Board' s reluctance to meet the costs
involved.
All the station comma,ider's efforts failed to prevent the
french reinforcing Guadeloupe in January 1795 and repeating
their success of six months before. The thrust was delivered
by a convoy of ten transports, carrying 3,500 troops and escorted
by five warships, 8° which had sailed from Brest on November 17,
1794.	 1-te safe arrival was vita], to Hugues' cause, especially
78. Nat. Mar. Mae. Caidwell Papers (Cal/ill); Caidwell's letter-
book, January 3rd, 1795.
79. Ibid, March 19th, 1795.
80. Comprising L'Hercule, an old 74, cut down (rae) to 46 guns;
the frigate L'Astre, 36; and three 20-gun sloope, lie Leveret,
La Prompte and lie Duras. The escorts' fire-power and manoeuvra-
bility was affected by their being crowded with soldiers and
stores. lie Duras, for instance, carried 400 troops in addition
to her own crew.
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for his planned offensive against the British Windward Islands.
That it should be undetected was also essential, since the
weakness of the escort made the convoy vulnerable against even
a small part of Caidwell' s squadron. But it was, in fact,
intercepted. Cruising to windward of Deseada, Captain George
Wilson, with Beilona, 74, and Alarm, 32, sighted the convoy on
January 5th and remained in contact for eighteen hours.
Caidwell was at anchor with the main fleet in St Pierre,
Martinique and no other vessels were close enough to Deseada
to intervene in time. 81 Nevertheless, Captain Wilson with his
ship-of-the-line could have seriously damaged the enemy if he
had acted energetically. But he went into action only after
hours of hesitation. The sloop Le Duras was taken with 400
troops aboard, but the whole of the rest of the convoy with its
82
vital cargo, got safely into Pointe a Pitre on January 6th.
The second penetration of the Guadeloupe blockade had
serious repercussions on the Leewards station during the next
eighteen months. Caidweil and Vaughan quickly found evidence
of an enemy offensive in preparation, with troops and vessels
81. See Map 2, page 4t
82. Nat. Mar. Mus. Caldwell Papers (Cal/ill): Caidwell's letter-
book - Caldwell to Rear-Admiral Thompson, January 7, 1795.
ADM 1/317: Caidwell to Stephens, January 15, 1795,
enclosing Captain Wilson's report, dated January 14.
massing at Pointe ) Pitre. 83
 The blockade of the harbour was
tightened, but when Hugues started to use the islands' many
creeks and estuaries for his operations, often under the cover
of night, there was no adequate reply. 'Copper'd small craft
frequently find the means of escaping from the numerous ports
in that island and land amnrunition, men and provisions, which
the ships I am able to afford to oruize round those islands are
not in number sufficient to prevent.' 84 Even when the enemy
were sighted, their small vessels were so fast that Caidwell's
frigates were only able to catch them when the winds were strong
and favourable. It was by these methods that Hugues forged a
link between his base at Guadeloupe and the islands he intended
to conquer.
In March 1795 the storm broke. french forces landed on
Grenada and St Vincent to coincide with negro and Carib uprisings
there. The Governor of Grenada was taken prisoner end the
Carib revolt on St Vincent led to a notorious massacre of
English prisoners on Dorsetshire Hill. Great economic daniage
was inflicted on the Windward Islands; many of the sugar
plantations were destroyed, the canes burnt on St Vincent alone
being equivalent to nearly two-thirds of the annual crop.
Victor Hugues found ready support from many of the local
83. Nat. Mar. J!u.s. Caldwell Papers (Cal/l08): Caidwell's
Journal, February 25 - 26, 1795.
84. ADM 1/317: Caidwell to Nepean, April 16, 1795.
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inhabitants and the British islands only held out, with the
small military garrisons almost besieged in the capitals.85
Severe criticism was levelled at Caidwell, but it was entirely
as a result of the utmost exertions by his squadron that the
Prench raids were not translated into permanent occupation.86
As the weakness of the British defences became apparent,
the enemy grew bolder. Further landings were made on Dominica
and St Lucia, immediately to the north and south of Martinique,
where the main British naval and military forces were based.
These attacks were repulsed, only to be followed in April by
others against the Leeward Islands themselves. An amphibious
landing was made on St Christopher with the support of French
sloops, but driven back due to the loyalty of the local
inhabitants. 87
 Caldwell then learned of an enemy plan to seize
the Du.tch island of St Eustatius, which in their hands would
have placed St Christopher, Nevis and Antigua in great danger.88
Fortunately the attack was abandoned after the signature of a
peace treaty between Prance and Holland in May 1795.
Against this minor gain, the treaty added further problems
to an already critical situation. With Holland now an enemy,
there was every prospect that detachments from her considerable
85.WO 6/7: Vaughan to Dundas, March 23rd, 1795.
86. ADM 1/317: Caldwell to Nepean, March 15, 1795.
87. Ibid... April 16, 1795.
88. Ibid... April 11, 1795.
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fleet, then entirely in home waters, would be sent to defend
her Caribbean possessions. Moreover the French privateers
were bound to gain by free access to the harbours of formerly
neutral islands. More immediately, the treaty raised the
question of the future of the Dutch possessions - the islands
of St Eustatius, Bonaire, Curaçao and the large colony of
Surinani on the South American mainland. The British Government'E
first reaction was to consider an early seizure of the latter,
as a means of extending Guiana colony and threatening the French
at Cayenne. How possibly could Caidwell and Vaughan, however,
with their entire forces thrown into a desperate defence of the
islands, be expected to undertake such an operation? Both
commanders rightly opposed it. 89
 There could hardly be clearer
evidence of the wide gulf which separated strategic theorizing
in London and the actual situation in the command.
As early as March 1795, the Admiralty had decided to
recall Caldwefl, during whose brief period of command the Leewards
station had suffered a series of disasters. Although not
personally responsible for them, he was like Gardner before him,
made the scapegoat of the Government's strategic mistakes.
Caidwell's efforts, too, looked very ineffectual against the
brilliance of Jervis' achievements earlier. By reappointing
Admiral Sir John Laforey to commcind of the station in April 1795,
89. ADM 1/317; Caidwell to Nepean, May 17, 1795.
it may be the Admiralty believed his previous experience might
help retrieve the situation. They were soon to be disillusioned1
The situation had altered too dramatioally.sinoe 1793 to allow
such influence to have any effect.
Arriving at the Leeward Islands in June, Laforey found the
enemy offensive in full flood. Only six days after he took
over the command, St Lucia was evacuated and shortly afterwards
a revolt broke out on Dorninica. Moreover, although the
squadron now possessed eight ships-of-the-line compared with one
small 50-gunner in 1793, command of the seas had been lost.
Laforey was at once given personal proof of this, when the
frigate which brought him to Barbados was chased ±'or fifteen
hours by three enemy cruisers operating from Guadeloupe. 9° In
his first report to the Admiralty he spoke of the poor condition
in which he found the fleet and: 'S.. the great lack of small
ships and seamen which makes it impossible to prevent the enemy
supplying Guadeloupe' .g	 Almost all the British islands in the
command were in serious danger and exposed to a joint foe,
'hoisting French and Dutch flags together'. In the Leeward
Islands to the north, the French were not only using Dutch
St Eustatius as a stepping-atone to further aggression, but
90.L'Heroule, ras 46; L'Astre, 32; La Concorde, 32.
The two first came out with theenemy convoy to thiadeloupe in
January 1795. The latter had been in the West Indies since
the outbreak of war.
9l.LDM 1/317: Laforey to Nepean, June 23, 1795.
their influence was spreading to the neutral islands in those
waters. Both Swedish St Bartholomew and Danish St Thomas in
the Virgin Islands, were being used as fitting-out bases for
small ships and as refuges for the French privateere and their
prizes. It was known that an enemy prison-ship rode at anchor
in St Thomas harbour, with British captives aboard awaiting
shipment to Guadeloupe.92
The strain o± the situation soon led to a breach between
Laforey and his second-in-command, Rear Admiral Charles Thompson,
just at the time when solidarity in. the squadron was essential.
Thompson was a veteran o± Caribbean service. A post-captain
under Hood and Rodney in the actions at St Kitts and the Saintee,
he had subsequently been deputy to four station admirals in turn.
An able and experienced but truculent officer, be openly
resented laforey's reappointment to the post he might have
expeoted to fill on Caidwell's departure.93
Two days after assuming command, Iaaforey ordered his deputy
to break away from escorting a homeward-bound convoy to England
and proceed iinniediately to St Christopher, where the Governor
feared an imminent French attack from St Eustatius. Thompson
obeyed with reluctance and spent only a short time at
St Christopher before taking his ships on to Antigua. There
92. ADM 1/317: Laforey to Nepean, June 23, 1795.
93. Biographical details in DIIN.B. xix, 689; Ralfe ii, 1.
4.9
he received a second urgent message from his admiral; this time
ordering him to return to Martinique. News had come in that
an enemy squadron had sailed from Brest on May 25th, bound for
Guade1oupe, and Laforey determined to concentrate his fleet for
its reception. But the enemy did not appear and instead the
Governor of St Christopher complained bitterly at the lack of
naval protection, mentioning in particular Thompson's desertion
to Antigua. When LaI'orey asked f or an explanation, Thompson
replied with a vehement condemnation of Laforey's entire strategy.
An acrimonious correspondence followed, 94 which ended with
Laforey ordering Thompson' s return to England and court-martial
on charges of disobedience and insubordination. Proceedings
were begun but terminated over a year later, after Laforey's
sudden death on return passage to England in June l796.
The dispute has been described at some length because it
reveals a sharp collision of views regarding command strategy.
Thompson advocated the maximum dispersal of the squadron to give
the best possible protection to the colonies and their trade
against enemy privateers and small warships. Laforey, on the
other hand, preferred concentration as a safeguard against the
arrival of a major enemy force from Prance. Both were sound
solutions to the problems concerned, but the squadron was too
94. Nat. Mar. Mae. Thompson Papers (Tho/8): Orders and Letters
received (March 1795 - December 1796) fully describe the details
of the quarrel.
95. Nat. Mar. Mae. Thompson Papers (Tho/8): Orders and
Instructions ... (.v. ante).
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weak and the seas too wide to allow them to be undertaken
simultaneously. This was the crux of the matter. Laforey's
main reason for adopting a strategy of concentration was the
knowledge that the arrival of an enemy squadron would best be
met by keeping his ships-of-the-line together, with which class
of warship the station was now comparatively well-equipped.96
As a result, the major ships of the squadron lay for weeks at
anchor in Port Royal and St Pierre, Martinique, awaiting an
opportunity to revenge the disasters of June 1794 and
January 1795.
They waited In vain however. Unfortunately for Laforey,
the enemy continued to rely on widespread privateering and
scattered raids by small warships as its main weapon. As
merchant ship losses through privateer action rose steeply
during the later months of 1795, a local outcry arose against
Laforey. Planters, merchants and shipniastere asked themselves
what was the use of Laforey' s ships-of-the-line lying inactive
in harbour, while the enemy privateers did as they wished at sea.
96. The Admiralty List Books (ADW8), if 68 - 76, in the Public
Record Office give annual figures of ship-of-the-line strength
on the Leewards station during the period. There was a sharp
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The fact that such warships were ill-suited for cruising did
not alter their resentment.
Laforey was indeed in a very awkward position. He
bombarded the Admiralty for more frigates and sloops, but few
were sent. Like Caidwell, he tried to obtain brigs and
echooners locally; but as before, the colonies were uncoopera-
tive and the few which were provided proved unsatisfactory in
service. They were invariably unarmed and Laforey could find
no cannon in the royal arsenal small enough to go inside theni.
Purchase and conversion costs were high and paid by the Admiralty
only with reluctance. In August 1795, for instance, nearly
£5, 000 was spent in converting two small sloops at the English
Harbour yard.97
From the autumn of 1795 until the following spring, events
on the station were overshadowed by preparations in England to
send a second major expeditionary force to the Leeward Islands.
As the product entirely of decisions made by the Cabinet and
Admiralty in England, the story of the ill-fated expedition
before it reached the Caribbean - the crisis over the naval
commatider, the exasperating delays in departure - is recounted
elsewhere. 98 Long before it arrived at Barbados, however,
repercussions were felt on the station.
In December 1795, Laforey was informed by the Admiralty of
97. ADM 1/317: Laforey to Nepean, August 6, 1795.
98. See chapter 6: 'Admiralty & Cabinet: 1788 - 1794,' pp.
3t et seq.
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his recall and the impending arrival of the expeditionary force
under -the joint comrn,.rid of Rear-Admiral Christian and General
Abercromby. 99 It had been decided in London that the principal
objective should be the recapture of St Lucia, with the ocoupatioi
of the Dutch colony of Surinam as the secondary aim. But of
-this Laforey was told nothing and for five months he waited on
the station, while the expedition was three times driven back
by gales in the Channel. 10° At last, on March 17th 1796, a
frigate put in at Carlisle Bay, Barbados with -the expedition's
military commander on board. Angry and impatient at -the endless
delays, Abercromby had arrived ahead of -the main expedition, to
begin the campaign in conjunction with Laforey and the local
forces 101
Two things struck Abercromby at once: Laforey's experience
and willingness to help, and the extent to which the campaign's
success depended upon co-operation with the station admiral and
the ships under his command. He did not hesitate therefore to
tell Laforey the expedition's strategic objectives and together
they worked out a joint plan of action. With La±'orey's
squadron, 5,000 troops available in Barbados and a further 1,800
scattered amongst the other islands, they agreed that two
amphibious operations could be undertaken without delay. The
99. ADM 2/ t2	 : Orders & Instructions: Nepean to Laforey.
100. Ibid. (98) pp. 3t6 .t .eq,
101. WO 7/8: Dundas to Abercromby, February 3, 1796, permitting
Aberoromby to set off ahead.
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first was a descent on the Guiana coast, where the settlements
of Berbice, Demerara and Essequibo had asked for British
protection in April. Commodore Parr, with the Malabar, 54,
-three frigates and an armed transport carrying 1,200 men, was
thereupon despatched front Barbados by Laforey. The Guiana
operation ended successfully on May 2nd, after a ten day
campaign. 102 The second and principal objective decided upon
by Aberoromby and Laforey was the recapture of St Lucia. With
the necessary troops embarked and the scluadron's ships-of-the-
line in attendance as escort, the expeditionary convoy weighed
front Carlisle Bay on April 21st, 1796.
On that very day, Admiral Christian appeared in the
roadetead with the leading ships of the main expedition, having
at last got away from Spithead at the fourth attempt on
March 20th. To his utter astonishment, the departing convoy
ignored his arrival and during the afternoon proceeded past him
out to sea en route for St Lucia. Unaware of its purpose or
destination, Christian, who had arrived to take over command of
the station, vented his feelings upon the Admiralty: '... the
Admiral Sir John Laforey being in the act of getting under weigh
with the several divisions of' troops, the particulars and objects
102. Capt. Thomas Southey: 'Chronological History of the West
Indies', vol. III, pp. 117 - 119.
Steel's Naval Chronologist, p. Lxxxiv.
ADM 1/318: Laforey to Nepean, April 22 & May 2, 1796;
Parr to Laforey, May 2, 1796.
of which I presume will be explained to me •,•,•103 The
complaint reveals the confusion into which the command of the
station had fallen. Obviously unable to await a reply from
the Admiralty, which might take six weeks to arrive, Christian
transferred to a frigate and ignominiously set off in pursuit
of the departing convoy. Having caught up with it at Martinique
he obtained a reluctant transfer of command from Laforey just
before the campaign opened.104
St. Lucia was recaptured on May 25th after a month's bitter
fighting in which casualties were heavy on both sides. It was
followed by the re-establishment of control over Grenada and
St Vincent, the centres of the Carib revolt. The Prench could
do nothing to impede the expedition's progress, as their naval
power in the area had dwindled to a few frigates and sloops
stationed at Guadeloupe. In fact their ability to despatch
raiding squadrons or convoys of reinforcement from Prance had
practically ended as a result of commitments in Europe and the
Mediterranean. Nevertheless, rumours to the contrary persisted.
The recall of Rear-Admiral Lessequel, the French naval commander-.
in-chief at Guadeloupe, in May 1796, was thought at first to
herald the arrival of a powerful enemy squadron led by five
103.ADM 1/318: Cbritian to Nepean, April 21, 1796.
104.ADM 1/318: Christian to Nepean, April 22 and 24, 1796.
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ships-of-the-line. It turned out however that this force
was bound for San Domingo.
In fact the main movement of enemy warships on the station
at this time came from the Dutch. At the end of April, a
squadron under Admiral Braak sudden3,y appeared off Cayenne and
Surinam; there was momentary anxiety for the safety of the
Guiana settlements which had been occupied earlier in the
month.' 06 But the fears proved groundless. Braak's crews
arrived sickly and scurvy-ridden and the ships were in a bad
state. For months the squadron lay at anchor in Surinam,
taking no part in enemy operations. Yet its presence - the
familiar "fleet in being" concept of naval strategy - forced
Christian to strengthen the cruiser patrols off the South Anieric
107
coast.
This precaution was Christian's last duty as station
commander. As early as May 1796, the Admiralty had decided
to replace him, only two months after his e1ayed departure from
England. It is difficult to justify the frequency with which
the Admiralty replaced commanders on the Leewards station. No
105. This information came to Christian in an anonymous letter,
dated May 8th, 1796, sent by an agent residing in Basseterre,
Guadeloupe.
106. q, .v. ante, p. 3.
107. ADM 1/318: Commodore Parr (senior officer off the Guiana
coast) to Christian, May 12, 1796. The Thitch squadron consisted
of one 54, two 36-gun frigates and two eloops.
56
doubt the old practice of a three-year appointment had to be
modified in time of war. But since the end of Laforey's first
tour in May 1793, no less than six changes had been made.108
The command's stability inevitably suifered. Moreover, the
station's routine administration was further disorganized by
the arrival of two major expeditionary forces from England
during the same period.
However, the next station admiral, Rear-Admiral Sir Henry
Ioq
Harvey, took over in June 1796 and remained in command the full
three years. It was an indication not only of his ability but
of a slacking of the tension and pressure of major events on
the station.	 Indeed by the end of 1796, the French effort in
the Lesser Antilles was nearly exhausted. Only a few frigates
and sloops still operated from their sole remaining possession,
Guadeloupe. Victor Hugues had returned to Prance and the revolt
he had instigated was crushed. At one stage Harvey had twelve
ships-of-the-line under him - far more than bad been available
to his predecessors11 ° - but some of these gradually transferred
elsewhere as the station's needs became simplified. The obliga-
tion to support the army in amphibious operations no longer
existed, so that more warships were available for the protection
108. See Appendix 1 (a): Naval commiariders-in-chief - Leeward
Islands.
109. Biographical details in D.N.B. ix, 88 - 89; Ralfe ii,
98 - 112.
110. Compare details in ADM/8: Admhalty list Books, ft. 68 - 76
See footnote (96).
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of the islands and their trade. On the other hand privateering
on a large scale remained the enemy's principal weapon of offence
and its control was Harvey's main concern. Although still
insufficient, the number of smaller warships in the squadron had
increased steadily. A study of the dispositions of Harvey's
ships on July 1st, 1796 shows clearly how much easier arid more
effective protection of the station had beoome.
Yet Harvey was faced by developments, unknown to his
predecessors, which resulted in the focus of squadron activity
being transferred from Guadeloupe and the northern reaches of
the station, down to the Windward Islands, Trinidad and the
Guiana coast. The cause of this strategic change was Spain.
Step by step during 1796 Spain had drawn closer to Prance.
By a clause in the Treaty of Madrid signed on August 19th, each
power agreed to form a combined fleet of fifteen ships-of-the-
line and ten frigates in readiness for joint action. Although
Spain was still neutral at this time, the decision had immediate
repercussions in the West Indies. In July the Admiralty learned
that a French squadron of seven ships-of-the-line and three
frigates under Admiral Richery was preparing to sail from Cadiz,
with Guadeloupe or San Domingo as its most likely destination.
Also at anchor in the harbour lay a Spanish squadron of eight
ships-of-the-line commanded by Vice-Admiral Solano. 112
 It
111. See map 3. The information was compiled from a disposi-
















MAP 3. Dispositions of Leewards Squadron.
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seemed probable that a combined cruise was being prepared,
especially since Solano might sail to Havana, Port of Spain or
Cartagena without any fear of being challenged. To meet the
-threat, the Admiralty ordered the station comin.riders of Jamaica
and the Leeward Islands to join forces and rendezvous their
squadrons at St. Nicolas Mole, San Domingo. It was very fortu-
nate -that this instruction did not have to be carried out.
Had Harvey taken his squadron to San Domingo, the entire Leewards
station would have been left defenceless against Richery's
arrival at Guadeloupe or the combined Pranco-Spanish squadrons
at Trinidad. The suspense continued during July and August and
the Admiralty only discovered the enemy movements many weeks
later. In fact Riohery's squadron had sailed independently from
Cadiz on August 4th, bound for Newfoundland. Solano did like-
wise a few days later, en route for Havana, where he arrived on
September 6th with five ships-of-the-line.113
On October 6th, 1796 Spain declared war upon the enemies
of Prance. Events in Europe precipitated the crisis, but in
the background lay her age-old resentment of British colonial
activity in the Caribbean. The occupation of Tobago 4 and the
112)The Richery incident is documented in:
113) ADM 1/319: Harvey to Nepean, July - November, 1796, and
Spencer Papers (N.R.S.) vol. iii, pp. 215 - 221; 228 - 242.
114. q.v. ante, P . f3.49•
60
landings on San Domingo115
 were regarded as the most recent
examples of foreign interference in her ancient Empire. But
Spain lacked the means of defending her Caribbean possessions.
Although strong on paper, the Spanish navy had deteriorated as a
result of years of inactivity and corruption. In addition to
Admiral Solario's sQuadron, recently arrived at Havana, there
were warships stationed in Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Trinidad
and in ports along the Spanish Main. But they were mostly
frigates and sloops in appalling condition and without proper
crews to man them. Curiously, Prance at first gained most by
the Spanish declaration of war in October. As the vulnerable
Spanish colonies drew the British forces southwards like a
magnet, so the pressure upon Guadeloupe was relieved. The
myriad harbours and creeks of the Spanish possessions became
openly available to the Prench privateers, and by the end of
1796 nearly three hundred were operating from them.
The opportunity to acquire, with little apparent risk,
more colonies in the Caribbean at the expense of Spain was an
irresistible temptation to the British Government. Instructions
were given to Harvey's squadron and the military forces to prepare
for successive assaults on Trinidad and Puerto Rico. But the
attack on Trinidad was delayed until February 1797, mainly
because of the appalling casualties suffered by the army in the
115. q.v. chapter 2, pp. 78-9.
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Caribbean.	 In the Leeward Islands alone, 2,500 troops had
died of yellow fever in the summer of 1796 and in the whole
theatre the death roll had reached over 40,000 since the
beginning of the war. 116
 Paced with such slaughter, even the
Government was momentarily deterred. Dirt it was not prepared
to forego the prize and sanctioned the expedition early in 1797,
the only proviso made being that the campaign should be as short
as possible.
General Abercromby was recalled from England to lead the
military force and the expedition's preparations at Martinique
were completed by the end of January. On February 12th, Harvey'
main squadron117
 set sail from Port Royal and linked up with the
convoy carrying 4,000 troops, off the Grenadines. Trinidad
was reached four days later and in Shaggaramue Bay, Harvey
surprised a Spanish squadron of four ships-of-the-line and a
frigate.'18
 Catnumbered and badly undermanned, Rear-Admiral
de Apodaca set fire to his ships during the night of February
17th, and the squadron were only able to rescue one 74, the
San Darnaso, from the conflagration. At one stroke Harvey had
116. Portescue: History of the British Army, vol. i, p. 96,
117. Comprising 5 ships-of-the-line, 2 frigates, 5 sloope and a
bomb-vessel. See Capt. Thomas Southey: 'Chronological History
of the West Indies', vol. III, p. 136.
118. The San Vincente, 84, (flagship); Gallardo, 74; Arrogante,
74; San Damaso, 74; Santa Cecilia, 36. Steel's Naval
Chronologist, xxxv.
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eliminated Spanish naval power in the Eastern Caribbean.
The capitulation of Trinidad followed immediately.119
After triumph at Trinidad, came failure against Puerto
Rico. The early stages of both operations, however, were very
similar. On April 8th, 1797 transports with 3,500 troops on
board sailed from Basseterre, St Kitts, heavily escorted by
Harvey's squadron. Ten days later the troops disembarked on
Puerto Rioo. But there the similarity ended. The defences
of the main town, San Juan, proved unexpectedly strong; in
particular the fortifications around Ii Morro castle were
impregnable to bombardment by sea. Nor could the troops make
any progress ashore, where the land forts encircling San Juan
were proof against enfilade. After only two weeks' effort,
Harvey and Abereromby had to agree upon an evacuation. It was
obvious that a protracted and costly campaign, expressly
discouraged by the Government, lay ahead° The repulse at
Puerto Rico confirmed Abercromby's growing doubts concerning
the value of further Caribbean operations. His return to
England in August 1797 coincided with the Government's decision,
long demanded by the Treasury, to do nothing further.
119. Aocouts of the Trinidad Campaign are in: ADM 1/320:
Harvey to Nepean, Pebruary 1, 1797 and, secondary sources;
James ... ii, 109 et sq; Southey ... iii, pp . 136 - 137.
120. ADM 1/320: Harvey to Nepean, May 2nd, 1797.
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Naval operations during the remainder of Harvey's command
were confined to trade protection and cruising against the
privateers. The conclusion of the island campaigns in 1797
indeed marked the station's end as a theatre of major operations.
This trend continued, with minor exceptions, under Harvey's
successors until the Peace of Amiens in March 1802. Admiral
Lord Hugh Seymour in the late summer of 1799 captured the Dutch
colonies of Surinam121 and Curaçao, 122 Pinally his successor,
Rear-Admiral Duckworth, used the squadron to seize the Swedish
island of' St Bartholomew in March l80l.23
Per over six years, the Leeward Islands station had been an
important theatre of war. At the outset the weakness of the
squadron had placed the British colonies in jeopardy. Had the
french not been distracted by revolts in their own possessions,
they must have made substantial. gains. Conversely, if the
Leewards squadron had been adequate in 1793 it would have been
able to take advantage of the disunity in the Prench islands.
This initial unpreparedness cost dear for it was only during the
Grey-Jervis expedition of 1794 that the initiative was regained
and the squadron became properly equipped to play its part. But
121. Southey ... III, 163; Steel ... lxxxvii.
122. Ibid ... III, 174 - 175
123. Ibid.... III, 189; Steel ... lxxxviii; Naval Chronicle,
xviii, 15.
6much of the power was dissipated in supporting the army during
the many amphibious campaigns which followed. Thus the enemy
were allowed to recover in 1795 - a disastrous year, in which
Guadeloupe remained in French hands, Victor Hugues' campaign
reached its climax and enemy privateering grew alarmingly. The
situation was restored only with the eventual arrival of the
second expeditionary force in March 1796, and the oampaign
of reconq.uest which followed. The entry of Spain and Holland
to the ranks of the enemy in 1796 enlarged and complicated the
station's problems but in no way threatened its control over the
area. Overcoming the suppleness and cunning of the French
"guerre de course" remained the greatest difficulty; above all,
operating against large numbers of enemy privateers with
insufficient small warships in the squadron. 124
 With this
notable exception, it was clear by 1798 that, despite numerous
mistakes and reverses and at great cost in men and arms, full
naval and military control of the area had been gained.
124. One secondary authority suggests that by 1801, enemy
privateering in the Leewards station bad practically ceased:
Southey ... III, 189: 'Privateering seems nearly to have been
given up ... only one French and one Spanish privateer are said
to have been taken in those seas'. But this view is belied by
the numerous references to privateers contained in the station
admiral's journals, 1799 - 1801.	 (ADM 1/322 - 1/323).
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CHA.PJER 2
JAIkICA AND TBE STRUGGLE P
SAN DOMIN(O, 1793 - 1798
Many of the problems which confronted the conimrniders-in-
chief of the Jamaica station during the period were similar
to those experienced by their colleagues in -the Leeward Islands.
Protecting yulnerable colonies, organizing convoys to England
and cruiser trols against the enemy t s privateers were
responsibilities common to both. So, too, was the onerous
duty of giving continuous support to the army in numerous
amphibious operations. Administrative problems inherent to
an overseas station fell equally heavily on both - the difficult
of manning and victualling the squadron, the inadequacy of the
local dockyards and -the chronic shortage of warships, especially
frigates and sloops. Likewise hurricanes and yellow fever
prevailed throughout the Caribbean.
Yet there were striking points of difference between the
two, which necessitated an alternative strategy on the Jamaica
station. In one respect the naval commander there was very
fortunate in being mainly concerned with the protection of one
large island, Jamaica itself, and not a large number of
scattered colonies. Admittedly, his comiwid embraced the
entire Bthtms group and the logwood settlennts on the
Honduras shore but these always remained subsidiary to the
economic and strategic importance of Jamaica, which had been
66
a Britiah possession since 1655. On the other hand the
advantage of having mainly to protect one large island was
reduced by its geographical position. Whereas the Lesser
Antilles formed the mouth of the Caribbean, Jamaica lay in
its throat. Situated far dcwn the Gulf of Mexico, its sea-
routes were dominated by the proximity of enemy-held Cuba,
San Domingo and Hispaniola. Moreover, the direction of the
prevailing winds fcced all the outward-bound trade from
Jamaica to sail through the Windward Passage or the Yucatan
Channel en route to North America and Europe.125
The most important differences between the two commcmds,
however, were political in. origin. The series of revolts
which had broken out In the French West Indian islands before
1793 ran dissimilar oourses. Those on Guadeloupe, Martinique
and elsewhere in the Lesser Antilles, either subsided or were
ultimately absorbed by British occupation. 126
 This was not
so on San Domingo. There the revolt grew in dimensions until
reaching a climax in the triumph of Toussaint l'Ouverture and
the evacuation of the British forces in 1798. For six years
the struggle between France, Britain and Its native inhabitants
for possession of San Domingo dominated the theatre nd inevit-
ably the Jamaica squadron was drawn into the vortex. Such
125. See map 4, p. 67.































MAP 4. The Jamaica Station.
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concentration upon one area contrasted sharply with events
in the Leeward Islands, where events ebbed and flowed from
one island to the next. Finally the attitude of Spain could
never be ignored by the station admiral at Jamaica. After
she entered the war on the French side in October 1796, the
proximity of Cuba and Hispaniola and the vulnerability of the
logwood settlements on the Mosquito shore were arguments which
necessitated an adjustment of comm'uid strategy.
San Domingo intruded upon the station's affairs long
before the Anglo-French declaration of war in February 1793.
Disturbances amongst the native population broke out early in
1791, following the publication of egalitarian decrees by the
National Convention in Paris. The revolt was crushed with
great severity after the arrival of a squadron under Admiral
de Girardin, bringing 6,000 troops to the aid of the white
settlers. 127 Restoration of order, however, was shortlived
and the prelude to more serious upheavals. Further decrees
passed in the National Assembly, including one which granted
full citizenship to all French colonists, provoked a second
negro uprising and by midsummer 1791, the island was engulfed
in civil war. In September the white settlers outlawed the _
decrees and proclaimed their adherence to the royalist cause.
By the end of the year over 100,000 rebels were in arms on
127. Leon Gurin: 'Histoire de ].a Marine Contemporaine de
France' (Paris; 1855); p. 117.
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San Domingo and both Admiral do Girardin, the French naval
commander-in-chief, and General Behague, the military governor,
admitted the situation was beyond their control.128
Britain long remained a spectator of these events, under
Pitt's policy of strict neutrality. Urgent appeals for inter-
vention, both by the San Domingo settlers to the Governor of
Jamaica and by Monsieur de Charmifly' a royalist delegation in
London, fell upon deaf ears. The furthest that Pitt and
Grenvifle would go was to authorize reinforcement of the Jamaica
garrison. This was clearly necessary, since large numbers of
refugees from the civil war in San Domingo were pouring into
Jamaica. There was danger, too, of the rebellion spreading
to the British colony, where the plantation slaves were becoming
restless. Three infantry battalions were therefore sent from
England during 1792 and smaller detachments arrived later from
Cork, Gibraltar and Halifax, Nova Scotia.
The Jamaica squadron was at that time in no position to
take positive ac-tion. Its commander since June 1789, Rear-
Admiral Thilip Affleck, 129
 had for three years never more than
a handful of frigates and sloops at his disposal. 13 ° When he
128.Lon Gue'rin: 'Histoire de la Marine Contemporaine do
France (Paris; 1855); pp. 121 - 122 and Bryan Edwards':
'History of the West Indies' (i.ii.a;1ao; vol. III - 'History
of San Domingo', pp. 98.9.
129. Biographical details in: D.N.B. 1, 17]. - 172;
Charnock vi, 346; Naval Chronicle xxi, 445.
130. See over.
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gave up the command in May 1792, his final report to the
Admiralty ended with the words: 'this island (Jamaica)
expresses much uneasiness at so little force being left for
their protection' 	 Indeed the weakness of the squadron,
without one single ship-of-the-line, persisted into the early
months of 1793. The presence of two french squadrons,
including first-rates, cruising off San Domingo and Martinique
added to the anxiety. Although their purpose was to assist
in quelling the revolts on those islands, it was obvious that
in the event of war they would be a serious threat to Affleck's
force. In another direotion, the Jamaica squadron's ability
to operate efficiently was in jeopardy. Two days before the
war broke out, a report prepared for the Navy Board revealed
that the state of the main naval base at Port Royal, Jamaica,
was far from satisfactory. 132 Although the careening wharves
and capstan houses were in reasonable repair, the mast-house
130. ADM 8/66 and £DM 8/68: Admiralty office, Ship list
Registers - Jamaica Station:
i. December 179 0 4 frigates - Blonde, Diana, Centurion, Juno;
5 sloope - Brune, Alert, Sèipen, Uygnet, Hound.
ii. November 1792 4 frigates - Penelope, Proserpine, Triton,
- Hyaena; 5 sloops - Falcon, Flirt, Serpent, Cygnet, Eounc
131. ADM 1/244: Affleok to Stephens, May 20, 1792.
132. ADM 1/245: Report by Naval. Storekeepers of the Jamaica Yard,
William Smith and Hugh Plehey to the Commissioners of the Navy
Board, January 31, 1793.
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and store magazines were structurally decayed and seriously
understocked. Other warehouses, sheds and boat-houses at
Kingston and Greenwich were found to be in the same condition.
In spite of these difficulties the squadron did its best
to assist the victims of the civil war in San Domingo. In
September 1791, Affleck sent his ships in to Port-au-Prince and
Cap Pranqois to embark refugees, although by so doing he left
the entire defence of Jamaica in the hands of two sloops. Two
months later one of his frigates escorted merohantmenbringing
food to the port of Aux Cayes, where the besieged white settlers
were in danger of starvation.133
These gestures by themselves could not affect the general
situation on San Domingo which became increasingly chaotic.
At the end of 1791 the whole eastern part of the country was
in rebel hands. Although a Prench squadron of two ships-of-
the-line and five frigates under Admiral Grimouard arrived at
Cap Prançois with a oonvoy of military transports, order was
not restored. Prance made one last attempt to do so in March
1792, when she despatohed three civil commissioners to San
Domingo, with powers to dissolve the colonial assemblies and
act as mediators between the white settlers and the negro rebels.
The results proved very different to what was intended. Two
of the commissioners - Santhonax arid Poverel - were fanatical
133. ADM 1f244: Affleok to Stephens, September 13 and
December U, 1791.
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republicans, who within weeks of their arrival at Cap Pranois
had identified themselves with the cause of the rebels. They
utterly refused to accept the white settlers' point of view,
condemning many of them as royalists. By the end of 1792,
two admirals, the military governor and the president of the
13*San Domingo Assembly had been removed from office.
Par from relieving the chaos, the commissioners' dictatorial
methods only sucoeeded in aggravating it. By alienating the
white settlers they drove them to summoning outside aid; by
supporting the negro rebels they encouraged their hopes of
achieving complete independence. Furthermore, the successive
dismissals of two naval commanders-in-chief in six months
seriously weakened French naval strength in the area.' 35
 In
June 1792, Admiral Grixnouard was spnt backi France with three
ships-of-the-line and two frigates, 136
 which were not replaced.
His successor, Admiral Girardin, stayed at Cap Pran9ois until
January 1793 with a force greatly superior to the Jamaica
squadron. 137
 But just before war was declared he too was
dismissed and returned home with most of his squadron.138
134, 135. Leon Guerin: 'Histoire de la Marine Contemporaine de
France', p. 155; p. 172.
136. Bore, 74; Duay-Trouin, 74; Pougeux, 74; Uranie, 36;Prudente, 36.
137. Three ships-of-the-line and one frigate were based at Cap
Franois (L'Eole, 74; America, 74; Jupiter, 74; Surveillant, 3
Two more frigates and three sloops alternated between ort-au-
Prince, St. Marc and Port-de-Paix, as the situation demanded.
138. Lon Gurin ...: p. 211.
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Even the outbreak of war in February 1793 had no immediate
effect upon the situation in San Domingo and seven months passed
before Britain intervened. The reason for the delay was milit-
ary and naval unpreparedness. Having ultimately decided to
act, the nation did not immediately have the means to do so.
Britain's small military forces were tally occupied in Europe
and there was no prospect of an overseas expedition being
despatched f or some time.
When Commodore John Ford arrived at Port Royal on
January 3rd, 1793, to assume command, he brought only one small
ship-of-the-line139 to augment the station force of four frigates
and five sloops. It did not take him long to realize the
squadron's inadequacy. As soon as war was d eclared he ordered
it to moor in a crescent outside Port Royal in. order to protect
the dockyard. Nor was lack of numbers the only difficulty.
Appeals for naval protection reached him simultaneous1 from
the north coast of Jamaica, the Bahamas, the Turks and Caicos
Islands and the Bay of Honduras. Clearly the small squadron
could not satisfy them all. In May, the President of Turks
Island thanked Ford f or sending the sloop Serpent, but added
that she alone would not remove the threat from San Domingo:
'... we shall, as soon as the enemy can man their privateers,
receive an unwelcome visit from them in our defenceless state' •14(
139. LMIIS. Europa, which became the squadron flagship.
140.£DM 1/245: President Andrew Murray to Ford, May 28, 1793.
74.
Two of the Bahama islands sent similar warnings. The Governor
of New Providence described how Nassau had been blockaded for
weeks by a French frigate lurking outside the harbour.
According to his evidence no British warship had been seen in
their vicinity since the outbreak of war, except for one sloop
which had brought in a prize and then promptly left. 141
 In
April the assemblies of Great and Little Exuma urgently req.uested
Ford for a sloop to cruize amongst their islands 'against enemy
and ploaroon privateers'.142' 143 At the same time he heard
from the British consul at Charleston, Virginia, that large
numbers of French privateers were fitting out in that harbour.
Ford had to meet the situation with the very limited
forces at his command. Two examples of how he disposed his
ships in the early months of 1793 clearly show the difficul-
ties.144
 Not only was the squadron far too small. Convoy
duty, cruising off San Domingo and the number of ships refitting
at Port Royal - were all factors which speedily exhausted its
capacity. As a result, naval protection of the Bahamas, Turks
and Caioos, Cayinan Islands and Windward Passage was either very
141. ADM 1/245: Governor Dunmore to Ford, April 26, 1793.
142. ADM 1/245: Memorial and petition by Committee ... ofGreat and Litt1eExuma to Ford, September 7, 1793.
143. In fact it was not until September 1795 that the Admiralty
transferred naval responsibility f or the Bah&mas from the
cornmandex'-in--chief, Jamaica to the oommder-in-chief, North
America station.
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MAP 5. Disposition of Jamaica Squadron a)ApriI 14, 1793
b)June 9, 1793
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temporary or completely non-existent. Nor could Ford spare
one warship to cruise off the north coast of Jamaica against
privateers 145
The acute lack of warships compelled the station admiral
to resort to requisitioning local vessels. In June 1793 for
instance a 60-ton schooner was purchased, armed with four
3-pounders and commissioned as H.M.S. Spitfire. Nearly half
the total squadron at this time consisted of schooners. But,
as on the Leewards station, their performance in service was
disappointing and cost of conversion high. 146
 In fact Ford
had to wait over a year before worthwhile additions were made
to the squadron locally. Two French corvettes, L'Actif and
La Libert, captured independently off San Domingo in March 1794,
were speedily commissioned in the Royal Navy and proved ideal
in service.'47
Until late in 1793, therefore, there was no prospect of
the Navy providing adequate support to landings on San Domingo.
This inability to intervene at a most opportune moment was to
have disastrous consequences. For six months the French colony
was practically defenceless, but thereafter the chance for
British forces to chieve complete occupation never recurred.
When the landings were made, the initial progress was encouraging.
144, 145. See Map 5, p.75.
146.See Chapter 1, pp. 5.
147..LDM 1/245: Ford to Stephens, April 3, 1794.
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But the Prench had been given time to recover; even more
important, the negro revolt had reached beyond the stage in which
it might have been controlled. In the first half of 1793,
San Domingo was an open door; by the autumn, it was half-ajar
and beginning to close.
British intervention however did not take place until
September 1793. The Governor of Jamaica had earlier been
instructed to accept any offers of capitulation from San Domingo.
In July the leader of the Prench royalists in London told Du.ndas,
the 8ecretary for War, that two coastal towns in the south-west
pen.ninsula - Jrrnie and Grand Anse148- were prepared to
surrender to a British force. 149
 At the same time a certain
Major Caries, a member of the San Domingo House of Assembly,
was captured at sea by a Ba1imis privateer and taken into Nassau.
There he disclosed that the key base of Mole St. Nicolas was
egually anxious to receive British protection. Caries was
hurriedly sent on to Jamaica to bring the news to the Governor.150
Upon receiving this information from the latter, the Cabinet at
last decided to act and in August a convention was signed
between Charmilly and Dundas declaring the colony a British
148. See Map 6: San Domingo, p.99.
149. WO 7/8: M. de Charmifly to Dundas, July 16, 1793.
150. ADM 1/245: Pord to Stephens, July 22, 1793.
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protectorate. Prom this moment and not before, Britain and
her forces on the Jamaica station became directly involved in
San Domingo.
Plans were hurriedly drawn up to occupy Jr6mie and Mole
St. Nicolas. But the logistic difficulties soon became
apparent. Only 900 soldierswere immediately available from
the Jamaica garrison and the escort of even such a small force
would require most of Ford's squadron. Nevertheless on
September 9th, the Europa, two frigates, a sloop and three
schooners sailed from Port Royal with the expeditionary force
under Lieutenant-Colonel Whitelocke
	 Only two small war-
ships remained behind to guard the whole station: the frigate
Penelope, cruising off the north coast of San Domingo, and the
sloop Hound in the Bay of Honduras.
In spite of lack of numbers the expedition gained immediate
success, the continuing chaos on the island preventing the French
from opposing the landing. J6r4mie was occupied on September
19th without a shot being fired and three days later the strate-
gically vital anchorage and fort of Mole St. Nicolas was in
British hands. In Ford's words the latter presented:
the extraordinary spectacle of one of th,e finest harbours
in the West Indies, guarded with, one hundred cannon, being in
the quiet possession of one fifty-gun ship.' 152
 The capture
151.ADM 1/245: Same to same, September 12, 1793.
152.ADM 1/245: Ford to Stephens, September 26, 1793.
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of the Mole was a major strategic success. It dominated the
Windward Passage, through which the bulk of the Jamaica trade
passed homeward-bound to England. It was a manor resort of
enemy privateers and, moreover, the most suitable base for the
Jamaica sq.uadron after Port Royal.
The French were in no doubt as to the seriousness of the
loss and in October made two attempts to retake the Mole.
Commissioner Santhonax marched overland at the head of 5,000 men
and got as far as Port-de-Paix. There lie was halted by the
terrain; ahead lay the impassable mountains of the Nord Ouest
Massif, with no roads and little water. 153
 He then tried a
flank attack along the north coast, embarking his men in armed
transports and local craft. But two of Ford's frigates
blockaded the enemy flotilla in Port-de-Paix and Santhonax was
repulsed 154
Five more coastal towns fell to British arms during 1793
against little resistance. 155
 Their possession gave the equadron
156partial control of the Bight of Leogane.
	 But these successes
concealed a potentially dangerous situation. As more positions
were occupied it became necessary to divide and then subdivide
153. Lon Gurin: 'Histoire de la Marine Contemporaine de
Prance', p. 279.
154. ADM 1/345: Ford to Stephens, October 27, 1793.
155. Jean Rabel, St. Marc, L'Arcahaye and Boucassin in the 'north;
Léog.ne in the south. See map 6.
156. See map 6, p. 99.
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a foroe which had been small in the first place. Without
rein.foroements or protection against yellow fever the isolated
garrisons began to dwindle. By December only 400 troops
remained at Jr6inie, 200 at the Mole and even less elsewhere.
Quite soon the mood of the local inhabitants, who had at first
welcomed the British, changed when they realized such smafl
numbers gave them no protection against the French or the rebels
Colonel Whitelooke and Governor Williamson sent urgent
appeals for military rein!orcements without success. Du.ndas,
the Secretary for War, could only promise the despatch of two
battalions during 1794 . 15 7 Misled by the easily-won success
o± the campaign so far, he shared in the general optimism at
home, which failed to understand the very real anxieties felt
by the commander in San Domingo.
Even in its early stages, the demands of the campaign
fell as heavily upon the navy as the army. The fact that
Ford's small squadron already had more duties than it could
cope with has been noted. To these were now added more patrols
off the San Domingo coast and the ceaseless ferrying of men, and
supplies to the isolated garrisons. Suriounded by a hostile
hinterland the latter utterly depended on the Navy for survival.
At the end of 1793 over three-quarters of the squadron were
concentrated in San Domingan waters, to the detriment of the
157. W0/6/5: Dundas to Governor Williamson, December 4, 1793.
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rest of the station.158
The only solution to this problem was a larger squadron
but throughout the whole of 1793 not a single major warship
joined the station. The need became so desperate in both
Jamaica and the Leeward Islands that quarrels broke out
between their comrn-riders-in-ohief.	 In June 1793 the Admiralty
assured Ford that two ships-of-the-line and two frigates would
be transferred to him from the Leewards station after the
Martinique campaign. When, it failed Vice-Admiral Gardner
sent only one frigate, with a curt note that the a ituation did
not allow him to supply the others. Ford was furious and
complained to the Admiralty but without satisfaction.159
For the Jamaica comjnand,1794 was a year of mixed fortunes.
In the early months two import gains were made on San Domingo,
which continued to hold the centre of the stage. Tiburon,
at the apex of the southerm.ost of the two peninsulas which
jutted far out in-to the Windward Passage, was taken by
amphibious assault in February. 16° Apart from its strategic
position, the place was a notorious refuge of privateers.
It was followed a few weeks later by the capture of another
privateer stronghold, Aux Cayes, which left most of the coastal
158. A diepositiorlist attached to Ford's r port to Stephens,
November 24, 1793, shows this to have been so. (ADM 1/245).
159. ADM 1/245: Ford to Stephens, July 6, 1793.
160. Capt. Thomas Southey: 'Chronological History of t West
Indies', vol. III, p. 88.
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towns of the southern peninsula in British hazxls.161
The summer of 1794 marked the high-water mark of British
achievement. It had always been thought, both in London and
Kings-ton, that the occupation of Port-au-Prince would have a
decisive effect upon the campaign. It was the country's
most heavily-populated city, the chief port and administrative
capital. Around lay the numerous sugar plantations of the
fertile cul de sac plain. Both Governor Williamson and Ford
rightly refused to embark on such a considerable operation
until reinforcements arrived from England, for which they
estimated at least 5,000 troops were needed. 162 After weeks
of waiting a convoy including military transports arrived at
the Mole on May 18th; on board were three infantry regiments
under Brigadier Whyte which had embarked at Cork?63
 To Ford's
satisfaction, the escort of two ships-of-the-line and a sloop
was attached to his squadron.164
Although the rainy season bad begun and the command was
beginning to suffer severely from yellow fever, Ford and Whyte
agreed upon an immediate expedition against Port-au-Prince,
before the disease spread to the new arrivals and tbe favourable
161. The most important exception was Jacinel, a key enemy
privateer base.
162. WO 6/5: Governor Williamsonto Dundas, February 9, 1794.
163. Ibid. The force totalled 1,600 men.
164. Irresistible, 74; Belligueux, 74; and	 , 16.
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situation in San Domingo changed. While some french royalists
were added to the Irish regiments, Ford brought together at t
Mole as many ships as he could muster. Onay 25th the
expedition sailed, Pord's squadron of 4 ships-of-the-line,
3 frigates and some smaller vessels escorting the convoy of
transports. 165 A landing was made in Lanientin Bay in the
L'Arcahaye roads and, after a brief engagement near Cabaret,
the enemy retired upon the capital. Taking advantage of a
tropical storm, the expedition made a sudden advance upon
Port-au-Prince which capitulated on June 4th. The enemy
retreated in disorder to Jaomel, where commissioners Santhonax
and Poverel were divested of their authority and put on board
a frigate bound for Prance. In the harbour of Port-au-Prince,
38 small ships including many privateers fell into British
hands 166
Triumphant as the operation had been, yet the seizure of
the capital did not end the San Domingo campaign. Although
the resistance of the French had indeed been broken, their place
was now taken by a more powerful enemy. The several bands of
165. The first indication that the line-strength of the squadron,
at least,had grown. - Europa, 50 (flagship); Irresistible, 74;
Belliqueux, 74; Sceptre, 64; Herniione, 32; Penelope, 32;
Iphigenia, 32;	 , 16, and 4 sohooners.
166. Capt. Thomas Southey: 'Chronological History of the West
Indies', III, p. 91., and A.DSM. 1/245: Ford to Stephens,
June 4, 1794. The displacement of the prizes ranged between
40 and 700 tons and included snows, polacres and brigs.	 (List
attached to Ford's despatch).
8negro rebels on the island began to assert their position.
The careers of their leaders Rigaud, Jean Pran9ois and others
foreshadowed the remarkable ascendance of Toussaint L'Ouverture,
he who was ultimately to transform the French colony of San
Domingo into the negro republic of Haiti. Only the preliniin-
ary rumblings of the eruption sounded at this stage and were
completely ignored in Britain. But the warning did not go
unheeded by the French forces still on the island. In July
1794, the oommissioners' sucoessort as military governor,
General Laveaux, proclaimed the rising fortunes of Toussaint
1' Ouverture 167
By December Toussaint's forces had gained control of the
whole northern province except for the area around Mole
St Nicolas. In the south, another rebel army led by the
mulatto Rigaud advanced against the coastal towns thinly
garrisoned by British troops. The important port of Log.ne,
only twenty miles from Port-au-Prince, was seized in November.
On Christmas Day Rigaud struck again. Three thousand of his
followers poured into Aux Cayes, where they embarked in a 16-gun
brig, three armed schooners and many smaller crqft. Creeping
along the south coast the flotilla surprised Tiburon before
Ford's cruisers could intervene. Yellow fever had reduced
the garrison at Tiburon to 500 fit men; after three days
I167. Leon Guerin: Histoire ... , pp. 313 - 314.
85
gallant resistance it surrendered and the rebels blew up a
British armed transport in the harbour.168
Although the remaining garrisons held out - particularly
at Port-au-Prince and the Mole - their survival against the
rebels and yellow fever could not be prolonged unless
reinforcements were brought in. The latter's toll is shown
by the state of the garrisons in January 1795:-
English Troops
	 Colonial Troops








Mole St Nicolas	 209	 166
	
209	 38
Jrémie	 95	 59	 n/a	 n/a
St Marc	 48	 33	 813	 321
169
Nor did the capture of Port-au--Piince ease t he situation
for the Jamaica squadron, which fared as badly as the army
during the second half of 1794. The loss of the Tiburon base
was a severe blow. Not only was command of the Windward
Passage weakened, but in enemy hands it threatened the supply-
line to the British garrisons further down the peninsula.
J6rniie was difficult to sustain and the Gonaive channel became
so in.feste with privateers that vessels bound for Port-au-PrincE
168.ADM 1/245: Ford to Stephens, January 5, 1795.
169. Bryan Edwards: 'History of the West Indies', vol. III:
'Historical Survey of San Domingo', p . 204. Note the coloured
troops' nrtch greater resistance to yellow fever.
86
and St Marc had to sail the long way round via Mole St Nicolas
and the St Marc channel.17°
In the luU which followed the loss of Tiburon, little
was done to strengthen the squadron in the direction needed.
Although another ship-of-the-line and a 44 joined the station
in July,171
 it was frigates and sloops in quantity which were
required. Thus Ford writing to the Admiralty in March 1795:
'... I am in very great distress for want of small vessels to
carry on the King's service, as the different possessions we
have -to protect on San Domingo require more than the whole
squadron, which are only two pendants 172 more than when I took
the command in peace. Lord Duninore173 complains be has not
a vessel at Providence; a similar complaint arises from the
logwood cutters in Honduras. The Governor of Jamaica, now
the troops are away, requests a frigate or two to guard the
north side (of the island). In this awkward predicament,
I require every assistance and unless reinforcements arrive
all is lost.'174
170. See map 6, p. 99,
171. Intrepid, 64; Chichester, 44.
172. That is, commissioned ships of the Royal Navy.
173. The eccentric and impetuous Governor of the Bahamas.See: Michael Craton: 'A History of the B.Jicimas', pp. 173 -l7; DSN.B. xlii, p. 1285.
174. .ADM ]/245: Ford to Stephens, March 4, 1795.
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In February 1795, a change took place in the station
command. Under the normal three-year appointment, Ford would
have remained in command until the end of that year. There is
no evidence, however, that the Admiralty had become critical of
his conduct. Although not stated at the time, the reason was
a breakdown in Ford's health. 175
 In his place the Admiralty
chose Rear-Admiral William Parker, who seemed admirably fitted
for the command. Fifty-two years old, he had considerable
experience of the West Indies and action at sea. A post-captain
under Barrington and Byron during the American War of Independ-
ence, he had commanded the Audacious, 74, during her memorable
action with Le Rvolutionnaire, 120, in May 1794. But his
greatest recommendation arose from his past service as commander-
in-chief of the Iaeewards station between 1787 and 1790.176
Wearing his flag in. Raisonable and with four other warships
in company, 177
 Parker sailed from Plymouth on 'February 15th 1795
with the outward-bound trade. After a passage of forty-one
days the whole convoy reached Barbados intact. There the
Leewards station admiral, Vice-Admiral Caldwefl, urgently
requested Parker for naval assistance. Evading these appeals,
175.The explanation appears in .ADM 1/245: Wifliam Parker to
Nepean, April 16, 1795. Evan Nepean succeeded Philip Stephens
as First Secretary at the Admiralty in March 1795.
176.Biographical details in D.N.B. xi, pp. 287 - 288; Half e, ii
pp. 45 et seq.
177.Medusa, 50; Solebay, 32; and two 16-gun sloops, Cormorant
and Dromedary.
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Parker proceeded with the Jamaica trade to within 1O miles of
Kingston, where be parted company and sailed directly to Mole
St Nicolas. There he took over command of the station on
April 15th.178
Parker's arrival in San Domingo brought some welcome
reinforcement to the command. But the chief' benefit was on
the military side. At the end of 1794 the Secretary for War
had at last become aware of the precarious situation o± the
remaining British garrisons on the island. 179
 Five infantry
regiments had been hurriedly got together and put aboard
transports which sailed with Parker's convoy.' 80 They arrived
just in time to prevent a military coollapse.
The naval reinforcement was far less satisfactory. The
increase to the squadron by the arrival of Parker's ships was
nullified by Ford's departure f or England on May 29th, taking
two ships--of--the-line and two eloops with him. 181 Although
three 74's arrived at the Mole in July, 182 the crucial weakness
continued to be the acute shortage of smaller w4rsbips in the
178.ADM 1/246: William Parker to Nepean, March 31, 1795.
179.WO 6/5: Dundas to Governor Williamson, December 8, 1794.
180. Ibid ... December 23, 1794. The units were the 81st and
96th of' foot and three Irish regiments, the 40th, 44th and 63rd,
making a total of' 6,445 men.
181.Europa, 50; BUigueux, 74; Magicienne, 16; and Swan, 16.
182. Leviathan, Hannibal and Swifteure - all 74's.
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squaciron. That this had long been a feature on the station
has already been emphasised, but during Parker's command it
became glaringly exposed. This was because the comparative
absence of enemy naval activity during Ford's administration
helped to conceal the weakness. By 1795, however, the large
number of enemy privateers operating over a wide area proclaimed
the squadron's inadequacy.
In an important despatch to the Admiralty in June, Parker
described the situation with great clarity.
	 ' ... It will be
observed that from being obliged to keep a ship constantly at
each post at San Domingo, I have not ships to prevent the
depredations of the enemy privateers which are very numerous
and cruize with much success, no only against the trade between
this island (Jamaica) and San Domingo and the coasts of both
islands, but our homeward bound trade also	 ,183 He
supported his statement with details of the whole squadron's
disposition at the time:-










GROUP A (SAN DOMINGO)	 GROUP B (JAMAiCA AND ELSEWHERE)






























Important conclusions may be drawn from this evidence.
First, over half the squadron - all its heavy ships and most of
its frigates - were committed to supporting the San Domingo
campaign. Second, only two ships were on cruiser patrol,
leaving the enemy privateers to operate almost at will.
Moreover, as Parker's ships became directly involved in
suocouring the isolated San Domingo garrisons, the old practice
of regular cruiser patrols off its coasts fell by the wayside.
184. ADM 1/246: Wifliam Parker to Nepean, June 29, 1795.
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In particular the vital patrol off the north coast between
Alta Vela and Monte Cristi185 was abandoned. This had always
been a reconnaissance area of great importance, in order to
keep a watch on the enemy naval base at Cap Pranqois and observe
the landfall of ships coming in from the Atlantic. Without
this patrol, early warning of enemy intentions was lost.
Having described the station's weaknesses, Parker went on
to suggest some remedies. Although the number of major war-
ships had risen, there was an urgent need for more sloops.
Such vessels, properly armed, were the most suitable for hunting
privateers in the restricted waters and narrow channels of the
command. Parker asked that ten more sloops be added to the
five already on the station. At the same time he warned the
Admiralty that it was pointless to continue providing less
powerful warships than sloops: ' ... three of the four schooner
on this station are entirely useless, because the smallest
privateer fitted out is of considerably more force than they
one has already been taken by the enemy and the others are so
poorly armed, having neither guns nor even swivels, only small
arms and muequetoons.'186' 187
185. See Map 6, p. 99.
186. ADM 1/246: William Parker to Nepean, June 29, 1795.
187. It was not until three years latex' that another remedy was
suggested, by Parker's successor. Admiral Hyde Parker strongly
favoured the use of gunboats, whose shallow draught would make
them very suitable for close in-shore work against privateers.
Two colonies - the Turks and Caicos Islands and Honduras -
specifically asked for them, In the case of the latter, Hyde
Parker suggested they might be sent out from England in frames
and assembled lcScafly. ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Nepean,
December 23, 1798.
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Turning to the geographical aspect, Parker drew the
Admiralty's attention to two areas under increasing attack from
privateers. The hundreds of large and small islands, many
uninhabited, which formed the Bahamas group were proving a
happy hunting ground f or the enemy. Moreover the difficult
sea-passages through them were vital trade arteries linking the
West Indies, Britain and North America. In Parker's opinion,
at least two sloops should be permanently stationed at Nassau
and New Providence. A second dangerous area lay between
Jamaica and San Domingo, across which considerable traffic now
passed. Many Jamaica merchants and planters complained bitterly
in 1795 of increasing losses through privateer action. Marine
insurance rates rose sharply and a cry tent up for the organiza-
tion of regular monthly convoys between the islands. Parker
replied that no escort f or them could be provided out of his
present resources. At least three more warships would have
to be added to the squadron to undertake this duty alone: one
to escort the outward monthly convoy from Jamaica; another for
the return convoy from San Domingo, and a third to protect the
Jamaican coast.
Parker's letter of June 29th, 1795, to the Admiralty has
been examined in detail because of the light It throws upon
the strategic problems of the time. The Admiralty' s reaction
to his requests is also significant. In the margin of his
despatch are written manuscript comments, in the hand of either
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Spencer, the First Lord of the Admiralty, or more probably,
Evan Nepean, the First Secretary. They fully endorse Parker's
argument and promise reinforcements when available. But
immediately only two sloops could be provided, for service in
the Bahainas) 88 This indeed was the main point; however
much the Admiralty agreed with the station admiral, there were
never enough sloops or frigates available to supply even half
his requests.
Keeping the squadron fully-mthiied and seaworthy in 1795
were as serious problems as obtaining more ships. Both
Caribbean stations were notorious for their lack of suitable
manpower and exposure of ships crews to tropical climate and
disease. In 1795 the Jamaica squadron was badly undermanned,
with no possibility of obtaining replacements by local recruit-
ment. 189 Two years later, Parker's successor knew bow imper-
ative it was to bring ships with their full complement aboard,
as I am going to a station where no men are to be got.'190
Another danger arose from the length of time warships lay at
anchor in Port Royal or the garrison ports of San Domingo,
increasing their crews' exposure to yeflow fever. In. the
188. AS comment in the margin of ADM 1/246: William Parker to
Nepean, June 29, 1795.
189. ADM 1/246: William Parker to Nepean, August 22, 1795.
190. ADM 1/247: Hyde Parker to Nepean, July 3, 1797.
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summer of 1795, for instance, the Intrepid remained for months
in the harbour of Port-au-Prince while her crew wasted away
with disease.'91
 The shortage of hands aboard merchant ships
was even more acute, for which pressing as much a disease was
responsible. At least one convoy set sail from Jamaica with
its deficit in crew made up by the last-minute inclusion of
inmates from the local gaol.
Desertion was another factor which weakened the squadron.
Whenever the ships returned to Port Royal their crews were
tempted and tricked by the numerous crimps on shore. Merchant
shipmastere were often so short of men for the homeward voyage
to England that they were prepared to pay extravagant sunis in
order to get their vessels to sea. Thus the crimp-shops were
able to offer a seaman as much as fifty guineas and unlimited
quantities of rum to desert the navy and engage for the run
home. Local magistrates failed to control the practice which
flourished in Kingston and Port Royal. The position became
so serious that in September 1795 Parker attempted to intervene.
He held maetins with a number of lawyers, merchants and ship-
masters warning them that wholesale desertion from the squadron
was threatened. His hearers condemned the practice but pointed
out that it had been caused by the shortage of crews aboard the
merchantmen. and by their obligation to sail on fixed dates if
191. ADM 1/246: William Parker to Nepean, August 22, 1795.
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they wished to join the regular convoy. 	 One prã.ctioal suggestioi
emerged from the discussions; namely that before a convoy
sailed, the escort commander should be empowered to take off
all men on board t1merchantmen who could not be shown to be
engaged in the normal way. In practice the suggestion proved
unworkeable. 192 Understandably many sbipmasters utterly
refused to div-ulge the arrangements under which their crews
had been engaged. Nor could vessels which sailed independently
be prevented from continuing to attract deserters from the
Navy.193
To return to the main sequence of events. With the
station already in difficulties early in 1795, matters were
made worse by two developments in the latter half of the year.
These were the Praneo.-Spanish treaty and the maroon revolt in
Jamaica.
The period of Spanish alliance with Britain against the
common enemy was drawing to a close. The reasons for the
change of attitude were European in origin, in particular the
Prancophile policy pursued by Godoy, the Spanish first minister.
But events in the Caribbean were a contributory cause. Spain
had watched the struggle f or San Domingo with jealousy and fear.
192. When Parker ordered it to be used on the September convoy
to England, the escort commander - Captain Thorn of the Medusa -
so failed to carry out the admiral's instructions that he was
court-mart jailed.
193. Much of this passage is based on Parker's views on the
manning problem, as expressed in two despatches -to the Admiralty
September 13 and 20, 1795.
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British intervention was regarded as an intrusion upon her
sphere of interest and a direct threat to her possession of
the eastern half of the island, Hispaniola. Another bone of
contention was the logwood settlements on the Mosquito coast.
The long history of Anglo-Spanish enmity in the West Indies is
well-known and readily traceable back through the years to Hawkin
and Drake, to Vernon and Pocook.
After a number of preliminary agreements, the Pranco-
Spanish peace treaty was signed at Basle on JLy 22nd, 1795.
Although Spain did not declare war upon Britin until fifteen
months later, the treaty had an immediate effect upon the
situation in San Domingo. One of its clauses ceded Hispaniola
to rance in return for the recognition of certain Spanish
claims on the Biscay coast.'94
 At one stroke the enemy in
San Domingo had thereby gained an invaluable supply-base and
nursery of recruitment. Nor was this all. Prenoh arid negro
privateers now had full access to anchorages on the Hispaniola
coast, to replace those they had lost to the British Expedition-
ary force. Pinally, the enemy coastline to be patrolled by
Parker's cruisers had doubled in length and the trade-routes
between Jamaica and the Leeward Islands were correspondingly
less secure.
Henceforth Spanish naval forces in the Caribbean could
194. Se. Caabride Mêera H±st.ry, w1. V1LL, p.1I112.
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no longer be ignored. At the end of 1795, Parker was able to
provide the Admiralty with full details of their strength and
disposition. 195 They comprised eleven ships-of-the-line,
eight frigates and several smaller warships under the overall
command of Admiral Aristazabal. Many were in appalling condi-
tion and badly undermanned. Yet even if they never left
harbour their very existence meant a constant watch had to be
kept. The Spanish ships were distributed among six naval bases








San Juan, 74; La Pirme, 74196 three
frigates, three sloops and two corvettes.
San Isabella, 74; San Ranion, 68;
San L6andro, 64; and three brigs.
San lago la EspaRa, 68; San Pedro
Aloantara, 64; one frigate and two brigs.
197
Bearing in mind how fully committed the Jamaica squadron
195. ADM 1/246: Parker -to Nepean, December 9, 1795. Parker
obtained the information from a Spanish naval officer stationed
at Port Dauphin, who turned spy.
196. Ex-Prench,
197. ADM 1/246: Parker to Nepean, December 9, 1795.
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was in 1795/6, it was fortunate that these warships did not
become an active enemy until after Spain's declaration of war
in October 1796. On the other band the commander-in-chief
Jamaica could not foresee to what an extent Spanish torpor and
the ships' state of unreadiness would blunt their impact when
the time caine.
In July 1795 a serious uprising amongst the maroons and
negro slaves broke out in Jamaica; resistance was prolonged
until the end of the year in the wild Cockpit country of the
northern higblands. The origins and progress of the revolt
are not relevant to this study, but its consequences are.
Military reinforcements scheduled for San Domingo had to remain
in. Jamaica and at the height of the emergency troops were brought
back from San Domingo in order to assist Governor Balcarres.198
On the naval side, Parker was instructed to base more ships at
Port Royal and increase the cruiser patrols along the north
coast, to protect the more isolated viflages and plantations.
Just when it was most needed, the pressure on San Domingo had
therefore to be relaxed.
The possibility of failure in San Domingo never occurred
to the British Government in 1795. The Secretary f or War
considered the military setbacks temporary and wrote to General
Forbes in September: ' ... you will be reinforced by an armament
198. WO 6/5: Dundas to Major-General Forbes (military commander,
San Domingo), November 13, 1795.
MAP 6. San Domingo.
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which on its arrival cannot fail to carry everything before
it by force of arms'. 199
 Dundas envisaged an expeditionary
force of 10,000 men for which he set three principal strategic
objectives on arrival in San Domingo. These were: the
capture of the key enemy bases of Cap Fran9ois and Port de Paix;
the conquest of the entire Northern Province; and the occupa-
tion of the island of Tortuga off the north coast. Quite apart
from the problem of finding the troops, the whole plan was
grossly over-ambitious. It showed little understanding of the
true situation - the terrain, the yellow fever, the rising
power of the negro rebels, the sheer size of San Domingo. In
particular the scheme to seize Tortuga was bad strategy. The
island was swampy and unhealthy and any operation there would
inevitably have deflected military and naval effort away from
the mainland campaign. Parker himself stood to gain most by
its occupation, since Tortuga was a favourite haunt of privateers
and would have been a useful anchorage for the squadron as an
alternative to the Mole. Yet he was the first to condemn the
folly of such an adventure.200
In fact the promised reinforcements never reached San
Domingo on the scale intended. As part of the ill-fated
199. WO 6/5: Dundas to General Forbes, September 30, 1795.
The despatch is marked: 'most secret'.
200.ADM 1/246: Parker to Nepean, December 9, 1795; WO 6/5:
General Forbes to Dundas, November 30, 1795. At first Forbes
strongly favoured the Tortuga plan, but was finally persuaded
of its folly by Parker.
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Aberorinthy-Christian expedition201
 assembling in England in the
autumn of 1795, they were scheduled to be diverted to the Mole
St Nicolas as soon as the combined force arrived in the Caribbean.
As a result of that expedition's failure to start, 202
 the San
Domingo section under Major-General Whyte did not reach the
Mole until May 1796, and then only with 3,500 troops instead
of the 10,000 originally promised. Prior to that Forbes had
only received two weak battalions, hurriedly got together at
Gibraltar and shipped over in February 1796.203 Neither Forbes
nor Parker now had any illusions about the final outcome of the
campaign.204
The year 1796 proved the turning-point in the struggle
for San Domingo. The failure to adequately reinforce the
British garrisons combined with other factors which now came
to the fore to tip the scales decisively in the enemy's favour.
These were: the rise of Toussaint l'Ou.verture; an unexpected
increase in French naval activity; the crippling cost of the
San Domingo campaign and Spain's declaration of war in October.
Chronologically the first event of the year was an attack
201. See chapter , pp.
202. See chapter 6, pp. 3%.9,
203. WO 6/6: Du.ndas to Forbes: three letters of January 6 and
27; February 7, 1796. The Gibraltar detachment of 1,600 troops
under General Bowyer, was brought over in a convoy escorted by
the frigate Ceres.
204. ADM 1/247: Parker to Nepean: February 28, 1796.
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on the British garrison at Irois. At the end of February an
enemy flotilla comprising the frigate La Concorde, three sloops
and smaller craft sailed from Aux Cayes but the assault was
beaten back. In March, Parker and Forbes countered by launching
/an amphibious expedition against the important port of Leogane,
which had been lost the previous Deceniber. 205
 Three battleships
of the Jamaica squadron took part, with frigates and sloops in
support. 206
 tkie to poor military leadership and strong enemy
resistance the operation completely miscarried. Heavy fire
from the enemy shore-batteries disabled the Leviathan and the
Africa. At a council-of-war held on board Parker's flagship
off Logane on March 23rd, it was decided to abandon the attempt,
only six days after it had begun. 207 The operation was later
described by Parker's second-in-command as: ' ... a blundering
and undigested expedition' ,208
The penalty for this failure was exacted two months later,
when two French squadrons broke through the weakened cruiser
screen and brought reinforcements to San Domingo. On March
22nd Commodore Thomas had sailed from Brest with eight troop
205. q.v. ante, p.
206. Leviathan, 74; Swiftsure, 74; Africa, 64; frigatesCeres and Iphigenia.
207. ADM 1/247: Parker to Nepean, March 23, 1796 (enclosing
copy of minutes of Council of War).
208. Spencer Papers (N.R.S.), vol. I, pp. 283 - 284: CommodorelXickworth to Captain Barker of the Leviathan, June 1, 1796.
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transports escorted by two frigates and a corvette.209
A few days later Rear-Admiral Thvenard left Rochefort with
two ships-of-the-line, a frigate and a corvette, en route for
the same destination. 210
 Both arrived at Cap Pranois between
May 6th and 9th. When one of Parker's cruisers shortly after-
wards reconnoitred the harbour, it was found to be crowded with
enemy shipping.211
Although Parker sailed at once from Port Royal with the
main squadron to blockade Cap Pranqois, the damage had already
been done. Nearly 10,000 French troops commanded by the able
General Rochambeau had reached San Domingo unscathed. Severely
criticised by the Admiralty for failing to intercept the enemy,
Parker tried to shift the blame on to the senior officer of the
San Domingo cruiser patrol. He maintained that Captain Lewis
of the Hannibal had, without orders, sent two of his cruisers
back to the Mole just before the enemy's arrival. Be that as
it may, the real causes of the disaster were exactly those which
enabled the French to reirii'oroe Guadeloupe twice between 1794
and 1796.212
209.Meduse, 40; ThsurenteA 36; Douceuse, 18. Five of the
transports were armed 'en flute' including La Chine and La Pine,
with 30-guns apiece.
210.Pougeu.x 74; .Wattigny, 74; Vengeance, 40; Berceau, 20.
2l1.ADM 1/247: Captain Tripp of the Sampson to Parker, May 15,
1796.
212. See Chapter 1, pp. 3 wL 4.2-3.
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Lack of frigates and sloops; the vast area to be trolled;
the squadron's over-commitment elsewhere - aU a]..lowed the enemy
to use the element of surprise at will.
Even before the disaster, Parker had begun to show signs
of deterioration wider the strain of oommR.nd. In June he
contracted yellow fever and the command was temporarily trans-
ferred to his deputy, Commodore Duckworth, while be convalesced
ashore at Jamaica. 213
 But on July 22nd Parker completely
broke down and his request to relinquish the command was accepted
by the Admiralty. Notwithstanding a future career of distinc-
tion, Duckworth in 1796 had no experience of senior command.214
Force of circumstances now placed him in charge of the Jamaica
station for five critical months, while Parker's successor was
being chosen in London. Duckworth was understandably cautious,
at a time when vigorous action was urgently needed if the situa-
tion were to be retrieved. 215 Nevertheless, it was not only
lack of leadership but the state of the squadron which was the
stumbling-block.
Although with 11 ships-of-the-line and 7 frigates, 216
 the
squadron was stronger than. at any time earlier in the war, the
213.ADM 1/247: William Parker, at sea en route to Jamaica,
to Nepean, July 1, 1796.
214.Biographical details in: D4N.B. vi, 92 - 96; Naval
Cbroniole xviii, 1 et seg; Ralfe ii, 283 et seq.
215.Spencer Papers (N.R.S.), vol. I, pp. 285 - 288: Duokworth
to Spencer, July 24 and 25, 1796,	 Ehese despatches
clearly S4 j
	-
216.ADM 1/247: Duckworth to Nepean, uly 30, 1796, includes
a full list of the Jamaica squadron.
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state of the ships and their crews was alarming. Yeflow fever
had worked havoc aboard; on the Dictator, 74,alone, the crew
was three hundred below complement. The worst feature was
the condition of the ships themselves, caused by months of
unrelieved service and inadequate repair facilities in the local
dockyards. Examples are not hard to find. Parker's flagship
the Raisonable, leaked so badly that constant hand-pumping was
necessary. Her mast and gun-breechings were rotten and both
capstan-spindles broken off short •217 The Argonaut was
falling to pieces and in the harbour at Port Royal the Alfred
had lain dismasted for months. 218 The casualty list was
increased by a collision between the Sampson and the Hannibal,
and the wreck of the Undaunted off the Morant Keys on August
31st. By September Duckworth found the squadron reduced to
five serviceable ships-of-the-line, all severely undermanned.219
Some relief however was at hand. On November 12th Vice-
Admiral Sir Hyde Parker 22° arrived at the Mole and took over
command of the Jamaica station from Duckworth. He brought
with him no less than seven ships-of-the-line, detached from
the Mediterranean Fleet. The cause of this sudden increase
o± force at Jamaica was news which reached the Admiralty at the
217, 218. Spencer Papers (N.R.S.), vol. I, pp. 285 - 288: Duck-
worth to Spencer, July 24 and 25; August 1, 1796.
219.ADM 1/247: Du.okworth to Nepean, September 9, 1796.
220.Biographical details in: D.NIB. xv, 244 - 245; Charnock vi
523; Ralfe i, 377 et seq.
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beginning of September. A powerful Prench squadron under
Admiral Richery had sailed from Cadiz, bound, it was believed,
for the Caribbean. A second enemy force - A Spanish squadron
under Rear-Admiral Solano - was also at sea and thought to be
set on the same course. To meet the threat, Hyde Parker was
ordered to the West Indies with all speed.
Although the Riohery sortie never reached the Caribbean,221
Hyde Parker's arrival in force at the Mole brought new vigour
to a station which had sunk to a very low ebb. Both he and
his deputy, Rear-Admiral Bligh, quickly discovered that the
administration of the squadron was in chaos. Arrangements
regarding victualling, naval stores and care of sick and wounded
had become scandalously neglected. Bligh immediately complained
he was unable to send cruisers to patrol off Cap François due
to gross negligence by the local victualling contractors.222
The supply of bread, fruit and vegetables to the squadron was
so disorganized that Hyde Parker demanded the immediate appoint-
ment of a properly-constituted agent victualler for the
station. 223
 When this was done, the victualling system graduall
improved but there were other administrative problems. In
March 1797, Hyde Parker complained that existing medical facili-
22L See chaer'l, pp. • 59•
222. LDM ]./24: Bligh to Hyde Parker, January 30th, 1797.
223. ADM 1/247: Hyde Parker to Nepsan, February 2, 1797.
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ties, both afloat and ashore, were quite inadequate to meet
the mounting yellow fever casualties. He called for more ship's
surgeons, the services of local doctors and the establishment
of a seamen's hospital at Presqu'ile, Martinique.224
Shortage of masts, sails, rigging and other tackle was a
perennial problem. Although the storeship Granpue arrived at
Port Royal in October 1797 with a few sails, many more were
needed especially for the 74's.
	
It was apparently difficult
to have large sails made at the Port Royal yard, owing to
insufficient sailmakers on the establishment and all being
engaged in current repairs. 225
 Not until the end of the
year did the long-awaited mast-ship Trelawney arrive at the
Mole from Halifax, Nova Scotia.226
Despite the administrative difficulties, the naval strategic
situation had greatly improved by 1797. Por the first time
since the beginning of the war the Jamaica squadron had reached
respectable strength. Moreover after the Richery episode the
Prench made no further attempts to send cruising squadrons to
the West Indies and thereafter her navy was represented in the
area by only a few frigates operating from Cap Pranqois. The
224. ADM 1/247: Hyde Parker to Nepean, April 18, 1797,
225. ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Nepean, October 6, 1797.
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Spanish ships remained almost entirely inactive. One or two
frigates occasionally emerged from Havana or Port Dauphin for
a sortie, but the rest of the squadron rotted in harbour with-
out sufficient crews to put to sea.
It was therefore tragic that at the moment when the naval
initiative had been regained, the military forces on San Domingo
suffered complete eclipse. Although the Government had become
apprehensive at the halting of the army's progress, they for
a long time refused to face reality. It was the appalling
military casualties and crippling financial cost of the campaign
which finally decided the issue. Pour years' struggle had
caused the deaths of 30,000 soldiers and seamen - a scale of
attrition which could no longer be tolerated.
The most telling statistics came from the Treauury.
Campaign costs had soared: £300,000 in 1794; £800,000 in
1795; £2,000,000 in 1796. As a result General Simcoe, who
had replaced Porbes as military governor in December 1796,
was curtly informed that the future costs of the campaign would
be strictly limited to £300, 000 a year. 227 Even so, the
expenditure for January and February 1797 alone reached
£700,000 before any economies could take effect.
Such stringent measures obviously affected the conduct of
a campaign which was already in difficulties. Even when
227. Du.ndas to Simncoe, June 7, 1797. A copy of this letter
is enclosed with: ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Nepean, July 1,
1797.
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favourable opportunities occurred, no advantage could be taken
of them. In June 1797, the inhabitants of Monte Cristi, an
important Spanish privateer base on the north coast of Hispano].ia
threw open their gates. 228
 Bu for lack of means the chance
was lost. The British Government imagined the campaign could
be carried on by withdrawing the forces to key strategic areas -
such as the peninsula of Mole St Nicholas - in order to reduce
the financial costs. 229
 Both Simcoe and Hyde Parker, however,
rigt1y condemned the idea. They know that the strength of the
Mole lay in its strategic position and not as a fortress. It
had no landward defences and was 'vi4nerable to attack from the
encircling mountains. Moreover the barren and uninhabited
hinterland could never support the expeditionary force.23°
In this difficult situation, it was left to the foresight
and ability of one man to extricate the army from San Domingo.
In April 1797 Brigadier Sir Thomas Maitland 23' arrived at the
Mole, with official orders to assess the situation. He at once
realized the difficulty of continuing the campaign and recommende
an early evacuation of Port-au-Prince and St Marc. 232 Dundas,
228.Spencer Papers (NIR.S.), vol. IV,: Hyde Parker to Spencer,
June 12, 1797.
229. WO 6/6: Dundae to Simcoe, November 25, 1796 (secret
instructions).
230. .ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Spencer, June 15/16 and 25/26,
1797.
231.Biographical details in: D.N.B. xii, 818 - 820, Gentleman's
Magazine (1824), part 1, 370 - 371.
232. WO 6/6: Maitland to Dundas, April 24, 1797.
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the Secretary for War, was taken aback and at first preferred
the advice of the resident coinin.riders, Sinicoe and Thyte, that
they should be held. All three were gailty of misjudging the
strength of the negro forces. It took time for Toussaint
l'Ouvertu.re, Rigaud and the other rebel leaders to settle
their differences and combine forces. But by March 1798
Toussaint was in supreme comm.n.d of a large army and openly
declared his intention of driving the British forces into the
sea.
As 15,000 rebels lay siege to Port-au-Prince, Maitland
superseded Whyte as military commander on San Domingo. His
first act was to order the withdrawal of the garrisons from
Port-au-Prince, L'Arcahaye and St Marc and he asked Hyde Parker
to provide naval support during the evacuation. On April 30th,
1798 a meeting took place between Toussaint 1'Ouverture and
Maitland on board H.M.S. Abergavenny, moored off Port-au-Prince.
The outcome was an. agreement by which the British garrisons
were allowed to withdraw under a five-week flag of truce prior
to the occupation of the three towns by the rebel forces.233
Toussaint honoured the treaty and the troops were taken off
by ships of the Jamaica squadron between May 6th and 9th without
incident.
Hyde Parker had watched developments with ill-conoealed
233. (ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Nepean, April 30, 1798.
(Bryan Edwards': 'History of the West Indies', vol. III
(San Domingo), pp. 422; 42-7
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disapproval. When it became apparent that Maitland intended
a complete evacuation of the island should follow, bitter
controversy arose between the two commanders. The crux of the
matter concerned the naval base at Mole St Nicolas. As early
as January 1798, Hyde Parker had warned the Admiralty that the
appointment of Maitland as military governor ' ,.. will place
the navy entirely at his disposal'. 234
 Although he had no
control over the ships of the squadron, he could take away
their bases on San Domingo.
Maitland advanced three strong arguments for complete
evacuation: the steadily increasing rebel forces; the yellow
fever casualties and the British Government's refusal to provide
any more money or troops fox' the campaign. The general was
fully aware that such a drastic step would have serious political
and naval repercussions. Before therefore making a formal
request to the Government for permission to proceed, he took
the precaution of finding out the views of the Governor of
Jamaica and the station admiral, although privately his mind
was already made up. Governor Balcarres gave a cautious reply.
Disassociating himself from the consequences, he felt particular1
anxious about the effect a negro triumph on San Domingo would
have upon the plantation slaves in Jamaica.
Hyde Parker's reaction was extremely violent. In two
234. Spencer Papers (N.R.S.), vol. IV: Hyde Parker to Spencer,
January 30, 1798.
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forceful letters to Maitland, he utterly refused to agree to
an evacuation of Mole St Nicolas: ' ... I think it a naval
port of too much consequence to be given up; nothing would
induce me to such a measure but express and most positive orders
of government.'235 He aw quite clearly what its loss would
mean to the squadron. In such a head-on collision of views,
the solution c ould only come from elsewhere and it was the
government who broke the deadlock. Early in August, Maitland
received Cabinet approval for a complete evacuation. Po*r
weeks Hyde Parker fulminated in a flurry of correspondence that
neither his wishes nor those of the Navy had been consulted
over the decision. But at length he gave way, not because he
agreed with Maitland but in obedience to orders from England.236
On August 20th 1798, the garrisons were evacuated from
Jrmie, Irois and Grande Anse with the assistance of the
squadron. The final withdrawal from the Mole itself began on
September 25th and was completed in ten days. 237
 In the
process friction developed between the squadron and the ground
forces over the allocation of transports and the disposal of
the large quantities of stores which had accumulated at the base.
235.ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Maitland, June 27 and 30, 1798.
236.Spenoer Papers, vol. IV: Hyde Parker to Spencer, August 10 -
October 29, 1798.
ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Bligh, August 8, 1798.
237.Capt. Thomas Southey: 'Chronological History of the West
Indies': III, pp. 317-8,
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Matters were made worse by Maitland's abrupt departure for
England three weeks before the evacuation. Before leaving
he had negotiated a secret treaty with Toussaint 1'Ouverture.
Two of its clauses stipulated -that many of the stores at the
Mole should be transferred to the rebels for a nominal sum and
that in future coastal shipping operating from San Domingan
ports would not be attacked by the Jamaica squadron. Many
people condemned the treaty in general and these clauses in
particular, for the recognition given to the rebel cause.
Hyde Parker considered it an even worse mistake than the
decision to evacuate the Mole; ' ... Maitland's secret articles
with the black general Toussaint, which were never made known
to me ... are a disgrace to our nation.' 238
 But the treaty
had received full Cabinet approval and Hyde Parker's complaints
fell on deaf ears.239
The evacuation from San Domingo in. October 1798, after
a five-year struggle for possession, marks the end of a chapter
f or British strategy in the Caribbean. Thereafter events on
the station were in a minor key. The Spanish warships remained
almost entirely inactive. On the one occasion they did bestir
themselves, they were decisively repulsed. At the end of 1798
a flotilla of twenty Spanish schooners arid sloops launched an
238. ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Spencer, November 17, 1798.
239. Spencer Papers, vol. IV: Spencer to Hyde Parker,
December 2, 1798.
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attack against the logwood settlements on the Honduras coast
but were routed in three sharp engagements off Montego and
St George's Gays. 24° Enemy privateers continued to be trouble-
some but by the end of the year, the last three French frigates24
had sailed from Cap Prançois before that important base fell
into the hands of the negro rebels.242
The struggle for possession of San Domingo dominated events
on the Jamaica station during the period. Ever since the
decision to intervene there at the end of 1793, almost the
entire resources of the sqjxadron had been devoted to its cause.
As a result the station admirals' other responsibiites - the
defence of Jamaica and other colonies, the protection of sea-
borne trade - were frequently neglected. It was indeed
fortunate that the French lacked the warships and the Spaniards
were too indolent to take advantage of the situation.
In retrospect it is clear why the campaign in San Domingo
ultimately failed. The belief that the whole colony could be
occupied with the limited troops available; ignorance of the
terrain and the strength of the rebel forces - all played their
part. Once the campaign had begun, the obstinate determination
to possess the economically rich colony at all costs blinded
240. ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Nepean, November 6, 1798.
241. La Sirne; Lê Bravoure; Le Cookade National.
242. ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Nepean, November 1, 1798.
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the government to the frightful cost in lives and money. The
outlook for the campaign became so serious in 1798 that
Maitland's decision to evacuate was made just in time to prevent
complete disaster. And in such a situation Maitland acted
entirely correctly.
Yet there was another type of strategy which might and
should have been pursued in San Domingo, and one which Hyde
Parker tried to put into words in 1798, four years too late.
This concept recognized the maritime importance of San Domingo:
the dominance of the Windward Passage by Mole St Nicholas;
the colony's proximity to Jamaica .nd the Bahamas; the value
of its long indented coastline and many small harbours to
enemy privateers. Prom the strategic point of view therefore
only the Mole and the main coastal ports should have been
occupied in 1794; under no circumstances should a large-scale
military campaign have been attempted. Once occupied, the
ports and bases could have been heavily fortified and garrisoned
and made impregnable to enemy attack by land or sea. It is
no accident that Mole St Nioolae is frequently referred to as
the 'Gibraltar of the Caribbean'; so it might have been in
British possession. Seapower is the dominant element in
Caribbean strategy. If it had been given full rein in San
Domingo, the outcome o± the campaign might wefl have been
different. As it was, other considerations - economic, politic




TI 00Nv0( SYSTEM AND TI WEST flDIk INTEREST
The organization of convoys to and front the West Indies and
the protection of the merchant ships while on passage lay in
the hands of the Admiralty and the escort commanders. But
others were as closely concerned in the success of the convoy
system - the marine underwriters and the whole West India
interest, merchants, planters and shipowners.
During the first half of the eighteenth century, marine
insurance was in its infancy. Partly through inexperience,
partly -through the need to obtain business, underwriters gave
generous cover at low premiums despite the considerable risks
involved. At that time there was no compulsion for ships to
-take convoy and the system laoked organization and discipline.
Nevertheless, many owners had little cause to regret the capture
of their vessels, as often happened, since they were generally
over—insux'ed. 243
 Moreover, the underwriters suffered as a
result of their efforts to encourage shipowners to take convoy.
They charged differential premiums in favour of those who did,
based on the warranty clause of the policy stating that the
ship had departed in convoy. B.it in practice many vessels
broke away from the convoy en route - exasperated at its slow
progress or determined to reach the market with their cargoes
243. Richard Pares: 'War and Trade in the West Indies (1739 -
1763)', p. 303.
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before the rest. Such abuse of the warranty clause became
so widespread that in 1746 the underwriters took action.
Henceforth the usual part-refundment of the premium was only
made in the case of ships which could be proved to have been
in convoy throughout the voyage. 244 Moreover, from an
insurance point of view, taking convoy became more precisely
defined: sailing with a regular convoy to a predetermined
destination, under a Government-appointed officer and in
obedience to his instructions and signals.
Although at first hostile to the development of marine
insurance, the attitude of the Admiralty changed after lloyds
rise to predominance in the 1770s. By 1793 Lloyds had become
the greatest centre of marine insurance in the world, 245 and
the Admiralty recognized its importance in the organization
of convoys. On the outbreak of war the Admiralty began
supplying 'correct lists of all convoys' 246 to the Lloyds
Committee, who in return made available their records and
reports. The unique intelligence system of shipping movements
which Lloyds had built up throughout the world proved of great
strategic value. These and notices of marine casualties were
published twice weekly in the 'Lloyds List'. Moreover, it
244. Richard Pares: 'War and Trade in the West Indies (1739 -
1763)', p. 303, and: Lilian Penson: 'The Colonial Agents of
the British West Indies', pp. 300- 301).
Wright & Payle: 'History of Lloyds'245. Por details see:
(London; 1928).
246. A.D.M. 1/5179: Orders in Council: April 18, 1793.
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became established practice during the war for the Admiralty
and even station commanders overseas to consult Lloyds Coinniitte
on convoy regulations, ports of assembly and trade defence.'
Lloyds were equally concerned with the convoy system on
their own behalf, for it formed the basis of their quotations
of differential premium rates. Normally the premium was
charged as a percentage of the value of the vessel or cargo,
according to whether it sailed with or without convoy. But
Lloyds underwriters generally preferred to use the 'returns'
system - a deposit of' between a third and a half' o± the value
of the vessel or cargo - because it gave them an advantage in
respect of ships which were captured after parting company from
a convoy. 249 In January 1795, a leading Lloyds underwriter,
John Julius Angerstein, gave the First Lord of the Admiralty
detailed scales of premium insurance from London to the West
Indies, as they had developed over the previous fifteen years:-
247. C.E. Payle: chapter on 'Shipownirig and Marine Insurance',in 'Trade Winds ... ' (edited by C.N. Parkinson), pp. 25 - 48.
248. ADM 1/3992: Letters from Lloyds to the Admiralty (1793 -1804) and Lloyds' Proceedings: June 11, 1794.
249. C.E. Payle ... (as 247), p. 29.
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SCALDS OP PREMIUM INSURANCE




7 - 8 guineas with convoy; 15 - 20 guineas
without
1782	 j8-.1O-15 guineas with convoy
1792	 j12 with convoy
1793: January 3 guineas
: February 5-7 guineas without convoy
: April	 8 guineas
2. LONDON to the LEEWARD ISMNDS
1779
	 f 7-8 guineas with convoy; 16 guineas without
1782	 18-12 guineas with convoy
1792	 I2 with convoy
1793: January 2fr-3 guineas
: February 10 guineas with convoy
March	 5 guineas	 250
By 1793 the West India interest was firmly established in
London, proof' of' the growing importance o:f Caribbean trade,
especially sugar, to the British economy. The development
250. Chatham Papers: PRO 30/8 - vol. 365, part 1: Angerstein
to Chatham, January 10th, 1795.
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of its representation in England had been a slow process,
however, and until 1760 no permanent organization existed.251
That year the Society of West India Merchants was founded in
London. It had at first no premises of its own and used to
meet every month in the offices of the Marine Society in
Leadenhall Street. Membership was confined to London merhantE
trading with the West Indies, who were charged a fund on trade
in order to keep the society in being. About the same time
another society was formed by Caribbean planters and colonial
agents resident in England. By 1785 a joint permanent (cmitteE
of West India Merchants and Planters had emerged, although
the Society of West India Merchants continued to function.
Both societies pursued the same objectives: the prosperity
of the plantations, protection of the colonies' trade and
opposition to negro emancipation.252
After 1793, the standing committee of the West India
Merchants and Planters became the vehicle whereby frequent
petitions were sent to the Admiralty concerning the appointment
of convoys and protection of trade on the Caribbean stations.
These petitions could not be ignored by the Government. The
committee's members included several of great influence, such
as the two Beeston Longs, John Julius Angerstein, Alexander
251. Lilian LI. Penson: 'The London West India interest in the
eighteenthoentury'.	 (E.H.R., vol. xxvi, (19 21), pp. 373 - 39
252. Thid: pp. 378 - 383.
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Baring and Lord Pexrhyn. 253 They and others made themselves
heard, not only through the committee, but in the House 0±
Commons, where a strong West India faction had developed.
Purtherniore following London's example, West India associations
sprang up in the other British ports engaged in the Caribbean
trade. The Bristol West India Society was established in
1782, the Glasgow West India Association in 1802, and the
Liverpool West India Association in 1803.254
In London there was an important difference of function
between the standing committee of the West India Merchants
and Planters and the Society of West India Merchants. Where-
as the former was mainly concerned with sending petitions to
the Government, it was with the latter that the Admiralty
corresponded over the appointment of convoys. And it was to
the local West India associations in Bristol, Glasgow and
Liverpool that the Admiralty similarly wrote, regarding the
assembly of the trade from those ports. It is a significant
comment upon the importance of these associations that, shortly
after they were founded, the Admiralty was dealing exclusively
253. The tw. Beest Liis were m.s.ssiv.1y sheirsew if th• West
Iiia Cmitte Jshw .Tulius A*gerstaia, sershast, philaa.threpist
ar patrew if art, was •ae if the 1uig figure. ii the early histaiy
if L1.y.'., k1e a ier Bariag wa* &	 bankw whose father hal
ftu	 the fia.tial house if Bsriag Brithers
Fir firther i.gaphissl istails, see D.LB, vs. I, pp. 4.16.7
sal 1110-12,
254. Lilian M. Penson: 'The London West India interest ...
p . 382.
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with them and refused to accept applications for convoy from
25
individual merchants.
The task of organizing the outward-bound convoys from
Britain to the Caribbean was shared between the Admiralty
and the West India associations. The trade was divided into
two portions: the London and East Coast trade assembling at
Portsmouth as the convoy rendezvous, the Irish and western
trade at Cork. In the former case, the Secretary of the
Admiralty corresponded with the London West India Committee;
in the latter with the outport associations at Bristol, Liverpoc
and G].asgow. 256 Requests for convoy in both cases originated
from the West India merchants and it was for the Admiralty
to devise the sailing schedules and provide the warship
escort in the light of their other commitments.
The minutes of meetings kept by the Society of West India
Merchants in London contain many examples of how the applica-
tion for convoy was made. 257 Their request to the Admiralty
255. These and later references (indicated'WIM or Wfl/IP here-
after) cite two manuscript collections preserved in the West
India Committee library, Norfolk Street, London, W.C. 2.
i. Minutes of the Meetings of the West India Merchants (1st
series): vol. IV - March 1794 to Deceniber 1802. 	 (vol. III
is lost)
ii. Minutes of Meetings of the West India Planters and Merchants(2nd series); vol. II - february 1793 to April 1801
256. lilian M. Penson: op. cit. p. 388.
257, 258. Examples occur in the WIM committee minutes for the
meetings of: March 28, 1794; September 16, 1794; November 25,
1794; April 28, 1795; November 27, 1798.
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followed a stex4otyped pattern: 	 that the Chairman be
directed to make application to the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty, that a convoy may be appointed and ready to
sail on ------next, on the first fair wind subsequent thereto,
waiting twenty-four hours for the ships in the Downs
The applications from the outporte were less uniform.
Although many followed the pattern of the London committee,
in some cases petitions were addressed direct to the Admiralty
by local groups of merchants and shipowners. Por instance
in October 1794, the merchants of Lancaster requested convoy
from Cork to the West Indies, to sail in the middle of Nover.
Their vessels had missed the Liverpool rendezvous and there
was too little time for them to reach Cork before the regular
convoy set sail for the Caribbean. In such circumstances the
Admiralty went out of its way to help. If the Lancaster
merchants could get their ship to Cork not later than November
9th, it agreed to provide a warship to escort them to the convoy
rendezvous at Spithead. 26 ° A similar case occurred in January
1794, when a group 0± Bristol merchants were given escort for
twenty of their vessels which had missed the last convoy.261
258. See previous page 257, 258.
259, 260. ADM 7/60: Convoys and Cruizers, 1794 - 1797.
Applications for Convoy: Mr. Dent (for the merchants of
Lancaster) to the Admiralty, October 16, 1794; and the reply,
October 31.
261. ADM 7/60: Convoys and Cruizers ... January 1, 1794.
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These however were exceptions to the general rule. Normally
the Admiralty .only granted applications for convoy from the
established West India associatiorin the four major ports.
Although the first steps in assembling the outward-bound
convoys were straightforward enough, many problems had to be
solved before they could sail. The most difficult concerned
their frequency and size, over which the interests of the West
India merchants and the Admiralty were often at variance.
Prom the merchants' point of view, the frequent dispatch
of small convoys from Portsmouth and Cork - preferably at the
rate of one every month - was the Ideal arrangement. Not
being self-supporting economically, the Caribbean colonies
were greatly dependent on the Import of foodstuffs from Britain
(and North America). The bulk shipment of Irish beef, pork
and dairy produce from Cork and the neighbouring ports was
particularly important. Highly perishable in the tropics
these cargoes had to be shipped at frequent intervals. More-
over the West Indian planters entirely relied upon the convoys
for the regular supply of plantation stores, casks and equip-
ment, without which they would have failed. For them it
was essential that several convoys left Britain early in the
year, to ensure the maximum number of ships being in the West
Indies for turn-around at the height of the sugar cane harvest.
April was recognized as the latest month for the departure
of outward-bound convoys, if they were to Unload their cargoes
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and clear for the voyage home before the hurricane season
began.262
In almost every respect these conditions did not suit
the Admiralty. The chronic shortage of frigates and sloops
in the Royal Navy made it impossible to provide escorts for
frequent small convoys. The situation was on one occasion
aptly summarized by Vice-Admiral Jervis: ' ... we cannot
afford convoy for driblets.' 263
 Because of the difficulty
over warships for escort duty, the Admiralty was reluctant
to authorize a fixed number of convoys per annum sailing from
Portsmouth and Cork. For the same reason it refused to
accept a number of long-term arrangements for convoys which
were proposed by the West India Committee. Nevertheless there
is sufficient evidence to show that the Admiralty did as much
as possible with the resources available. 264 Gradually the
annual number of convoys to the West Indies rose as the war
progressed. The average for the first three years of the war
was five from Portsmouth and five from Cork; by 1809 the
frequency was eight from each port.265
262. It was not until later in the war that autimn convoys
from the West Indies were appointed. See p.14.
263. St Vincent Papers (N.R.S.): vol. II, p. 331.
264. See WIM: minutes of proceedings of September 16, 1794;
November 25, 1794 and November 24, 1795.
265. The figures exclude convoys composed of troop transports,
victualling and ordnance ships, and fleet trains.
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A second problem concerned the size of the convoys.
For two reasons they were invariably large during the period.
The volume of trade to the Caribbean had grown dramatically;
moreover, if the West India merchants and shipowners could
not have the frequent small convoys they required, It was
inevitable that those which were appointed should be large.
Over 200 merchantmen in one convoy was not uncommon and the
number was rarely less than 150. With the few warships he
had, the escort commander needed all his skill to be able to
control such numbers even in fine weather. The task o± assem-
bly at the rendezvous and getting the convoy under way was
inevitably a slow and laborious business.
Assuming that all the difficulties mentioned have been
resolved, a typical outward-bound convoy is assembled in
St Helens roads off Portemauth, awaiting a favourable wind.
When the escort commander opened his sealed orders from the
Admiralty, he read the ThU owing: '... Taking under your
convoy, all such store-ships, victuallers and trade as may be
at Portsmouth or Spithead bound f or the West Indies, you shall
put to sea and proceed to Palmouth and whence to Cork and take
under convoy anything there ... call at Madeira to take on
wine ... then proceed to the West Indies and having seen into
Carlisle Bay (Barbados) the trade for the leeward Islands, go
on with the remainder to Jamaica.' 266 So instructed, the
266. ADM 2/1097: Secret Order3 & Convoys - May 1793 to April l7
Admiralty to Captain P. Roberts of H.M.S. Success, at Spitheaci,
March 17, 1794.
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escort commander then had to transmit the orders to the
convoy in his charge.
Normally this was done in the form of a printed document
en-titled: "Signals and Instructions for ships under convoy."26
One copy was sent b the master of every merchant ship in the
convoy, after being signed and dated by the escort commander.
The document contained a mass of detailed instructions and
one of its main purposes was to ensure that none of the ship-
masters afterwards complained they had been unaware of convoy
procedure.
Much space was devoted to an explanation of the different
types of signals, which the escort might make to the convoy
either in harbour or at sea. One set comprised distin,guishing
signals, whereby the identity of the escort warship was clearly
established for -the members of the convoy. These were very
necessary in a crowded anchorage like Spithead where several
convoys might be assembling simultaneously. The recognition
signal hoisted by the escort differed according to the desti-
nation of the convoy. In one copy of the "Signals and
Instructions ... " for instance, the distinguishing flag was
a union jack f or the West Indies, white for the Mediterranean,
267. Numerous copies of these instructions survive, especially
for the period after 1802. Their first appearance in standard
printed form is difficult to date with certainty, but they were
definitely in use during the American War of Independence.
The copies cited hereafter are held in the National Maritime
Maseum Library.
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blue pierced with white for Africa, yellow, red and yellow for
the East Indies, and so on.268
Similarly detailed signals applied to the convoy at sea.
When, for example, the escort hoisted a blue, white and blue
flag, with a red flag below, at the foretop mast, the instruc-
tion to the convoy was: 'make all sail possible to windward'.
The same signal flown from the maintopmast meant: 'put into
port', and at the *Sizen: 'Anchor'.
	 Such procedure was aU
in the day's work to warships of the Royal Navy, but the lunib-
ering merohantmen often became confused by the commander's
signals. Signal instructions were not confined to flags
flown by the escort. In foggy weather and during the hours
of darkness, prearranged systems of gun and light signals were
used. Moreover, the masters of the merchantrnen were ordered
to supply themselves with a q.uantity of false fire to
give the alarm on the approach of an enemy's cruizer in the
night.' In addition to signals procedure, the printed instruc-
tions told shipmasters what to do in the event of their vessels
being captured by the enemy. Finally, most copies of the
"Signals and Instructions" contained additional orders, written
in the escort commander's own band, which specifically related
to the voyage about to be undertaken.269
268, 269. "Signals & Instructions for ships under convoy".
Printed document of 14 pagee, as issued to Mr. Metcalf, master
of the merchant ship Countess Harcourt, by Captain George Price
of H.M.S. Hotspur, April 4, 1802.	 C'àpy in Nat. Mar. Mus.
Library.
130
Having set sail from Portsmouth, the convoy followed a
well-defined route to the West Indies. The course was
dictated primarily by wind and current but also by calls en
route and the difficulty of ascertaining longitude at sea.27°
Down Channel the convoy might sail in company with others,
bound for the Mediterranean or the Cape, in which case the
escort would temporarily be strengthened by units of the Channel
sQuadron. It was customary for the Portsmouth convoy to put
in at Falmou-th, the headquarters of the Post Office mail packets
There the latest despatches for the West Indies were collected,
as well as stragglers who had missed the last convoy from Cork.
Once clear of the soundings, course was steered south-west
into the Atlantic. At least one convoy per season called at
Funcha]. (Madeira) to take on wine, a valuable commodity in the
West Indies. The north-east trade wind was then picked up
anywhere between Madeira and the 27° N. parallel of latitude
and followed across the Atlantic. Throughout the oceanic
passage the escort was fully engaged in signalling the convoy
to keep station and close round the commodore during the night,
chasing the laggards and coming to the assistance of those in
distress. Each day the number of ships in sight were counted
270. The problem is well summarized by G.W. Nookolds in two
articles entitled: 'Early Timekeepers at sea' and published
by the Anticivarian Horological Society in its Proceedings,
vol. IV, No. 4, (September, 1963) pp . 110 - 113; and vol. V,
No. 5, (December 1963), pp . 148 - 152.
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to see that none of the convoy was missing.271' 272
In the approximate position of 15° N., 50° W., a section
of the convoy parted company from the main body. This was
the Guiana trade bound for Berbice, Essequibo and Denierara.
As it usually comprised only a few ships, the last part of
the voyage was undertaken with the weak escort of only one
sloop or sometimes alone. The risk of meeting enemy privateere
off the Guiana coast was considerable but two reasons prevented
more satisfactory arrangements being made. It was normally
impossible for the Guiana ships to accompany the main convoy
to Barbados and then proceed on to their destination because
of strong currents, adverse winds and the delay involved.
Equally it was impracticable for the whole convoy to be diverted
to the Guiana coast, when its most nimerous and valuable portion
was anxious to reach Jamaica and the Leeward Islands without
delay.
Qnce the Guiana trade had been detached, the rest of the
convoy proceeded on to Barbados and dropped anchor in Carlisle
Bay. Normally the passage from England to Barbados took six
to seven weeks but very much longer in bad weather. As the
271, 272. For typical contemporary accounts of an outward-bound
convoy, see:
Nat. Mar. Mu.s.: Lieutenants Loge:-
1. Adin L/R: 28-18 - Log of the Raisonable, February 15 to
March 30, 1795.
2. Adm WS: 583 - Log of the Swan, June to July, 1796.
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first landfall for the incoming convoys, Carlisle Bay was
often crowded with shipping. But it was in many ways an
unsuitable anchorage, being an open roadstead on the exposed
windward side of the island. Moreover the Jamaica merchants
always resented the time lost by their vessels having to call
first at Carlisle Bay. In pite of their protests the
Admiralty refused to consider direct convoys to Jamaica on
the ground of lack of escort warships. Thus both the Jamaica
and the Antilles trade were escorted in the same outward-bound
convoy and upon arrival in the Caribbean distributed to the
various islands according to an unvarying pattern.273
Prom Barbados, the trade bound for the other Windward
Islands made the short passage to St Lucia, St Vincent and
Grenada independently. The rest, and greater part, of the
convoy then sailed under escort from Barbados, steering north-
west through one of three passages between Dorninica and
St Vincent. 274 Once through, the Leeward Islands trade was
detached and proceeded north to English Harbour, Antigua.
Here the ships made their own way to the individual islands -
St. Christopher, Nevis, Montserrat and, ocoasionally, Barbuda.
After this detachment the remainder of the convoy, now
with reduced escort, steered west-north-west across the Carib-
273. Lucy P. Horsfall: 'The West Indies Trade',
in 'Trade Winds'. (Edited by C.N. Parkinson; London; 1948)
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MAP 7. Route of the Outward : bound Convoys and their
Distribution in the Caribbean
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bean Sea to Jamaica. Course was shaped for Alta Vela, a
rocky islan.d off the south coast of San Domingo and from thence
to Point Morant, the most easterly headland of Jamaica. The
passage from Carlisle Bay to Point Morant normally took between
five arid six days. Before the convoy sighted Jamaica, the
San Domingo trade was detached off Cape Donna Maria to make
its way to Port-au-Prince and Mole St Nicolas. The bulk of
the Jamaica trade then followed the south coast of the island
under escort into Port Royal, while the less numerous and
important north coast trade was left to proceed independently
to its destination. Throughout the voyage to Port Royal,
the Honduras trade remained attached to the Jamaica section
of the convoy. There it frequently had to wait many days
until a suitable escort could be found for the final stage
of the voyage. One sloop normally performed this duty, taking
the trade via Swan and Ruatan Islands into Honduras Bay.275'276
The convoy route which has been described calls for
comment. In the first place it was a well-trodden path which
had been followed for decades. Due to wind and current and
the need to fit the complicated convoy arrangements into a
routine pattern, little alteration of route was possible.
This bronght certain advantages. Cruiser patrols could be
concentrated at points of danger; the intricacies of the
275, 276. op. cit.: Lucy P. Horsfall ... pp.l%8.
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passage became familiar after years of experience. On the
other hand, the route became egually well-known to the enemy.
Such knowledge might not harm a strongly-escorted convoy in
the Channel or in passage across the Atlantic. But it was
a very real danger after the convoy's arrival in the Caribbean,
especially when the merchantmen were dispersed to the individua]
islands. French privateers invariably concentrated in those
waters through which they knew the trade must pass.
The threat was obviously greater to ships sailing indepen-
dently than to those with even a weak escort. In fact during
the period, very few attacks were made by privateers upon large
escorted convoys. 277 Nevertheless it is clear that after
the Atlantic passage and landfall at Barbados, the normal
outward-bound convoy became progressively less capable of
defending itself. Distributing the ships to their individual
destinations inevitably weakened the escort, in those very
areas where the privateere operating close to their bases were
strongest. Indeed, as has been shown, many merchantmen
traversed the final stages of the routes to Guiana and the
Bahamas without escort. Their losses became so serious by
277. The Bahamas trade
A few vessels bound for Bahamas accompanied the main convoy
from England on the route described. But the distance between
Barbados and Bahamas was so great and the time taken to reach
their destination so unnecessarily prolonged from their point
of view that most Bahamian merchants preferred the risk of
trading with independent sailers or "runners". Sometimes
they took convoy as far as mid-Atlantic and then got the
escort commander's permission to proceed independently to
Bahamas.
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1798 that the London West India Committee had to remind the
Admiralty of the trade's need for protection along the whole
route. Unless escort was given to each port of destination,
the whole concept of convoy was destroyed in seas ' ... much
infested with small privateers.' 278 While, therefore, the
general planning and routeing of the outward-bound convoys was
basically sound, operational weaknesses existed especially in
the latter stages of the voyage.
The organization of the convoys homeward-bound from the
West Indies was much more complicated. It ought, theoretically,
to have been simpler in an area of similar crops and trade.
There were however factors which did not occur in England but
were inescapable in the Caribbean: the hurricane season, the
vagaries of the sugar cane harvest and the problem of weighing
the needs of the local merchants and planters against those
of the station commanders.
Responsibility for appointing homeward-bound convoys rested
with the commanders-in-chief of the Jamaica nd Leeward Islands
stations. Although the initial steps were taken by the
Admiralty and West India Committee in London, they had no real
control over their appointment. The distance between London
and the Caribbean and the resultant communications delay was
partly responsible. More important was the fact that the
278. WIM. Minutes of the Committee meeting of November 27, 1798.
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assembly and departure of the convoys entirely depended on
local conditions and circumstances - which only those who were
there could assess. Thus the composition and sailing dates
of the convoys were decided after joint discussion between
the station admirals and local, merchants and planters. Another
point was that, in contrast to the outward convoys, the return
trade sailed for England in two distinct sections and by differ-
ent routes - one from Jamaica and the other from the Leeward
Islands. 279 This clear separation lay emphasis upon the
responsi1ity of the station admiral for convoy arrangements
within his command.
Convoy arrangements were affected by the frecjuency of
hurricanes in the Caribbean during the months of August, Septeni-
ber and October. Marine underwriters always charged double
premium on vessels which remained in the area during that
period. Lloyds would only insure vessels at the standard rate
if it could be shown that they bad cleared from Jamaica not later
than July 26th and from the Leeward Islands not later than
August 1st. 280 As a result the u1y convoys were always large,
with merchantmen jostling to join in time. If the sugar crop
was delayed, the difficulties multiplied.
By far the greatest influence upon the convoy schedules,
279. See pp.l50-'l for their description.
280.WD: Minutes of meeting of Committee, January 12, 1798.
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however, was exerted by the principal commodity the merchant
ships brought home - sugar. To understand why, an outline
of its production in the West Indies must be given. Briefly
the seed was planted between October and January and after
twelve to fourteen months' growth the canes were cut and crushed
in mills. The extracted juice was then boiled in vats, from
which molasses was drawn off as the raw material for distilla-
tion into rum. The brown residue remaining formed the
muecovado sugar, which was then packed into barrels. Normally
the planter aimed to have all his muscovado in cask and ready
f or shipment by mid-summer.281
Unfortunately so far as convoys were concerned, wide
variations existed throughout the Caribbean both in methods
of cane cultivation and in the harvesting season. There were
great differences even within the Lesser Antilles. The
Barbados planters often uned to "clay" or semi-refine their
sugars. This practice enhanced their value on the London
market bt could result in shipments being as much as two months
behind those of the neighbouring islands. By contrast,
harvesting on the Antigiia estates was usually completed much
earlier than elsewhere; there was bitter rivalry between the
two islands as a result. 282 Moreover, the Guiana plantations
281.Chambers Encyol. (1959), vol. XIII,	 . 265 - 266.
282.Richard Pares: 'War and trade in the West Indies ...
pp. 307 - 308.
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followed yet another seasonal pattern. As mainland crops they
were not only cultivated quite differently from those on the
islands, the harvest season was much earlier. In consequence,
the increasingly important Guiana sugar trade would have bene-
fited by convoys sailing for England in January or February.
But for years the old system prevailed, whereby the first
convoys of the season did not depart from the Leeward Islands
until April or May.283
Any mishap to the cane harvest brought serious dislocation
to convoy arrangements. In April 1794, Admiral Jervis was
iifformed by a group of leading Antigua merchants that: ' ... the
lateness of the crop will not permit our sugars to be shipped
in time for the arranged departure of the convoy.' 284 With
difficulty the station admiral recast the entire assembly and
escort plan for the conmiand and the convoy's departure was
postponed until the end of May. Pour years later heavy rain-
fall tbroughout the Leeward Islands in June delayed the harvest
so much, that large quantities of sugar remained to be exported
after the final convoy of the season bad sailed on August let.
After repeated requests, the Admiralty agreed to appoint a
special convoy, departing from Antigua on October 10th after
the hurrican season was over.285
283.Ragatz, L.T.: 'The Pall of the Planter Class in the
British Caribbean, 1763 - 1822',
284.ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, April 13, 1794.
285.WIM: Minutes of Committee meeting, August 3, 1798.
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Since the planters entirely depended upon England for the
shipment of stores, casks and equipment, further disruption
could be caused by the late arrival of an outward-bound convoy.
Sugar production on Jamaica in March 1794 was affected in just
this way: ' ... the crops throughout the island have been
considerably retarded for want of the animal supplies arid
especially as regards the articles of wood hoops, copper nails,
etc. for making hogsheads and puncbeons.' 286
 The harvest was
delayed six weeks as a result. Only a few vessels were ready
to sail from Port Royal at the appointed time and the convoy's
departure was postponed until May 20th.
The last aspect of organizing the homeward-bound convoys
to be considered concerns the problem of liaison between merchant1
planter and station admiral. Much as the planter wanted his
crop to be shipped at the right time and the merchant his vessels
protected by convoy, their wishes had to be offset against the
scuadron's ability to provide them. The acute shortage of
small warships for escort purposes on both stations has already
been noted. 287 Normally the first step in the sequence of
convoy assembly was taken by the merchants and planters. Their
request for the appointment of a convoy on a certain date was
made to the station commander through their representative on
286. AtIIIl/245: John Jacques, custos of Kingston, to Commodore
Pord, March 17, 1794.
287. See chapters I, p.38, 40; and II, p. 88-9.
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each island, known as the 'custos'. It was the duty of the
'oustos' to ensure that the trade was ready in time and to relay
the station commiider's instnuctions to all concerned. John
Jacques, who was 'chief custos' of Jamaica between 1794 and 1798,
frequently appears in the station ournals in this connection.288
After receiving a req.uest for convoy, the station commander
decided its date of departure and arranged for the provision of
an escort. Once the date had been chosen an interval of about
six weeks was allowed the merchants and shipowners, to collect
their vessels and assemble at the appointed rendezvous. It
was particularly important for the escorts to be there in good
time, ' ... to prevent the merchant ships or storeships being
kept in deinurrage.'289' 290
The sequence of assembly worked tolerably well in practice,
but was liable to break down at several points. Dilatoriness
by merchantmen in reaching the rendezvous was a frequent cause
of trouble. Many ships used to delay join ting convoy until the
last possible moment - in order to keep their cargoes and crews
freshest and profit by most favourable terms of insurance. Two
288. For instance in: ADM 1/245: John Jacques to Commodore
Pord, March 17, 1794.
	
-
ADM 1/247: same to Rear-Admiral William Parker, June 16, 1796.
289, 290. Barham Papers (N.R.S.), vol. III, p. 37. A similar
warning occurs in ADM 1/246: Ford to Stephens, March 30, 1795.
'Dennirrage' was a technical term used in insurance and maritime
law to refer to a vessel or its cargo detained in prt beyond
an agreed time.
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examples amongst many will suffice. In February 1797, two
warships reached Mole St Nicolas from the rendezvous at Port
Antonio, Jamaica, escorting a convoy of only five vessels. The
Kingston cuetos had originally said that twenty-eight ships would
be ready to sail on January 12th. Despite a three-week post-
ponement and every effort to collect the trade from the Jamaican
ports, only five left on the appointed day. 291
 Quite rightly,
the escort commander pointed out that: ' ... unless the merchants
are more punctual in assembling their ships, it wLll be impossible
to carry on the service without prejudioe to other objects of
importance'. 292
 A similar case occurred five months later.
Captain Bissett, the escort comm,irtder, waited three days beyond
the appointed sailing date for his convoy to assemble at Port
Antonio. 293 After being forced to divide the escort in order
to round up the laggards, the convoy eventually arrived very
late at Mole St Nicolas and with many fewer ships than originally
intended.294
Once assembled at -the rendevous, the entire responsibility
for protecting the convoy until it reached its destination rested
291. ADM 1/248: Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker to Stephens, February 14
1797.
292. ADM 1/248: Captain Brooking, in command of H.MIS. Jamaica,
to Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker, February 11, 1797.
293. ADM 1/248: Captain Blssett, in command of H.M.S. Quebec,
to same, August 23, 1797.
294. ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Stephens, August 26, 1797.
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with the escort commander. Often the onerous duty was well
performed, as several resolutions preserved in the West India
Committee records, congratulating officers concerned, testify.
]Tach depended on the individual commander, the size of convoy and
escort and the weather encountered during the voyage. Prequentl
the inadecjuacy of the escort made an arduous and unpopular duty
more difficult. Early in 1794, for instance, the shortage of
warships in the amaica scivadron became so acute that only a
captured French frigate was available to escort the February
convoy. Hurriedly fitted out and renamed H.MIS. Convert she
sailed from Bluefields Bay on Feb±uary 5th with thirty-two mer-
cbantmen. Liore ships joined off the north coast of Jamaica unti
the convoy numbered fifty-five sail under the sole charge of the
Convert. Two days out from Port Antonio - in the darkness of
the early hours o± February 8th - the convoy struck the reefs off
the east coast of Grand Cayman Island. The Convert and nine of
the merchantrnen were wrecked although most of the crews were
rescued. At the ensuing court-martial Captain Lawford was not
exonerated but the main cause of the disaster was attributed to
the inadecjuacy of the escort, both in numbers and calibre.295' 2
Sometimes relations between the escort commander and his
convoy became very strained during the voyage. The case of
Captain James Norman of the Medusa was fortunately exceptional,
295, 296. ADM 1/245: (1) Rear-Admiral Ford to Stephens:
February 20 and April 3, 1794.
(2) Captain Lawford to Rear-Admiral Ford:Pebri*7 27, 1794.
	
(the convoy report).
but showed what could happen. A convoy of 130 merchantmen
sailed from Jamaica on July 28th 1795, under the charge of
Captain Norman in the frigate Medusa, with the sloop Triton in
support. A!ter its arrival in England a protest signed by
twenty-five of the ships' masters was delivered to the West India
Committee. The escort commander's conduct was so severely
criticised that the committee instituted a fu].]. enquiry. Their
findings disclosed a number of disturbing incidents. Ten days
out from Port Antonio the convoy had been scattered by a storm.
Instead of laying-to and allowing the merchant ships to regroup,
Captain Norman forged ahead. Throughout the Atlantic passage
the Medusa remained from six to ten leagues ahead of the convoy -
logging as much as 185 miles a day - although fully aware that
many of the ships were too far astern to read her signals. Most
were not coppered and their sailing speed was in any case reduced
by the heavy cargoes they carried. In a desperate effort to
keep up with the escort, several lost spars or split their rigging1
The results were disastrous • When the Channel was reached on
October 2nd only 35 ships, the fastest sailers, etill remained
in touch with the escort. A group of between 50 and 60 merchant-
men which had fallen completely behind by September 13th, still
held their course in an effort to rejoin. Sixteen of these
were taken by Prench privateers before they could reach safety.
The West India Committee report was sent to the Admiralty, who
ordered Captain Norman to be court-martiafl.ed. In Pebruary 1796
14.5
297, 298
he was found guilty of gross negligence and reduced to half-pay.
The question of how many homeward-bound convoys should
sail annually, and at what time of the year, was another crucial
factor. It has been said that the hurricane season prevented
departure during August and September. 299 The period between
December and March was also unsuitable, owing to winter gales
in the North Atlantic and the fact that the sugar cane bad not
then been harvested. 300 As regards the months which remained,
the West Indian merchants and planters had in the past been
satisfied with a straightforward system. This comprised the
departure of two convoys each from Jamaica and the Leeward
Islands during the season. The first left England in the late
autumn and returned from the Caribbean the following spring;
the second reached the Caribbean in the spring and left again for
home in June or July. The volume of West Indies trade during
the early and middle decades of the eighteenth century had, with
some difficulty, been accommodated within this framework. But
by the end of the century it was no longer adequate. The whole
scale of Caribbean exports, principally sugar but also other
produce, had grown enormously, as had the number of merchant
ships wishing to take convoy. It became apparent soon after
297, 298. WIM: Minutes of Committee's proceedings, December 9,
1795; January 2, 1796.
299. See p. 137
300. Except in Guiana; see p. 139
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the outbreak of war in February 1793 that more homeward-bound
convoys must be appointed and their dates of sailing reconsidered.
Little was done for some time but in September 1794, the
Committee of West India Merchants prepared a memorandum on convoys
for the Admiralty. Included were recommendations about their
frequency and date of departure and they proposed the following
time-table:-
Optirnuni Period of Departure
	 Number of Convoys (annually)
1. STThMER April to end of
July
2. AUTUVIN October to November
















The dates chosen by the Committee coincided with the
anticipated arrivals - in February, April, June and October -
of the outward-bound convoys from England. More important was
the rise in the number of summer convoys to three. Also,
because the pressure for more convoys was so great, the Committee













did not hesitate to ask for the appointment of a email winter
convoy in January/Pebru.ary in spite of the risk of bad weather
during those inonth8.
The Admiralty accepted the proposals and the new schedules
began in the 1795 season and continued throughout the war. In
1798 it became necessary to define the sailing dates of the three
main summer convoys from each station more precisely:-
Optimum Period of Departure
SITh	 1. Not later than May 10th
2. About June 30th
3. Not later than
July 26th




There were good reasons for this. Demands for shipping
and convoys were heaviest in the montha of May, June and July,
the peak of the sugar cane harvest. Earlier in the season the
302, 303. Table prepared from information in the following:-
WIM. Minutes of Committee's proceedings, November 27, 1798.
ADM 1/321: Harvey to Nepean, April 8 and May 13, 1798.
11f8
produce was not ready and the beginning of August heralded the
hurricane season. It has been said that Lloyd's charged
double insurance on all vessels still at Jamaica after July 26th
304
and in the Leeward Islands after August let. 	 To avoid chaos
and overcrowding in the last summer convoy, therefore, more
attention had clearly to be paid to the timing of the earlier
sailings.
Even so, it soon became imperative to appoint an autumn
convoy. Merchants and planters were unanimous in insisting
that vessels which had missed the July/August convoy should not
be compelled to waste months waiting for the departure of the
first convoy the following year. 'A convoy from Jamaica in
October is always necessary, since much of the Jamaica crop of
sugar and other produce can often only be collected after
July 26th. Mach loss and inconvenience has been caused by the
failure -to send an October convoy in 1797.1305 Autumn convoys
were also instituted on the Leewards station. That for 1796
sailed from St Kitte on November 28th, and for 1798 on October
30th.306
The size of the homeward-bound convoys was invariably large -
150 to 200 inerchantinen. By comparison the escort was exceedingly
304.See p. 31.
305.WIM. Minutes of Committee's proceedings, January 12, 1798.
306.ADM 1/319: Christian to Nepean, December 22, 1796.
ADM 1/321: Harvey to Nepean, December 8, 1798.
May 1795	 188	 1
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email, except if units of the station squadron happened to be
returning to England at the same time • The escort normally
comprised one or two frigates and sloops, depending on the size
of the convoy but often it might only be a single sloop. The
details of known convoys sailing from the Caribbean during the
period are revealing:-
e of Departure 	 Size of	 Escort	 Remarks
in West Indies	 Convoy
June 1793	 150	 1
July 1793	 158	 1
July 1794	 183	 1







June 1796	 170	 2
July 1796	 177	 1	 Including 57 milit-
ary transports
May 1797	 179	 4








May 1800	 206	 1
307, 308, 309, 310
(see footnotes next page)
150
The ratio between convoy and escort is 168 1 6/2.l; j
other words, each escorting warship had to look after eighty
merchantmen.
In contrast to the outward-bound trade from England, the
convoys from Jamaica and the Leeward Islands sailed in two
distinct sections and followed different routes for the home-
ward passage.
Of the two, the assembly of the Jamaica convoys was less
complicated. Clearly the task of collecting ships from pQrts
along the Jamaica coast was easier than from numerous scattered
islands. There were three convoy rendezvous on the Jamaica
coast - Negril and Bluefields in the west, Port Antonio in the
north-east. 311 The former were chosen if the convoy intended
to proceed via the Gulf of Mexico, the latter if through the
Windward Passage.
In the iritial stages of assembly, the trade from the ports
along the south coast of Jamaica normafly collected at Port
Royal and then proceeded together under escort to the rendezvous.
Pew difficulties were experienced by this valuable section of
the trade as it passed close to the sq.uadron's main naval base.
Collecting the north coast trade was much less easy. The
307, 308, 309, 310. Compiled from Lieutenant-Commander D.W. Water'
unpublished paper: 'Notes on convoy system in naval warfare(December 1957) and from information in:
ADM 1/321: Harvey to Nepean, April 8, 1798; A.D.M. 1/248:
Hyde Parker to Nepean, May 12, 1798, and ADM 1/3992: Lloyds
Committee to the Admiralty, September 15, 1798.
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MAP 8. Routes of Homeward:bound Convoys from
Jamaica and Leeward Islands.
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plantations were scattered and remote and oontrary winds and
currents made its access difficult from Port Royal. In
particular the area was notorious for enemy privateers.312
Usually one sloop of the Jamaica squadron was on permanent
patrol off the north coast and two others collected the trade
and escorted it to the rendezvous.313' 314
Convoys from Bluefie].ds and Negril Bay proceeded borne via
the Gulf of Mexico. They first steered north-east to pass
through the Yucatan Channel between Cuba and the mainland.
Occasionally a convoy would call at the Cayman Islands on the
way to pick up a cargo of' tortoiseshell. The passage of the
Yucatan Channel was not difficult, provided the convoy kept
well out from the Cuban shore to avoid the strong currents
setting to leeward. Thereafter the course was due north to
the Dry Tortugas, before any attempt was made to get to the
east through the Plorida Straits where the curf'ent was swift.
Once clear of the Straits, the convoy followed the Gulf Stream
north as far as Newfoundland and then picked up the Westerlies
for the Atlantic crossing.
The alternative route began at the Port Antonio rendezvous
and ran north-east through the Wihdward Passage. It was much
shorter than via the Gulf of Mexico but winds in the Windward
312.Emphasized, for instance, in: .A.DM 1/246: WillIam Parker
to Nepean, June 29, 1795.
313..ADM 1/245: Pord to Stephens, July 26, 1794.
314.ADM 1/246: William Parker to Nepean, October 25, 1795.
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Passage were frequently dead against, which at certain times
of the year made it quite impracticable. Thereafter the
convoys usually sailed through the Bahamas by way of the Crooked
Island Passage. The more direct Caicos Passage was normally
avoided because of contrary winds. North of the Bahamas the
route linked up with that via the Gulf of Mexico and the same
course home was then followed.
Generally the Jamaica station comm'iiders preferred to send
the trade through the Windward rather than the Gulf Passage.
Not only was it shorter; gaining a full 5 degrees easting was
a great advantage, especially for the bigger convoys. However
the struggle f or San Domingo closely affected the use of the
Windward Passage. In -this connection the crucial importance
of the base at Mole St Nicolas has been described. 315 After
the British forces were evacuated from San Domingo in October
1798, the route became increasingly dangerous; 316
 from 1802
onwards all Jamaica convoys returned home via the Gulf of Mexico.
As well as Jamaica, the station admiral was responsible
f or the safety of all the Honduras and Bahamas t rade which wished
to return to England in convoy. It proved very difficult to
combine the former with the Jamaica convoys. Because Honduras
lay far to windward of Jamaica, ships trying to reach the convoy
rendezvous faced a long struggle against adverse winds. The
315, 316. See chapter II, pp. 19 aM. 113
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voyage could take as long as six weeks to accomplish. Further-
more, there were no sugar plantations in Honduras. The princi-
pal exports of the British settlements on that coast were tropi-
cal hardwoods, especially mahogany. Adjusting the export of
these materials seasonally to coincide with the sugar trade
convoys from Jamaica was no easy matter.
In the Honduras forests the trees were felled as far as
two hundred miles into the interior, from where they were floated
down river to the coast. On arrival it was essential that
their shipment should not be delayed, otherwise the floating
logs split in the water or became infested with teredo worm.317
Normally two convoys sailed from Belize annually - in January
and July - under the escort of one sloop despatched from Jamaica.
Their departure was timed to coincide with the arrival of the
log-rafts at the coast. If the main Jamaica convoy was proceed-
ing home via the Gulf of Mexico, it was usual - particularly
in July - for the Honduras trade to join it in the Yucatan
Channel. 318 On the other hand, when the Windward Passage was
chosen the Belize convoy was forced to make the arduous voyage
to the rendezvous at Port Antonio. In the circumstances the
trade sometimes preferred to run the risk of proceeding home
independently •319
317. P.r b&.].&y ..e Easysi. bit,, 11th .a (1911), v.1. xxvi, pp. 637-9,
318..ADM 1/245: Ford to Stephens, May 12 and 17, 1793.
319.ADM 1/245: Same to same, July 26, 1794.
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The assembly of the homeward—bound convoys on the Leeward
Islands station was much more complicated. Without a central
focus like Jamaica, -the trade had to be collected from many
islands spread over a wide area, from the Virgin Islands to
Tobago and the Guiana coast. Mitch could happen before all
the ships reached the convoy rendezvous. One broken link in
the chain - a late harvest on Barbados or dilatory merchants
at Antigua - was eu±ficient to dislocate the entire system.
During the :first ten years of the war, Basseterre on the
island of St cThr)4'opher was the convoy rendezvous f or the whole
Leewards station -trade. After 1802 it was changed to Tortola
in the Virgin Islands. The method of bringing the trade to
the rendezvous was clearly established. About a month before
the convoy was due to sail, the station admiral notified each
island governor of the proposed arrangements.
Warships, normally two or three frigates or sloops, were
then detached from the squadron to collect the trade. It was
usual for the escort to start at Tobago in the extreme south
and then proceed northwards through the Windward and Leeward
Islands, picking up the trade as it passed, until the rendez-
vous was reached at St Kitts. Only on the few occasions when
several warships were available, could the escort commander
wait at a central point like Fort Royal, Martinique, while the
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trade was collected.320' 321. More often the escort was
too smil to be divided and each island had to be visited in
322turn.
The British occupation of Guiana and Trinidad in 1796/7
complicated the assembly of the Leewards station convoys.
As early as May 1796, it had been suggested that as the passage
between Berbice and Tobago took only three days, escorts collect-
ing merchantmen from -the Windward Islands should also call at
the Guiana coast to pick up any trade there wishing to take
convoy. 323
 Fortunately f or the station commander, who found
-the existing arrangements sufficiently onerous, -there were
decisive objections to the proposal. The seasonal differences
in harvesting -the sugar cane which occurred between Guiana
and the Caribbean islands have been nientioned. 324
 Moreover,
the Guiana river estuaries were frequently obstructed by sand-.
bars and laden ships could normally cross them only during the
spring and aituinn tides. For -these reasons it proved impossible
320, 321. As happened, for instance, in May 1795 when Rear-
Admiral Charles Thompson assembled the homeward-bound convoy.
See Nat. Mar. Izs.: Caidwell Papers (CAI,/l16): Caidwell's
journal and letters to Admiralty, April 20 and May 1, 1795.
And Nat. Mar. Mu.s.: Thompson Papers (THO/8): Caldwell to
Thonipsen, May 13, 1795.
322.ADM 1/316: Gardner -to Stephens, June 3, 1793.
323.ADM 1/319: Captain Parr, off Demerara, to Rear-Admiral
Christian, May 13, 1796.
324.See p. t39
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to integrate the Guiana trade with the convoy arrangements for
the rest of the station. The Guiana merchants themselves
strongly objected to sending their ships to such a distant
rendezvous as St Kitte. Having for years unsuccessfully
petitioned for direct convoy to England, in the end their
merchandise was almost entirely aarried by ships sailing
independently.
Once assembly was completed at Basseterre, the Leeward
Islands convoys sailed for England by a clearly-defined route.
Having passed through the Anegada Passage, 325 where the trade
from Tortola. was collected, course was shaped due north towards
Bermuda. No attempt was made to gain easting before reaching
latitude 300 N.326 There, any warships which bad been detached
from the squadron t o augment the escort parted company and
returned to the station. Prom Bermuda the convoys steered
north-east as far as 40° N. off the Newfoundland Bank, them
picked up the Gulf Stream and the prevailing westerlies to
carry them across the Atlantic to England.
In spite of more convoys being appointed during the period,
a lot of the Caribbean trade continued to be carried by ships
sailing independently. No legislation existed before 1798
which made it compulsory to take convoy; even afterwards,
325.See Map 8, p.
326. op. cit. Lucy P. Horsfall: 'The West India trade', p. 171.
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exemption was easy to obtain. The Government proceeded very
slowly in the whole matter of convoy legislation. Two Orders
in Council, issued soon after the war began, authorized the
arming of merchant ships for their own defence and a procedure
whereby vessels already armed could obtain licenoes to sail
without convoy.327' 328 But much more stringent regulations
were required.
Legal compulsion to take convoy was first introduced in
the Convoy Act of June 1798, severe penalties being imposed
on those who failed to do ,329 Nevertheless, large numbers
of merchantships obtained exemption - including all which were
licensed to sail independently; all sailing from foreign ports
which had no licensing authority and all trading in areas where
no organized convoy system existed. In this way hundreds of
ships avoided the compulsion to take convoy.330
For many engaged in the West India trade the attractions
of working independently were considerable. Despite the greater
risks in wartime, the voyages were often extremely profitable.
Their ships could reach the markets ahead of the slow-moving
convoys or in the long intervals between each. They followed
a more direct route to their port of destination and, above all,
327, 328. ADM 1/5179: Admiralty - Orders in Council. February
13 and March 3, 1793.
329.The provisions of the Convoy Act of 1798 are given in full
in: Pant. Reg., vol. VI (1798), pp . 151 - 155.
330.See: Capt. H. Hudleston's unpublished paper: 'The History
of Convoy' (1912), part V.
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avoided the chronic delays which beset all convoys, in
assembly and on passage.
A good 'r'unner' or independent sailer could make three
voyages annually to the Caribbean and back. Outward-bound
from England it was the best means of shipping perishable goods
which had to reach their destination without delay. For the
home run it was the best, sometimes the only, means of trans-
porting West Indian produce during times of the year when no
convoys were appointed or from areas badly served by the system.
Si.milar)4r,, many merchants and shipowners of the British
outports for the Caribbean trade resented the loss of time and
business caused by having to send their ships to the convoy
rendezvous at Portsmouth and Cork, with all the irksome delays
which that implied. Their local pape's were Lull of notices
advertising the departure of fast-sailing 'runners to the
West Indies. Thus, to give one example, the following appeared
on the front page of the 'Bristol Mercury', September 3rd, 1797:
the Hector: For Kingston and Morant, Jamaica ... mounting
14 carriage guns, with men answerable • Will sail early in
October, a running ship ... ,331
The Convoy Act was hardly enforced in the British West
331. B.M. Newspaper library, Colindale.
Thid. 'The I1verpoo1 Advertiser' of February O, 1797,
describes the launching of the 'runner' Watt, intended for
the Jamaica trade.
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Indian colonies. Merohantmen bound for England were cleared
from their ports by customs, whether they had licences of
exemption from convoy or not. It was not simply that the
customs were lax; the authority for issuing licences of
exemption was never properly organized during the period. In
some islands the power rested with the governor, in others
with the local 'custos' • More often than not, no authority
to license existed at all.
During 1798 interpretation of the Convoy Act became so
confused that several lengthy memoranda passed between the
London West India Committee and the Admiralty. The Committee
feared that inflexible compulsion to take convoy would cause
serious inconvenience and delay in the islands: ' ... unless
the convoys are more frequent than of late years and unless
the colonial governors or council have the power to grant
licences in particular cases.' 332 When the Admiralty failed
to respond, they pressed for an amendment of the 'warranty
of departure with convoy' clause, which the new act demanded
be written into the insurance policy of every nierohantman.
In future it should be qualified by the addition of the phrase:
unless by particular licence according to the provisions
of the Bill.' 333 Determined to solve the problem of exemption
332. WIC: Minutes of proceedings and correspondence between
Mr. Beeston Long, the chairman, and the Admiralty, March 2, 1798.
333, 334. WIC.: Minutes of proceedings ... March 2, 1798.
161
from convoy, the West India Committee emphasized to the
Admiralty, how disastrous were the consequences of ships missing
an appointed convoy. By the Convoy Act there was no alterna-
tive but their waiting weeks even months for the next one.
Most shipmasters in such a predicament willingly paid insurance
at the long premium. The Committee urged the creation of
licensing authorities on every island without delay. 334 The
power should be vested in the colonial governors or island
assemblies and not the station commanders, who were too involved
with their squadron duties. In September 1798 the Admiralty
accepted the suggestion335 but it was a long time before the
system became properly organized.
Little has been said about convoy discipline. Escort
duty was one of the most hated tasks in the Royal Navy and one
which few commanders undertook with any pleasure. There was
little compensation f or the heavy responsibility and prolonged
delays. If all went well they might earn the gratitude of the
convoy and a gift of plate from the West India Committee or
Lloyds. 336
 If not, they faced the wrath of the shipinasters,
333, 334. WIC.: Minutes of proceedings ... March 2, 1798.
335. ADM 2/604: Secretary's Out-Letters: Nepean to Beeston
Long (chairman of the WIC), August 1, 1798.
336. Thus Captain Roddam Home of H.M.S. Africa received a hand-
some dinner service and the congratulations of the West India
Committee in 1796. SEE: WIM: minutes of proceedings,
October 18 and December 13, 1796.
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merchants and owners and sometimes a court-martial.
The problem is perhaps beet shown by q.uoting extracts from
the log of one escort ship during a typical voyage. In 1797
Captain James Bissett, with the frigate Janus, 32, and one
sloop in company, was escort commander of a homeward-bound
convoy of 54 merchantmen which sailed from Port Antonio,
Jamaica, on July 26th and arrived in the Downs on October 3rd:-
'July 26th Signalled -to weigh; convoy joined by 15 sail
from the south side of the island (Jamaica);
signalled for ships to windward to bear down into wake of
convoy
July 31st Signalled for ships astern to make more sail
(not complyd with)
August 5th 17 sail joined convoy from the Mole ... convoy
all in eight, in number 54.
August 7th ... Signalled with gun for convoy to close during
the night.
August 28th Corvo 391 leagues ... progress during day of
convoy only 20 leagues.
August 30th - September let Peggy transport hailed and told
us that they made three feet o± water in one hour
survey'd and found unfit to proceed further; burnt her and
took out the people.
September 3rd Signalled Quebec (the esoort sloop) to keep
rear of convoy in close order.
September 5th Pired a gun shotted at ye Pingall for not
complying with signal.
September 16th Strong gales. Heavy sailing ships at some
distance astern. - past 9 saw a bright light
astern ... a brig coming before the wind, through neglect not
paying due attention to their steerage ... ran us athwart hawse,
carried away our bowsprit, foremast and main topsail yard with
several other damages ... at 10 made signal of distress
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September 17th .... on the previous night 4 sail of the convoy
parted company.
September 19th .... made signal with gun to call in all the
detached ships of the convoy.
September 20th Overpress'd with sail having in tow the brig
Musgrove of Whitehaven that 1st her mainmast.
September 25th Sighted land, N1W 14 leagues (Mizen Head)
23 sail of convoy in sight.
September 29th Made signal with 4 guns to wore; in wearing
the Busbey Park ran on board us but sustained
no damage. 3 of the transports parted company in the night.
October 3rd
	
Signalled the convoy to make the best of their
way to their port in view; at 9 came to with
the best bower in the Downs ... ' 337
In summary, the convoy system as it operated to and from
the West Indies during the period was a necessary inconvenience.
In spite of its many faults - delay, cumbersomeness, unpopularity
and dif±'icuJ.ties in organization and control - the system sharply
reduced mercantile shipping losses through enemy action. This
was not to say that ships sailing without convoy did not continue
to p]ay an important part in the Caribbean trade. Hundreds
337. Nat. Mar. Mus.: Lieutenants Logs.
The lo of the Janus, August 4, 1796 to November 29, 1797.
(AdnVI41J.l6).
Other logs of ships escorting convoys to and from the West Indies
during the period tell a very similar story. See in particular
(Nat. Mar. Mae.: same source).:-
The log of the Swan, September 1794 to October 1799.
(Adm/1475.583).























of independent 'runners' still operated and in many instances
the provisions of the Convoy Act were blatantly disregarded.
Nevertheless the effectiveness of the convoys can be proven
statistically. Although the facts available are few and not
altogether reliable, the evidence is conclusive. Between
1793 and 1805 over 6,500 British and colonial-registered
merchant ships were lost or captured, that is an average of
500 per annum. Yet in 1797 - the year before the Convoy Act
came into force - the loss had risen to 949 ships. A Convoy
Register (covering the period April 1793 to December 1796 only)
which has survived, gives the following remarkable statistics:-
Year Convoys hips	 Ships taken Stragglers from Annual 	 ae
recorded convoyed in convoy 	 convoy taken	 SB
allc	 es)
338. Admiralty Library: Convoy Register No. 41.	 (April 1793 -
February 1797).
Volume I of Lloyd's Proceedings (1771 - 1804) quotes an average
annual loss of 400 merchant ships from enemy privateer action,
during the period 1793 - 1802.
II.
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In other words during the first four years of the war
only 21 . 5% of the total marine casualty was of ships belonging
to an appointed convoy at the time of their loss. More-
over, most of those were vessels which had, for one reason
or another, become detached from the convoy. So the true
loss of merchant ships while actually in convoy was extremely
small, only 1.8% of the total. Therein lies the complete
vindication of' the convoy system. No further doubts could
be expressed at the time as to its necessity. The main
problem which remained was that convoys should be more
efficient and more frequent.
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CHAPJER 4
CAR IBBEAN MAR IT IME TRADE, 1783 - 1802
Part 1: The ships, the commodities and the
Free Port System
Between the end of the American War in 1783 and the
outbreak of the French Revolutionary War ten years later,
trade between Britain and her Caribbean colonies rose
sharply. 339
 Even in the war years which followed, the growth
was hardly checked despite severe losses by enemy privateer
action. As the volume of trade increased so did the number
of merchant ships engaged. Available statistics 0± entries
and clearances from the ports of Britain and the colonies,
confirm the trend:-
339. Detailed statistics appear in P.R.0.: BT 6/185:
'State of the Trade of Great Britain in its imports and
exports ... '. For part of these, see appendixf.
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Trade	 Number of British-registered veaae].e
1784 1192 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799
1. Entries into Britain from
the British West Indies	 487 544 590 571 602 617 577 655 829
2. Clearances frQn the British
West Indies to Britain	 - 705 726 718 608 -	 - -	 -
3. Entries into the British
West Indies from Britain	 - 503 406 564 510 -	 -	 -	 -
4. Clearances from Britain
to the British West Indies 422 482 I53 572 501 597 594 675 6%
340, 34].
Of greater significance than the number of ships, however, was the
rise in overall tonnage;-
340, 34].. Calculated from entries in BT 6/185 (see previous page) and
P.R.O.: Cu8tolns 17/15 to 17/19 inclusive. For part of these, see appendices.
The figures here shown are not directly comparable. Di. to the duration of
the Atlantic passage, there is a disparity between clearances from the West
Indies and arrivals in Britain, and vice versa.
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Tonnage of British-.retered vessels
-	 1784 11792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799





British West	 88.2 121.8 114.4 343.6 110.5 122.4 355.9 175.1 185.2
Indies
343
This was due mainly to an increase in the individual tonnage
of ships engaged in the trade. Until 1750 the typical London
West Indiaman displaced 15 0 to 200 tons, there being no
equivalent to the great merchant ships of the East India
Company. On the contrary, many ships of less than 100 tons
crossed the Atlantic to the Caribbean. This was particularly
the case from the ports of Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow,
where small brigs, schoonere and snows persisted in. the trade
until the end of the century.
Moreover, there was little specialization of function.
342. Until the mid-1770s ship displacement in Britain was
calculated as tons burden. It was gradually replaced by
measured tons, which became the standard practice after the
general Registration of Ships began in 1786.
343. BT 6/185: 'State of the Trade of Great Britain
See also appendix 5.
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Most vessels carried within their cramped holds or 'tween
decks a bewildering variety of cargoes - slaves, ivory,
provisions, plantation stores, manufactures, tropical produce
and tiniber. 344
 But in the last decades of the century, more
ships specifically designed for the West Indies trade were
built in British yards. The principal impçtus to this
development came from the expanding sugar trade. The need
was £ or larger vessels, with greater capacity in their holds
for single types of cargo. Typical was the ship Hannah,
322 tons, plying between Dorninica and London.
	 In. the summer
of 1792 she shipped home 315 hogeheade of' niuscovado sugar,
49 puncheons of rum and little other cargo. 345
 An added
reason for larger ships was the growing importance of the
timber and dyewoods trade of' Honduras and Jamaica. Small
vessels could not handle the bulky logs of mahogany, I'ustio
and lignuni vitae.
By the 1790's, then, West Indiamen of over 300 tons were
becoming common and the bulk of the traffic was being under-
taken by ships of' 150 to 300 tons. :Exaniination of entries
in the 'London Registries of Shipping: Foreign Trade'346
and 'Lloyd's Registers of shipping' for the period confirm
344. Horefall, Lucy P.: 'The West Indies trade'; chapter in
'Trade Winds ... ', pp. 177 et seq.
345. HO 76/2: 'Accounts by naval officer at Roseau, Dominica
July to October 1792'.
	 See appendix 19.
346. The two sets of Registries - Foreign and Domestic Trade -
covering the years 1787 to 1802 are preserved in Nt. Mar. Mus.:
Dept. of ManuecIiipts.
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the trend. For instance, if three comparable samples are
taken from the 'L1oyd Registers' of 1784, 1794 and
certain facts emerge.
In the Register for 1784, of 50 merchant ships on direct
voyage to and from Britain and the West Indies, only three
displaced over 400 tons, 26 between 200 and 400 and 20 under
200 tons. In 1794, the number of ships rose to 70 and its
composition changed slightly. Although there were still
only three in the largest category, the number of ships of
between 200 and 400 tons rose to 38. But with the Register
for 1804, the shift of emphasis became very noticeable. Not
only did the total rise to 102 ships, but no less than 14 were
over 400 tons and over 60% of the total fell within the 200/
400 tons group.348
The value of the 'Lloyd's Registers' is not confined to
details of tonnage. Information as to the type of each
vessel, its construction, ownership, port of registry and
voyage-pattern is also recorded. If these details be compared
in the three samples from the Registers of 1784, 1794 and 1804,
significant changes are again apparent.
Coniarison reveals a progressive decline in the number
of the smaller types of merchantmen engaged in the West Indies
347. See Appendices I4,I5.H respectively, for these samples
in full.
348. Lloyd's Registers of Shipping: 1784; 1794; 1804.
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trade. Par fewer brigs, snows, sloops and schoonerswere
operating in 1804 compared with twenty years earlier. A declin€
from 40% to 22%d the overall total is a very substantial one
over such a short period. Equally the figures for 1804 show
how the number of larger ship-rigged vessels has risen to
replace them.
There are obanges, too, in the pattern of where and when
the ships were built. Before, during and after the American
War of Independence part of the direct Britain to West Indies
trade was carried in colonial-built vessels. Some had been
built in Canada and Newfoundland, but more in the shipyards
of New England - Boston, Thiladeiphia, New York and Piscatoq.ua.
As late as 1784 these American-built ships continued to feature
in the trade. But within twenty years a complete tranformation
had taken place. As the nascent United States began to use
her shipbuilding resources towards the creation of her own
merchant marine and direct trade between her shores and the
West Indies, so the proportion of" plantation-built ships in
the transatlantic Britain to West Indies trade rapidly declined.
The lloyds Registers bear this out. In. the 1784 sample, the
number of American-built ships in the trade was 32% of the
total. By 1794 it had declined to 14% and, ten years later -
at less than 4% - bad a1most disappeared altogether.349
349. Samples from Iiloyc?s Registers of 1784, 1794 qnd 1804.
See appendices
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Where the West Indiamen were built in Britain also
fundamentally changed during the three decades in question.
The Thames yards at Deptford, Rotherhithe, Limehouse and
Blackwall continued to launch the larger vessels but, for the
West Indies' trade at least, their proportion of the total
number fell during the period. The number of ships built
at Bristol, 350
 in the Scottish yards at Leith and Greenoc1c
and at the smaller ports on the south and west coasts of England1
showed little change. But there was a sharp increase from
the shipyards of Northern England, especially the north-east.
Whitby in particular emerged as a major shipbuilding port for
the Caribbean trade. 351
 From the samples chosen, 27% of the
total number of British-built vessels were built in the north
of England in 1784; 54% in 1794 and 58% in 1804. The full.
analysis is:-
350. See Professor W.E. Minchinton: 'The Trade of BristoL in
the eighteenth century'.
	 (Brite Records Society; 1957),
especially pp. ix - xix, and appendioes (d), (e) and (f).
351. See Richard Weatherill: 'The ancient port of Whitby and
its shipping'.	 (Whitby; Home & Son; 1908), especially
pp. 330 - 376.
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SHIPS BUILT IN	 ITISH kRDS for the WEST INDIES TRADE
(sample)	 Number of ships
	
352
Shipyards	 1784	 1794	 1804
River Thames	 10	 8	 5
Bristol	 3	 6	 10
Northern England353	 7	 26	 46
Scotland	 3	 1	 6
Other ports354	 3	 7	 12
Total	 26	 48	 79
The age of ships engaged in the trade was another important
factor. Examination of the dates of build of all the vessels
listed in the three samples reveals the following:-
352. Samples from Lloyd's Registers of 1784, 1794 and 1804.
See appendices J'h'Sih'.
353. On the North-east coast: Whi-tby, Shields, Newcastle,
Scarborough, Sunderland, Hull, Pillon and Alnmouth.
On the North-west coast: Liverpool, Chester, Lancaster, White-
haven and Workington.
354.Welsh ports and Appledore, Redbridge, Topeham, Cowes,





of total	 of total	 of total
	
Ships over	 20 7




years old	 14	 28	 16	 23	 25	 25
Ships under 3
	
years old	 6	 12	 18	 27	 26	 26
Total of
	
sample	 50	 -	 70	 -	 102	 -
In the earlier year nearly b1f the trade was carried in
ships at least ten years old, in many cases much older.
A decade later the proportion of newer vessels rose and by
1804 very few over twenty years old remained. The london
Registries of Shipping - Foreign Trade, confirm this assessment.
Of 33 ships displacing over 200 tone, entered in the Registry
f or January 1787 - 7 were over twenty and 7 under three years
old. 356 By comparison the entries for November 1793 show
355.As 352
356.London Registries o± Shipping - Foreign Trade (1787 - 1802)
Nat. L1.r. Mus. Collection.
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23 ships of over 200 tons registered, with none in the first
category but ten in the second. 357
 The explanation is clear
enotgh. During the war enemy privateer action thinned the
ranks of the older West Indiamen. Slower and more vulnerable
-they were less able to d efend themselves than the more modern
'p
coppered vessels. Finally, the pace of new construction in
British yards during the later years more than replac the
earlier losses.
egarding route-patterN and ports of destination, there
are less signs of change during the period. This is clear
from the following break-down of ships from the three selected
years, according to their ports of departure from Britain and
arrival in the West Indies:-	 358
357. London Registries of Shipping - Foreign Trade (1787 - 1802).
Nat. Mar. Mas. Collection.
358. Compiled from selected ex-trac-ts from Lloyds Registers of
1784, 1794 and 1804.
See appendices ",'5,,6.
Two entries falling outside the classification adopted have
been omitted:-
- one ship plying between Hull and Jamaica in 1794.
- one ship plying between Newcastle and Antigua in 1804.
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FR*I	 TO	 1784	 1794
	
1804
No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.
LO!1D0N	 JRm(ca	 12	 24	 15	 22	 2].	 2].
Leevardleland.	 9	 18	 5	 7	 7	 7
Windward Island.
	 5	 10	 5	 7	 U	 U
Honduras	 0	 0	 2	 3	 2	 2
Trinidad&Tobago 	 2	 4	 0	 0	 9	 9
West Indies generally




(N	 O	 00	 0	 5	 5
TOTAL	 28	 56	 28	 39	 56	 56
BRISTOL	 Jamaica	 2	 4	 5	 7	 3	 3
leewardlelands	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1
Windwardla].ande 	 2.	 2	 3	 4	 5	 5
Honduras	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1
Tobago	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1
TOTAL	 3	 6	 9	 12	 11	 U
LIVERPOOL & other Jamaica	 4	 8	 5	 7	 0	 8
North-West porte leeward Islands 	 °	 0	 3	 4	 3	 3
(Lancaster &	 Windward Islands	 0	 0	 ]3	 18	 5	 5
Whitehaven)	 Trinidad & Tobago	 o	 0	 0	 0	 3
	West Indies generally 0
	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1
TOTAL	 4	 8	 2].	 29	 20	 20
SCOTrISH PORTS 	 Jamaica	 3	 6	 4	 5	 6	 6
(Greenock,	 Leeward Island.	 5	 2.0	 0	 0	 0	 0
Glasgow &	 Trinidad & Tobago	 0	 0	 0	 0	 2	 2
Leith)
TOTAL	 8 16	 4	 5	 8	 8
IRISH PORTS	 Jmnt(ca	 2	 4	 5	 7	 3	 3
(Cork, Kineale & leeward Islands 	 4	 8	 0	 0	 1	 1
Dublin)	 Windward Island. 	 1	 2	 1	 3	 0	 0
	
West Indies generally 1
	




0	 0	 0	 2.	 1
TOTAL
	 8 15 8 9	 6	 6
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Consistency is the main feature of these returns. In
contrast to the other aspects which have been considered - the
size and age of the merchant ships and their place of build -
there were few changes. London throughout the period continued
to rank as the premier outport and her trade with Jamaica
remained the most important single element. A decline in
sailings from the Scottish ports in the later years was offset
by a rise in the Caribbean trade of Liverpool and neighbouring
ports. The volume of shipping to both the Leeward and Windward
Islands showed little change, except for the number of vessels
from Liverpool to the latter in 1794. The one sector which
did show a sharp increase in 1804, namely the number of ships
trading to Martinique, Demerara and Trinidad, can readily be
explained. None of these colonies came into British possession
until after 1794.
It is evident, therefore, that neither the passage of
time nor the outbreak of war in 1793 substantially affected
the lines of communication between the British ports and the
West indian colonies. Those Customs records of the period
which have survived, moreover, 359 show that the volume of
shipping between Britain and the islands was not only maintained
but actually increased during the first two years of the war:-
359. P.R0.: Custonl8 Ledgers 17/15 to 17/24, inclusive: 'States
of Navigation, commerce and revenue, 1793 - 1802'. The shipping
statistics are recorded in the return: 'Account of number of
vessels, including repeated voyages ... which have entered and
cleared in the several British West Indian islands •..'.
But note that this return appears in the Customs Ledgers 17/15
and 17/16 only. Those for the later years were lost, along with
178




No.	 000t	 No. 000t	 No. 000t No.	 000t
of ships	 of ships	 of ships	 of ships
Entries into:
JAMAICA	 150	 40.9 255	 69.].	 17	 3.0	 38	 6.7
IE.MW ISLANDS	 90	 19.6 158 32.0	 17	 2.1	 17	 2.6




31	 4.2	 20	 3.1
Clearances from:
JAMAICA	 208	 58.5 354	 85.3	 14	 2.1	 15	 2.1
IEJ.AILD ISLANDS	 154	 31.9 353	 28.8	 12	 1.4	 8	 1.0
WINDWARD ISLANDS 249 52.4 194 43.1 14 1.5	 8	 1.2
360
Having considered the general shipping trend between
Britain and her Caribbean colonies, the next step is to examine
in detail the records of entries and clearances from some of
the individual islands. Prom the large number available, those
of Doininica between July and October, 1792, and of Barbados
for the same period in 1801, have been chosen for purposes of
comparison. 361 Thereby, any change in the movements of shippin
359, 360 (cont.) with many others, as a result of the Customs
House Lire of 1834.
361. P.R.0.: HO 76/2. Shipping returns of the Naval Office
at Roeeau, Dominica: entries and clearances, July 12 to
October 10, 1792.
P.R.O.: HO 76/2. Shipping returns of the Naval Office at
Bridgetown, Barbados: entries and clearances, July 1 to
September 30, 1801.
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to and from those islands between the beginning and end of
the period under consideration, may be observed. But this is
not the only reason for the choice. These returns bring to
light two crucial factors which cannot be discerned from the
more general statistics. One is the place trade with Britain
occupied in relation to the total shipping activity of the two
colonies. The other is the discovery of a characteristic
pattern, established by the statistics of arrivals and departureE
Between July 12th and October 10th, 1792 - that is
approximately six months before the outbreak of war - James
Laing, assistant naval officer at Roaea, recorded the entry
of 44 merchant ships into the chief port of iDominica. 	 Only
nine had arrived from Britain:—
Date of arriyal	 Ship	 type tone where from	 cargo





Robinson	 ship 183 Whitehaven	 plantation stored
July 13th	 Queen Charlotte 	 brig 143 Lencaster &	 provisions,
Cork	 herring, stores
July 13th	 Mary	 ship 148 Liverpool	 line, coals
July 14th
	
Friends Adventure sloop 103 Cork	 provisions, dry
goods
July 16th	 Lady Augusta brig 97 Liverpool 	 provisions, vine
lime
August 30th Joseph & Mary	 brig 163 london	 plantation &
Government stores
October 4th	 Hope	 brig 137 Liverpool	 cordage, vine,
stores
October 8th	 Triton	 ship 180 Glasgow	 porter, provision
dry goods
362
362. PR.0. s HO 76/2 - Shipping returns ... Dcninica,ae previous page.
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There are several points of interest here. The arrivals
from Britain amounted to only 20% of the total shipping
entering Roeeau during the period. Moreover, of these nine
which came over a period of three months, no less than six
arrived within four days of each other. 363
 This pattern was
to become very characteristic of the war years which followed,
indicating arrivals in convoy. During peacetime it was unusual
but can be explained, in this instance, by local circumstances.
Geographically, Donilnica was uncomfortably situated between the
two larger Prench Islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. Both
had been in the throes of civil war intermittently since 1791
and the surrounding seas were no longer safe. It is not
therefore surprising to discover British merchantmen proceeding
to Dominica in convoy. The remaining bhree vessels among the
arrivals, were clearly "runners" - reaching Dominica indepen-
dently out of season to dispose of their cargoes at greatest
advantage.
James Laing's record of clearances from Roseau during
the period tell a similar tale. 364
 Of the 58 vessels which
left, thirteen were bound for England - almost the same ratio
as had been the case with the entries.
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14].	 Liverpool coffee, cotton
cocoa
	
]43	 Lancaster ruin, cotton,
hides, fustic
	








198	 Liverpool sugar, ruin,
coffee
	
2].].	 london	 sugar, cotton
coffee, indigo
	
180	 Liverpool sugar, gum, cop
	




97	 Liverpool sugar & coffee
	




Once again, concentration in sailing dates occurred.
But the reason was not the same as in the case of the ships
entering. It was the sumnie r harvesting of the sugar cane
and the advent of the hurricane season at the beginning of
August which caused so many vessels to sail from Roseau in the
last days of July. Only a few independent 'runners' - in this
case the Lady Augusta and Nysus - ventured to sail out of
season and during the hurricane months.
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One other feature of these Dominica shipping returns deserve
mention. The predominant element in the homeward o ,argoes to
England was tropical produce, notably sugar. But there were
exceptions, in this case the cargoes of the bark Isabella and
ship Mentor. They had brought slaves from West Afrioa to the
Caribbean and weighed from Dominica with some tropical produce
for England. But, as the records show, much of their hold-
space was already filled by African cargo destined for England -
ivory, beeswax, palm oil and gum copal. Thus in the case of
African slavers, their calls at British West Indies' ports did
not belong to the normal inward/outward shipping pattern but
represented entrepts to their real destination, England.
When the records of entries and clearances for Dominica
in 1792 are compared with similar returns f or Barbados ten
years later, 365 significant changes are apparent. Between July
1st and September 30th, 1801, the following merchant ships
entered Bridgetown, Barbados from Britain or sailed from that
port to Britain:-
365. HO 76/2. Shipping returns of the Naval Office at
Bridgetown, Barbados - showing entries and clearances, July 1
to September 30, 1801. See appendix 1$ f or the full entry.
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date	 ship	 type tone where fronVto	 cargo
a) ENTRIES:
July 1801 Dominica Packet ship 231
	
Liverpool	 beef & other provisions
R	 Befl8On	 ship 256	 lancaster &	 provisions and dry
Cork	 goods
p	 Isca	 SnOW 157	 Liverpool &
Cork	 provisions
Briton	 snow 217	 Bristol &	 stores, mci. hoops &
Cork	 bricks
August	 Brilliant	 ship 321
	
Greenock	 wine, herrings, soap, por
September Cicero	 ship 429	 Liverpool	 provisions & stores
Barton	 ship 222 Liverpool	 provisions & stores
b) CIE.RLNCE8:
July 1801 Atlas	 ship 408 London	 sugar
Isle of Thanet ship 34].	 London	 sugar




Carleton	 brig 130	 Liverpool	 sugar, runt, ginger
*	 Adventure	 Ship 245
	
Liverpool	 sugar
Dominica Packet ship 231	 Liverpool	 sugar
August	 Brilliant	 ship 321 Liverpool 	 cotton
September ELover	 ship 29? Liverpool	 sugar, cotton, coffee,
indigo, fuetic
P	 Barton	 ship 222 Liverpool	 mahogany, 1ignum vitae,
coffee, cotton, hides,
cocoa
P	 Cicero	 ship 429 Liverpool	 fuetic, cotton, coffee,
cocoa
•	 Emerald	 ship 326
	
london	 sugar, cotton, coffee
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These returns amounted to only 11% of the total inward,
and 16% of the total outward traffic from the port366- a sharp
decline from the position at Roseau in 1792. Clearly, British
vessels trading to and from Barbados in 1801 occupied a reduced
share.of the island's overall volume of shipping. Nor was
this all. A wider discrepancy was apparent between ships
entered from, and ships cleared out to Britain. Pewer ships
carrying provisions, dry goods and plantation stores were
reaching Barbados from Britain, to balance the greater number
the colony was sending home with tropical produce.
These, then, were the salient features of seaborne trade
between Britain and her West Indian colonies during the period.
Most were a source of encouragement. Both by number çf ships
engaged and by their individual disploements, the trade was
increasing. More ships were being built of a type and to a
design suitable to the produce they carried. As specializa-
tion of function and emphasis on single cargoes developed, so
the "established" ship increasingly replaced the "seeker", sent
to the Caribbean on a speculative basis. Most important of
all, the volume of shipping had not been reduced in spite of
the lose of many rnerchantmen through enemy privateers; the
importance of the trade to Britain had guaranteed their replace-
ment by vigorous new construction.
366. HO 76/2. Shipping returns ... Bridgetown, Barbados
July 1 to September 30, 1801. See appendix 18	 for the
full statistics.
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Despite these favourable developments, other inherent
factors of Caribbean maritime trade came to the fore during
the period, which were to prove far less satisfactory to
Britain. To identify them, it is necessary to go back a
number of years. Until the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies
in 1775, strong trade and shipping links had been established
between Britain and her North American and West Indian possessior
The links had been forged upon the anvil of the English Naviga-
tion Laws. Before 1775, the basic imports required by the
British West Indies, especially foodstuffs, were largely met
by Britain's North American colonies, for which the latter
received British manufactures in payment. Provisions also
reached the British West Indies from Britain - notably beef
and dairy produce from Ireland, but the bulk came from North
America. Having brought food, lumber and stores to the West
Indies, the vessels returned home to New England and Cand.da
with cargoes of sugar, rum, molasses and other tropical produce.
This vital trade between North America and the Caribbean was
long established by 1775 and had always been regarded of the
utmost necessity by the unse1supporting British West Indies.36
By the end of the American War of Independence in 1783,
the system was no longer operable. Prom being under British
367. BI Add. VISS. 12404.
	
In 1775, American vessels under
Plantation registry undertook more than 75% of the entire
North America to West Indies trade.
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control, the operation of the North Aniericamest Indies carrying
trade had passed to ships belonging to a new and hostile nation.
The results were far reaching; at one stroke, all those factors
which Britain had used to tighten her trade links with the
West Indies and North America were now turned against
Because of their country's relative proximity to the West
Indies, American shipownere held a priceless advantage over
their British competitors. Freight and insurance costs were
lower all round and, without the need to sail across the Atlantic
the rnerchantmen could be built smaller and cheaper. Although
often structurally inferior to the British vessels, they were
more practical for the trade. 372 At a time when manning was
a chronic difficulty, they carried smaller crews and undertook a'
far greater number of voyages annually. The picture that
emerges, therefore, is of a vitaltrade in the hands of mahy
small single-decked sloops and schooners, displacing 50 to 100
tons and often less. 373 Making several voyages annually, they
plied to and fro, cruising at will among the Caribbean islands,
368 -to 371. See Richard Pares': 'War and Trade in the West
Indies .1.'; 'Merchants arid Planters'; 'Yankees and Creoles'
and IF. Ragatz: 'The Fall of the Planter Class ...', as major
studies of the trade before and during the period.
372. H.C. Bell: 'British commercial policy in the West Indies,
1783 - 1793.'
	
E.H.R. xxi (1916), pp. 429 - 441.
373. H.C. Bell.	 op.cit., p. 435.
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loading and discharging where advantage offered.374
Within a few years, American merchant ships were to be
seen everywhere in the Caribbean, trading especially with the
French and Neutral islands, where no efforts were made to
restrict them. Even among the British colonies, few island
governors paid much heed to exhortations from London about
strict adherence to the Navigation Laws. A brisk trade grew
up: ' ... The commerce among the islands is carried on by
sloops and schooners ... these vessels trade to Martinique
and Guadeloupe but especially to St Eustatia, where they are
laden with lumber, provisions, etc., from the Americans ...
	 37
Attempts by the British Government to deny American vessels
access to her colonies failed for two fundamental reasons.
Only the United States could furnish the provisions and lumber
which the islands needed. Equally, the British colonies were
not to be deprived of a most valuable outlet for their produce,
especially rum and molasses. The two-way traffic was too
vital to be smothered by the Navigation Laws and continued to
grow, directly and indirectly - legally and, if necessary,
illegally. Large quantities of American goods reached the
British West Indies via the Neutral Islands. GoveDnor Shirley
374. &1! 5/1, if. 12, 13 and 20; BT 5/11, 1. 3.	 Minutes of
the Board of Trade, March - May, 1784.
375. Co 260/7: Governor Linooln of St Vincent to Sydney,
December 1, 1785.
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of the Leeward Islands wrote in 1785:
	
the old inter-
course with the Dutch island of St Eustatia is again opened,
and through that medium we get many American oommodities.'37°
The indirect trade became so extensive, that Parliament in
1787 passed an Act prohibiting the import of flour, bread, rice
and lumber from the Foreign West Indies except in times of
emergency. The prohibition was flagrantly ignored by the
island governors, who made use of every emergency, real or
feigned, to allow American vessels entry to their ports.
The turning-point came in November 1794, when the British
Government had to admit that the economy of the islands was
being damaged by the restrictions upon American shipping. The
key clause of Jay's Treaty, signed between Britain and the
United States on November 19th, permitted the entry of American
merchant ships not exceeding 70 tons displacement to the
British colonies. On the other hand, in order to retain the
British monopoly of carriage, restrictions were imposed upon
the export of tropical produce from the islands in American
vessels.377' 378
If the treaty of 1794 eased the supply of foodstuffs to
the islands, it by no means signalled free trade between the
376. 00 l'64: Governor Shirley to Sydney, January 11, 1785.
377, 378. See S.F. Bernie: 'Jay's Treaty ... a study in commerce
and diplomacy' (Macmillan; 1923) and A.L. Burt: 'The United
States, Great Britain and British North America ...' (Yale
U.P.; 1940)
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United States and the British West Indies. The restrictions
upon tonnage and exports angered the West Indian planters and
the merchants on both sides. Despite official threats, they
continued to pursue unrestricted trade whenever possible.
Two examples from the many available show what was happening.
At an enquiry set up by the Board of Trade in 1795 to investigat
the commercial situation in the Windward Islands, two Tobagan
planters testified that the island's trade had fallen completely
into the hands of American and neutral ships. On neighbouring
Grenada, it was the same story: ' ... the trade is wholly
open and chiefly in the hands of the Americans. 379 With the
exception of the shipments to Britain, almost all the island's
sugar export was being carried by American or neutral
Comparison of shipping returns of St Vincent in 1787 with
those of Grenada in 1795, confirms the trend. During the first
379. B 5/9. Board of Trade Minutes, September-October 1795.
380, 381. The situation on Antigua and Nevie in 1799 was very
similar. Despite the treaty prohibition, the Governor of the
first allowed American ships to load up to * of their cargo-
space with sugar for the return voyage. Similarly, Governor
Ricketts of Nevis gave permission on the basis of up to 25%
of the total value of the cargo.
CO. 152/79: Governor Thompson to Portland, April, 10, 1799.
CO. 152/79: Governor Ricketts to Portland, June 11, 1799.
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three months of both years, approximately the same number of
merchant ships entered Georgetown, St Vincent and St George's,
Grenada.382' 383 But there the similai±ty ends. The 58 ships
arriving at St. Vincent between January and March 1787 were
divided:-
(1) From other British West Indian islands 	 ... ...	 18
2	 From Foreign West Indies	 ...	 ...	 ... ...	 18
3	 Prom Britain and Africa	 ...	 ...	 ... ...	 1
4 Prom the United States	 ...
5	 Prom British North America 	 ...	 ...	 ... ...	 2
= 58
Only 5% of the total inward traffic was undertaken by
United States' vessels:-
date of entry	ahi	 tve dieplacement where from	 cargo









Two Frienda aloop 45	 New York	 liveetock,
lumber, atoree
Clearly, therefore, it waa not they who were meeting St. Vincent' a need
for provieiona. It vaa au,1ied by the arrival of an unuauaUy large
number of merchanthien from Britain thning the periods-
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flate of entz7 shin	 te displacement where from	 cargo
January, 15, 1787 Diligence sloop 	 60 tone Gweek	 provisions & cod
January 20	 Tom	 ship	 163
	























January 31	 Pan	 snow	 ]32	 Bristol
& Cork	 provisions
February 2	 Isabella	 ship	 262	 Liverpool provisions, wine
& hoops





	 247	 London	 provision & wine
February 12	 Klngetown brig	 234	 Greenock	 provisions, herrix
& Cork	 & stores
March 19	 Harmony	 ship	 323	 Newcastle fish, oats
384
Examination of the equivalent entries into St. George's, Grenada,
between January and March 1795
	
ehowa how the situation has completely
altered. The entries were divided:-
(1) From other British West Indian ialands ......... 17
(2) FromForeignWestlndies ....................... 16(3	 PromBritain and Africa .......................e 	 8
(4)	 From the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20()	 FromBritishNorthimerica ........................2
= 63
382, 383, 384, 385. BT (/188 and HO 7EJl: Shipping returns — St. Vincent,
January to March, 1787; and Grenada, January to March, 1795. See
appendices 20 & zi for the full returns.
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While the arrivals from elsewhere in the Caribbean and from Canada
showed little change, the influx of American vessels has risen dramatically
from three to 20, with 17 of the latter under United States registry.
Almost all carried provisions or livestock as main cargo, the re"rnirdng
space in the holds being occupied by lumber, staves, shingles and other
stores needed by the St Vincent plantations.
The entries from Britain were equally striking. Of the eight vessels
shown as arrivals from Britain and Africa, two were slavers frau Gambia and
Angola and two brought vine from Madeira. From a tobi entry of 63 vessels
during the period, only four came to the island directly from Britain:-
date of ent	 ohi	 t	 dis lacement where from 	 c o
February 10, 1795 Fame
	 ship
February 12	 Chat worth brig
February 20	 Hobby Horse sloop
218 tons Greenock	 plantation store a
dry goods &
provisions
132	 Lancaster plantation stores
dry goods &
provisions





	 91	 Port	 stores, provision
Glasgow	 dry goods
Even these few hardly constituted the bulk carriage of provisions from
Britain to St Vincent. Two of the ships were very ams1l and the details of
cargo for all four suggest that plantation stores and dry goods predominated
over provisions.
386. HO 74/1: Shipping returns - Grenada, January to March, 1 895. See
arpendix 2 for the full return.
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The conclusions to be drawn are clear enough. The British West Indies'
imports of foodstuffs were increasingly provided by the United States, as the
moat satisfactory supplier. In cases when the need was met from Britain -
as to St Vincent in 1787 - it was neither a norma.]. exchange nor, from the
British point of view, a welcome one. Britain always preferred to bring
manufactured goods and plantation stores to her West Indian colonies. Except
in the special case of Irish beef and dairy produce, the shipnent of perish-
able foodstuffs across the Atlantic was best avoided.
Within only three years, the volume of American trade with the British
West Indies underwent a remarkable transformation. In 1793, 512 United
387
States ships entered and 3U cleared from the islands' ports. 	 By 1795 -
on'y one year after the signature of the Jay Treaty - the figures were 1,266
and 1,279 respective].y.88
The main arteries of British West Indies trade - to and from Britain
and the United States - have been considered. But there were other channels
of considerable importance, which can best be expressed in a table showing
the movement of shipping during the first three years of the wars-
387. P.R.O.s Customs 17/15.
388. P.R.O.s Customs 17/17. The total for ships of aD. nation,d-lties wass







IN	 OUT	 IN	 OUT	 IN	 OUT
8hipe 000 ships 000 ships 000 ships 000 ships 000 ships 000
tone	 tons	 tons	 tons	 tone	 tons
• Africa	 169 32.0	 3 0,2 58 11.1	 4 0,7 56 10,5	 3	 0.4














320 22.9 263 16.9 283 23.2 408 42.4 187 3.3.5
647 51.5 77]. 58.6 772 67.9 928 73.8 1,055 86.1
389
As is we].]. known, the Africa trade consisted almost entirely of the
transport of negroes across the Atlantic to work on the Caribbean plantations.
There was practically no return traffic. Once the slavers had disembarked
their human cargoes, what remained in their holds was destined for Britain.
Vessels from Canada and Newfoundland brought mainly fish and lumber to
the British West Indies, but also some provisions. SaJ.tfish formed part of
389. Computed from entries in Customs 17/15; 17/16 and 17/17.
390. Those figures refer to shipping between the islands and not to the local
shipping within each island. An important category is therefore omitted:
the sugar-droghere and other nui1l craft, used for transporting produce from
the plantations to the nearest port.
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the staple diet of the negro population in the British colonies.
On the return voyage the principal commodities carried were
molasses and rum, both in great demand in Canada.391
During the war, the volume of trade carried out by the
Neutral Islands in the Caribbean grew in importance. As war
restricted the movement of the belligerents' merchant ships,
so the use of the neutral ships and their ports expanded.
The above figures refer only to a small section of the neutral
trade. A far greater part was undertaken entirely outside
the orbit of the British colonies, notably in the intercourse
between the French West Indies and the neutral islands.
The most interesting part of the table concerns the
local shipping within the British West Indian islands. The
large number of vessels shown to be engaged in this traffic
has to be qualified by their individual displacement. Their
size and the amount of cargo they could carry were smaller
tban vessels in the other categories. On the other hand, the
inter-island trade increased in volume during the period, whilst
the others declined. The explanation lies in the Interruption
of norma]. communication between the islands during the war.
As the convoy system developed under pressure of enemy privat-
eering, so the practice of assembling and dispersing large
391. See G.S. Graham: 'Sea power and British North America1,
for details of this trade.
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Warnumbers of merchantmen at a few selected places became more frequent.
also brought food shortages to many of the islands, which could only be
alleviated by obtaining supplies from better-stocked neighbours. For both
these reasons, greater activity in the movement of local shipping was
essential.
Exm1riation of vessels ehow in the 	 ni' shipping returns as being
engaged in the inter-island trade, indicates that what they lacked in die-
placement and cargo capacity was compensated by the frequency of their
voyages. In 1787, for instance, the 62-ton schooner &ift, based at George-
town, St Vincent, made five voyages in seven weeks :_392
date	 voype and cargo
January 23rd, 1787 Entered from Grenada, in biTh et
January 24th	 Cleared out to Grenada, with provisions, dry goods and
apparel (transshipped from the	 , 163 tons, which had
arrived at St Vincent on January 20th, from Lancaster
and Cork).
February 22nd	 Entered from Lntigua, with oats and linen.
March 17th	 Cleared out to Antigua, with butter, beef and tallow.
March 29th	 Entered from Antigua, with Irish linen.
In 1795, a vessel of similar size - the sloop Commerce of 70 tons -
operating from Grenada, completed seven voyages to and from four widely-
separated places within nine weeks:-








Entered from Demerara, with corn and lime.
Cleared out to Barbados, with 65 new negroes.
Entered from Deinerara, with cotton.
Cleared out to Laguan Island, with ilO seasoned negroes.
Entered from Demerara with cotton
Cleared out to St Lucia, with cotton
Entered from Demerara, with cotton
392. BT 4/188: Shipping returns - St Vincent, January to March 1787.
-'4
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The inter-island shipping pe.formed tlree important
functions. After the arrival of an oceanic convoy, it assisted
in the distribution of the imports to the individual islands.
Conversely, it helped to ensure that the exports of each island
were brought to the convoy's place of departure. Moreover,
local sloops and schooners proved invaluable in the task of
linking up more remote areas with the normal convoy routes.
The sloop Commerce's frequent shipments of cotton from Demerara
to Grenada is a good example.395
Having examined the shipping, it is logical to continue
with an assessment of the commodities carried. The trade of
the British West Indies was divided into two distinct parts.
The Plantation trade comprised the export of tropical produce,
mainly to Britain and North America, and the import of goods
and materials essential to the islands - provisions, plantation
stores, dry goods and manufactures. The Entrept trade
comprised the use o± specific Pree Ports in the colonies by
foreign vessels, for the purpose of developing trade with the
Spanish Indies and the French islands.
Sugar was by far the most important product in the
Plantation trade and the major source of the ialandp'wealth.
Every British colony, except the Bahamas, grew cane and in
some it was the sole export. Together they furnished 95% of
395. See previous table.
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Britain's sugar requirements. A sharp rise in European demand
during the period produced spectacular increases in sugar prices
which brought a feverish prosperity to the British colonies.
Between 1774 and 1791, however, the position bad been
far less satisfactory. The British colonies in those years
faced s evere competition from the sugar production of the
French West Indies. The larger islands of San Domingo,
Guadeloupe and Martinique possessed greater areas for cane
cultivation and more economic methods of cultivation. This
was particularly so on San Domingo, where the great plain of
Cul de Sac near Port-au-Prince abounded with prosperous planta-
tions. As a result of the American War, moreover, the export
of sugars from the French plantations to the United States and
the neutral Caribbean islands had grown at the expense of the
British colonies. Pinafly, these years revealed fa' the first
time the inability of some of the British islands to keep up
with the increasing demand f or sugar. The older colonies in
x;fl:)
the Leewards group - Antigua, St Chr)étopher and Nevis - and,
to a certain extent, Barbados, were beginning to lose their
place as major centres of sugar production. 396 '	 There
were a number of reasons for this: exhaustion of the soil
caused by repetitive and often wasteful cultivation; the
396, 397. See L.3. Ragatz: 'The Pall of the Planter Class ...'
and Richard Pares: 'Merchants and Planters' for details of
the sugar trade.
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small size and mountainous terrain of the islands, which
prevented further development; the growing exodus of native
labour to newer and larger plantations, as in the Guiana
highlands.
This unfavourable trend was temporarily halted by political
and military developments in tthe French West Indies. The
revolts which broke out on Guadeloupe, Martinique and particu-
larly San Domingo in 1791, were followed by a long struggle
between Britain and Prance for their possessionin the war
which followed. 398
 In the process mans of the French sugar
plantations were destroyed and several years elapsed before
large-scale production could be resumed. As a result the
decade 1791 - 1801 witnessed a great revival ol' the British
West Indies plantations, since during that period only they
were in a position to satisfy the rising European demand for
sugar. But the boom was short-lived. By the t urn of the
century the French West Indies had resumed production and new
areas- notab1 Cuba, Guiana and Puerto Rico - emerged as major
sugar exporters. The inevitable consecluence was over-produc-
tion; the European sugar-market became glutted and prices began
to fall. In June 1798 unrefined brown muscovado was ciuoted
on the London sugar exchange at 72/- per owt., f.o.b.; by
September 1807, it had declined to 32/gd.
398. See chapters 1 and 2.
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Britain's imports of brown muecovado from the Caribbean during the first
five years of the war were as foliowa s-
milijon pounds (weight)	 1793	 1791k	 1795	 1796	 1797
From: a. J1AXCA	 1033.2 1154.7 1086.5 1089.2 1049.5
b. IEWARD ISLAIDS:
Antigua	 202.0	 155.4 119.6 133.0 114.9
Monteerrat	 35.1	 23.2 22.].	 22.0	 19.9
Nevle	 57.5	 39.3 47.8	 48.6	 50.9
St Kitte	 3.55.9	 246.2 128.2 342.1	 85.3




Barbados	 337.9	 130.2 107.2 330.6	 89.7
Dominica	 64.2	 52.6 37.7	 45.5	 49.1
Grenada	 195.6	 199.7 128.3 111.5 113.5
St Vincent	 134.1	 128.6 57.5	 39.8	 67.2
d. TOTAL BRITISH WEST
INDIES	 22.15.3 2097.2 1871.0 1725.7 1594.2
e. EL3EWHBE	 -
Foreign West ndiea	 2.3	 17.6	 n.a. 48.4	 14.8
Conquered Islands	
-	 232.2 199.6 264.5 510.0
399
Jamaica's predominant share of the trade is very apparent. Moreover,
the volume of her sugar export was less affected by the war than that from the
Lesser Antilles. The table also shows that the fall in imports from the
Leeward Islands was more than offset by ahipnente of sugar from a new source -
399. Calculated from entries in P.R.0.z Customs 17/15 to 17/19.
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400the Conquered Islands. Indeed, it was the produce of their
plantations which had been one of the main reasons for the
capture of Martinique, St Lucia and Tobago and the campaigns
against Guadeloupe and San Domingo.
The organization of the Caribbean sugar trade bad always
been a highly speculative business. The quality of the eane
crop fluctuated violently from year to year due to vagaries
of climate and harvest. Other problems were created by the
effect of the hurricane season and the widely differing methods
of cultivation and production used in the individual iands.
For these reasons much of the trade by the end of the century
was operated on the "tied-ship" system. To reduce the iisks,
fixed arrangements were made between agent, planter and ship-
master. Under them, the planter was assured f cargo-space
for his produce in the vessel concerned, and the shipmaster
of his vessel sailing home fully laden. The system came to
be almost universally adopted in London, where the sugar
commission agents dominated the West India trade.
Perhaps the best account of its operation was given by a
contemporary writer: 'The course of trade is as follows -
the principal British merchants are concerned with Houses in
the West Indies to whom they send their ships, which carry
out goods from hence and who provide cargoes of the West Indies
400. q.v. ante.
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produce to load them home; these ... are called stationed
ships and seldom or ever vary their course.' 40' The writer
then went on to mention the exceptions: ' ... there are many
others who go to the West Indies to look for freight and are
called 'seekers'. There are also ships which arrive from the
coast of Africa with negroes and which want freight home'.402
These words were written in 1775; but by 1792 the number of
'seekers', sent out to pick up a cargo of sugar by local
negotiation in the planters' houses, had begun to dwindle.
Wartime conditions and the inflexibility of the convoy system,
higher freight and insurance rates - all tended to reduce still
further the number of individual 'seekers'.
Outside the 'tied-ship' system, the problem of securing
an adequate cargo for the homeward voyage was often never solved
Unrefined muscovado in barrel was a difficult bulky cargo,
whose value was low in proportion to the ac it occupied in
the ship's hold. No merchant, having disposed of his provision
or dry goods in the West Indies and accepted a cargo of niuscovadc
for the homeward passage, could ever hope to carry back even
half the value of his outward cargo • It was this disproportion
which often led to complications when attempts were made to
balance the values of the inward and outward shipments. More
British planters should perhaps have refined their sugars, in
401. Quoted in B.M. Add. L1SS. 38383, £. 10.
402. Quoted in B.M, Add MSS 38383, f. 10.
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which case the merchants and shipowners would have got more
value and less bulk. Bat most planters lacked the necessary
capital and equipment, especially in time of war; throughout
the period almost all the sugar exported to Britain was unrefined
rnuscovado brown.
The shipment of sugar from the British West Indies started
early in the year, usually in February, and continued until the
end of July when the hurricane season began. It was essential,
both for English and American merchant ships, that their arrival
in the islands was timed to coincide with the peak harvest
season between Pebruary and May.
Once their outward cargo had been discharged, the main
aim of the British ships was to take on sugar and return home
as quickly as possible. If they could arrive back in England
in late summer or autumn, they would be ready to set out once
more fox' the West Indies in December or January. The carriage
of sugar to Britain was basically in the hands of ships which
made single voyages annually. Attempts were made to send
ships out twice in one year but they were rarely successful.403
The length of the sea-voyage was partly responsible but the
main cause of failure was the delay invariably experiencein
the West Indies. However much the shipmaster endeavoured to
403. In Richard Pares: 'A West India fortune' there are accounts
of several such attempts, made by the Bristol firm of Pinney
in the 1790's.
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achieve a rapid turnover, many factors intervened to make his
stay in the islands a long one. The cargo he brought had
perhaps to be distributed not to one, but to several scattered
islands. Loading of sugar might be delayed for weeks by a
late harvest and there was often protracted haggling over sugar
prices and freight charges. Worst of all, the master often
found great difficulty in obtaining a full cargo or enough crew
for the return voyage. All these delays were accentuated in
time of war. The tbreat of enemy privateers drove most ship-
masters to take convoy, in spite of all the additional frustra-
404tions which that system imposed.
American vessels trading with the British West Indies
benefited greatly from the shorter distance, which, enabled
them to make more voyages annually. But it was as necessary
for them to time the voyage to the cane harvest. Unless they
reached the islands soon after the middle of June, they were
apt to have difficulty in selling their grain and obtaining
a full car5 of sugar. The American states, moreoever, exporte
more grain than the British West Indies could consume. A mer-
chant vessel arriving in the Leeward Islands in October, tor
instance, might well find them drained of sugar but glutted
with American grain and provisions.405
404. See chapter 3.
405. See A.P. Middleton: 'Tobacco Coast: a maritime history
of Chesapeake Bay in the colonial era'. (Virginia; 1953),
p. 184.
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Colonial shipping returns of the period bear out the
characteristics of the sugar trade which have been mentioned.
The following examples illustrate the different pattern of
freq.uenoy between sugar shipments to Britain and to America.
The departure of a number of vessels within a few days of
each other - due either to the state of the sugar harvest
or, in wartime, by the necessity to proceed in convoy - is
also very characteristic.
406(a) Clearances from Roseau, Dominica: July to September 1192.
(1) 9 ships bound fox' Britain, carrying sugar. 6 sailed
within ten days of each other (July 21st to August 1st).
(2) 7 ships bound for the United States or British North
America, carrying sugar. By contrast, their dates of
departure were spread over the whole period.
(b) Clearances from Bridgetown, Barbados: July to September
1801. 4(11
(1) 10 ships bound for Britain, carrying sugar. 7 sailed
during the last fortnight in July and none during the
hurricane season (August - September).
(2) 24 ships bound for the United States or British North
America, carrying sugar, molasses or rum. Sailings
spread over the whole three months, including the
hurricane season.
Molasses and ru.m were by-products of musoovado sugar.
Every sugar planter, therefore, inevitably produoed certain
406. P.R.0.: HO 76/2: Shipping returns, Dominica - July to
October, 1792.
407. P.R.O.: HO 76/2: Shipping returns, Barbados - July to
September, 1801.
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quantities of molasses and rum and finding a market for them
was almost as important to him as sugar. But there the
connection ended; the export of West Indian molasses and rum
followed an entirely different pattern.408' 409
There was much less demand for rum in Europe. Preference
for other alcoholic beverages restricted its sale in Britain.
In Prance a high tariff wall had been erected against the
import of cheap rum, in order to protect the domestic cognac.
By contrast, there was a heavy and increasing demand from
North America. Almost every American vessel which brought
provisions and lumber to the Caribbean, returned home with
rum or molasses. In Canada especially, rum had become a
necessity, not only to sustain the inhabitants but as an
indispensable article of trade with the Indian trappers and
hunters.
In the export of these commodities from the West Indies,
the British Government were faced with a dilemma they utterly
failed to resolve. Long before 1793, American merchants
had found it more satisfactory to buy molasses in the French
West Indies. Because of higher prices and greater profit,
the British planters always preferred to sell the distilled
product, rum. The French, on the other hand, were faced
with a very limited outlet in the mother country and carried
408, 409. See appendices 1f'-	 for statistics of the period.
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therefore large stocks of surplus molasses, which they were
glad to dispose of cheaply to the Americans. Because they
did not insist upon selling rum only, a flourishing trade
grew up.41°
Britain bad tried to stifle this t rade by the Molasses
Act of 1764. The entry of foreign molasses into British
North America was more strictly controlled and the import of
ruin prohibited, except that of British West Indies' origin.
However, the severity of the Act's provisions contributed to
its failure; large quantities of foreign molasses reached
North America illicitly. Although certified as of British
colonial origin, they were actually shipped either directly
from the French colonies or indirectly via Dutch St Eustatius
or Spanish Monte Cristi.
During the decade before 1793, further complications
affected the trade. Pollowing the loss of the American
colonies, Britain made determined efforts to bring Canada
into the Navigation System as a substitute. The intention
was that Canadian foodstuffs, fish and lumber should be
supplied to the British West Indies, whose sugar and molasses
would go to Britain. The latter would, in turn, supply her
own manufactures and rum (distilled from the West Indies'
molasses) to Canada, thus completing the cycle. For this
410. Samuel Eliot Morison: 'History of the United States
(Oxford; 1963), pp. 142 - 143.
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scheme to be successful, it was essential that Canada ceased
obtaining molasses and rum directly from the West Indies and
bought from Britain instead. To this end, the Quebec Revenue
Act of 1774 imposed heavy and discriminatory duties upon the
import of molasses and rum into Canada by any other route.411
The manoeuvre had disastrous consequences. To the
British planters, London merchants and Canadian shipowners
alike what really mattered was direct inter-colonial trade.
They rightly deplored a system which regarded Kingston and
Quebec as merely ports of call in an elaborate and expensive
system o± single voyages. 412 Worse than this, the restric-
tions of the Quebec Revenue Act seriously affected almost all
the islands' exports of rum to Canada, since only Jamaica
among them was a major exporter of molasses. 413 The inevit-
able result was that Canada turned to the Du.tch and Prench
West Indies for supplying nearly all her molasses; 414 deterre
by the high cost of importing British West Indian rum she
preferred to manItaoture it herself. By 1787 there were in
Quebec alone, four distilleries with a combined capacity of
400,000 gallons. A Board of Trade committee set up in 1788
411, 412. See Professor G.S. Gr.hm: 'British Policy in
Canada, 1774 - 1791', pp. 77 - 98; and the same author's:
'Sea Power and British North America', chapter iv.
413. See appendix 7.
414. CO 42/12, f. 9.
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to enquire into the trade found that the: 'importation of
foreign molasses into the province of Canada is greatly
increasing ... to the detriment of British rum.'415
Paced with such a situation, British planters and mercbant
demanded a reduction of duty on their imports of rum into
Canada and a heavy increase upon foreign molasses. They
received little comfort from the Board of Trade's final
decision on the issue, declared in March 1788. The
	 import
duty on ruin of 6d per gallon would only be waived on vessels
returning from the West Indies, which had taken Canadian
provisions and lumber to the islands on the outward voyage.
For three crucial reasons the Board of Trade's findings gave
little help to British West Indies' interests. Foreign
molasses continued to enter Canada unimpeded, and West Indian
rum was given no preference in competition with the domestic
rum of the Canadian distilleries. Most important of all,
the very small part which Canadian provisions played in the
British West Indies' total import of foodstuffs meant that
the abolition of the rum duty in those few cases had little
practical significance.
The outbreak of war in 1793 brought little improvement
in this unsatisfactory situation to the British planter.
415. 6/76: Misoellanea - British West Indies: Ieeward
Islands, 1787 - 1791.
416. P1! 5/5 and B.M. Add. LOS. 38391, f. 356.
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With the exception of Jamaica, exports of both rum and molasses
to Britain slumped and the in-bond price of molasses on the
London market nearly doubled in ten years. 417 The hope that
the trade in foreign molasses would suffer eq .ually was not
realized. Neutral and American vessels were not hindered
from shipping French West Indian rum and molasses to the
United States (and thence across the border to Canada) and
to Europe. But the British planters received one unexpected
consolation as a result of the war. With the arrival of
large military and naval forces in the theatre their ruin
sales rapidly increased.
Other less important commodities in the Plantation Trade
were: cotton, coffee, lumber, dyewoods, cocoa, pimento,
ginger, salt and tortoiseshell. Export statistics for most
of these are given in the appendices. 418 Sea-island cotton
was principally grown on the Bahamas and Jamaica. Production
increased during the 1790's, but it was an uncertain crop
which had to be cultivated on ooastal.plains. It was there-
fore very vulnerable to enemy attack during the war. There
are many contemporary accounts of sudden raids and destruction
of the cotton fields and ginneries, particularly amongst the
Bahamas. 419 Most of the exporl to Britain was handled by
417. See L.3S Ragatz: 'The Pall of the Planter Class ...
418, 420, 421. See appendices
419. See chapter 2, pp.
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Liverpool merchants supplying the Lancashire mills. After
1800, the cotton output of the British West Indies began to
be rapidly eclipsed by the development of large-scale produc-
tion in the Southern United States.
Over tI]ree quarters of all the coffee produced in the
British West Indies came from Jamaica. 42° The preference
for tea as a beverage in Britain limited the export market,
but nevertheless production increased during the period. The
trade in. logwoods421- mahogany, lignum vitae, braziletto,
Nicaragua - and dyewoods - indigo, fustic, cochineal - was
both important and lucrative. Jamaica was again a leading
supplier b&t the principal source was Honduras, where logwood
settlements had existed on the Mosquito shore and around
Belize since the early seventeenth century. Many of these
products could not be obtained elsewhere in the British
Empire, but because Honduras lay within the Spanish Indies
the logwood trade was bjset with political difficulties.
In return for the export of their tropical produce, the
British West Indies needed to import four main groups of
commodities - provisions, lumber, manufactures and plantation
stores. The first wa vital, sjnce the predominant use of
available land f or sugar cultivation resulted in. the islands'
utter dependence on imported foodstuffs. That this could
420, 421. See appendices 6rq.
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be disastrous was shown during the American War of Independence
when the inhabitants of several of the islands faced starvation.
The same tIireat occurred after 1793.
	
On Antigua, for instance,
there are not on the island at this time 5,000 bushels
of corn for sale ... which quantity is but ten days usual.
consumption of our negroes. Only three vessels in our trade
with America are expected before the hurricane months, and one
is stranded.' 422
 French privateere swarmed off the American
coast, reducing the number of ships carrying food to the islands
Although Britain - especially Ireland, with beef and
butter from Cork and Kinsale - supplied some of the need, by
far the greatest quantity of provisions came from the United
States and, to a lesser extent, from Canada and Newfoundland.
Examination of the imports of one island makes this clear:-
ST. VINCENT: Mean Annual Lnport ci' Foodstuffs, 1794 -
1805
from	 from British from United States from Unite
Britain North America (in British ships) (in Ameri-
can shipe
Bread & flour 000 barre].a 16.3	 3,4	 15.1	 67.0
Beef & pork 000 barrels 23.6	 1.2	 0,4
	
15.4
Dry Fish	 000 quinta.].a 2.5	 110.8	 0.5	 28.2
Pickled fish 000 barrels 19.9	 5.8	 1.2	 6.4
422.CO 15Z/74S Petition by planters of St. John 'a, Antigua, to Governor
Edward Byam, July 12, 1793.
423.CO 260/21. Quoted by L.T. Ragatz in: 'Statistics of Caribbean
History
424.See appendix $0 for further details of imports of provisions.
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Similar evidence is provided by the entries into Barbados between July an
September 1801. Out of the total of 63 ahip8, 32 brought provisions,
either exclusively or as main cargo. Of these, 50% had sailed from
United States' ports - Alexandria, Kennebec, New Orleans, New Indon,
Rhode Island and Wiacasset; 25% had brought fish from Newfomd1and and
Nova 3cotia. 425 One of the results of the greater difficulty in bringing
food stuffs to the colonies was a sharp rise in prices :-
DCINICAs Price. of Imtorted Foodstuffs. 1793 - 179'7
1793	 1795	 1797Mess beef
	
sh(llings
per barrel	 148/6	 198/-	 330/-
Mees pork	 165/-	 214/-	 330/-
Flour	 lt	 115/6	 148/6	 148/6
426, 427
The islands' next most neoessary import was lumber and
related products, the main supplier being again the United
States. The lumber itself was used extensively on the
plantations in housebuilding and mill construction. Apart
from Honduras there were few stands of timber remaining among
the British West Indies. Extensive deforestation had been
the penalty for increased utilization of land for sugar cane.
Parts of the Jamaican highlands were still heavily wooded
especially in the Cockpit country, but there were difficulties
of access and a lack of skilled labour. Even so, there is
425. See Appendix IS for the full return.
426, 427. CO 260/14: Governor Seaton of Doniinica to Portland,
May 22, 1797. 00 71/24, f. 117, enclosing a list of current
prices.
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evidence of extensive felling having taken place in the years
after 1783.428
Equally important to the planters was the bulk import
of shingles, staves, headings, scantling, hoops, shooks and
board, 429 These articles were essential components of the
sugar cask and sugar mill and were imported in large quantities
from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from Britain
and Canada. Without adequate supplies of them in each colony,
sugar production would speedily have collapsed.
That such a situation could quickly arise is evident
from what happened in Jamaica at the end of 1793. In November,
Governor Williamson received a report from the Council of
Assembly of a great scarcity of timber on the island. The
import of staves and headings during the two previous years
had hardly kept pace with rising consumption, which had reached
between seven and eight million units annually. Stocks
remaining on the island had fallen below half a million, and
unless supplies were rapidly obt.ined the season's sugar
production would be affected and many of the British merchant-
men compelled to make the homeward voyage in ballast.
Governor Williamson agreed to the Assembly's demand thai the
428. Treasure 64.72 and CO 137/84, quoted in II.C. Bell's:
'British Commercial Policy in the West Indies, 1783 - 1793.'
E SHIR. xxi (1916).
429. See appendix ID for statistics.
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Jamaican ports be opened without restriction to American and
neutral vessels carrying lumber. 	 fter reluctant permission
had been obtained from London, the ports were opened for four
months only to foreign vessels with cargoes of lumber and
staves and the crisis was averted.430
Hitherto consideration has been limited to the Plantation
Trade. But the islands were also actively engaged in another
form of trade which had begun in 1766. This was the Entrep't
Trade, carried out under a system which admitted foreign
vessels into specified Pree Ports in the British West Indies.
The system had a double purpose: to obtain the produce of
the Spanish and French Caribbean possessions and to open
markets for British manui'ad±ures within them. During the
American War of Independence the trade su!fered severely, but
a revival began in 1784.431
That year Pitt created a new committee of Trade which
ultimately became the Board of Trade. It was due to its
work under the chairmanship of Lord Hawkesbury, who was
convinced of the importance of the system, that the free parts
were re-established and maintained tl'irough the critical years
of the Prenoh wars. Many British merchants and planters
430. CO 137/92: Governor Williamson to Du.ndas, November 18,
1793 et sep.
431. The subject is treated in detail in Prances Armytags
work: 'The Free Port system in the West Indies. A study in
commercial policy, 1766 - 1822'.	 (London; 1953).
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opposed the system through fear of competition. Others
realized its value. In 1786, a group of Grenada merchants
and planters told the Governor: ' ... trade with the Spanish
colonies is very extensive and beneficial ... slaves and
English manufactures are in great demand ... in return their
merchants pay cash and supply our plantations with cattle,
mules etc. ... carried out in Spanish bottoms.'432
After 1787, the British Government began to turn away
from using the free ports as an attempt to erode French
colonial trade and concentrated upon intercourse with the
Spanish possessions. Two new free ports were opened with
easy access to them St. George's in Grenada and New Providence
in the Bahamas. 433 The range of British goods for export
through the free ports was extended and, for the first time,
those articles which could be imported from the Spanish colonies
were enumerated. 434
 Moreoever, in order to exclude American
vessels from the free ports, entry was limited to those not
exceeding seventy tons from ' ... colonies or plantations in
America belonging to ... a foreign European state',435
432. 6/75: Letter to Governor Lucas of Grenada, June 8, 1786
433. By the Free Port Act of 1787.
434. wool, cotton, indigo, coohineal, drugs, logwood, fustic,hides and skins, tallow, furs, tortoiseshell, mahogany and
livestock.
435. Quoted in BT 5/16: Minutes of the Board of Trade,April 1787.
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By the outbreak of war in 1793, the Entrept Trade had
reached maturity. Two years before, a contemporary source
estimated that - of the shipping entering Kingston, Jamaica,
were so engaged436
 and the number of foreign vessels using
that port rose from 250 in 1784 to 373 in l792.	 Similarly,
the influx of foreign merchantmen into all the Caribbean Free
Ports more than doubled between 1787 and 1792.438
Naturally, the war with Prance brought all intercourse
between her Caribbean possessions and the Free Ports to an
abrupt end. The change is very apparent from a study of the
entries and clearances of foreign vessels to and from the
free port o± Roseau, Dominica between July 1792 and December
1793- until the outbreak of war, the main entrep6t for
trade with the French islands. Similarly, Dutch vessels were
excluded from the Free Ports as soon as Holland became an ally
of France in July 1795.440
It might be thought that the same fate befell Spanish
merchant ships trading with the Free Ports, after the Anglo-
Spanish declaration of war in October 1796. But this was not
436. 6/76: Customs memorial, May 4, 1790.
437. See statistics in P.R.O. Customs 17/14 and 17/17.
438. BT 1/13, f. 102: 'Account of British and Foreign Vessels.,
The actual tLgures were 405 (1787); and an average of 850 for
the years - 1788 to 1792.
439, 440. HO 76/2: Shipping returns of Roseau, Dominica.
See appendix	 for the full statistics.
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so. Although at first it appeared impossible to allow enemy
vessels entry into British West Indies' ports in time of war,
greater issues were in fact at stake. The British Governnient'
main object in the Caribbean trade war was not to sever trade
with the enemy, but divert it to her advantage. To this end,
it was essential that access to the Spanish Indies' market
be kept open for herself, but closed to Prance. As the war
progressed the Spanish colonies, without effective naval
support, began to suffer from the interruption o± their normal
imports of dry goods and manufactures. Similarly, the British
colonies' need for Spanish bullion and livestock increased,
particularly in order to succour the large amphibious expedi-
tions operating in the theatre.
To safeguard the trade, the British Governniant aithorised
that Spanish vessels trading with the Free Ports be provided
with special licences by the governors of the islands
concerned. 44' Station warships were ordered not to detain
such ships. There was widespread resentment in the Navy at
the loss of prize-money and although many of the licenced ships
were unnioleeted, 4there were many instances of ufiawfu]. seizure
by disgruntled commanders. In 1799, for example, merchants
of Nassau, Bahamas, complained three times that British
441. BT 5/10, 5/11 and 5/15: Minutes of the Board of Trade -
June 21 and November 11, 1797; August 7, October 21 andNovember 9, 1799.
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cruisers were interfering in their trade with the Spanish
colonies. That year, the scale of seizures became sufficient-
ly serious for the Board of Trade to make official complaint
to the Admiralty, without obtaining much redress.
The licencing of Spanish vessels in the free Port trade
did not become properly organized until after the capture of'
Trinidad in 1797, when San Josef (Port-of-Spain) was declared
a free port within the system. 2 For some time afterwards,
while the rest of' the British West Indies remained closed to
Spanish commerce, Trinidad was the sole licensing authority,
but gradually in 1798 the system was extended to Jamaica and
the Ba1iam.e.443
The importance of the free Port trade with the Spanish
Indies during the war years should not be exaggerated.
Reliable statistics are lacking, but at least as regards the
flow of raw materials into the Free Ports, the system was
never very successful. The main items were logwood, dyestifffs
cotton and livestock. 444 With the exception of the first,
more adeq.uate supplies came from North America and the East
442, 443. BT 5/10, 5/11, and 5/15: Minutes of the Board of
Trade - June 21 and November 11, 1797; August 7, October 21
and November 9, 1799.
444. PT 5/8: Minutes of the Board of Trade - February 9, 1793.
Barbados agent, John Braithwaite, to Lord Hawkeebury on the
importance of' the Spanish logwood trade: ' ... the import
from the Spanish Main of the following species of timber -
bully tree, purpleheart, greenheart, mastic, yellow saunders
and locust mahogany - have always been used by British West
Indian planters as essential in sugar-mill construction
and these woods are unobtainable elsewhere in the West Indies.,'
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Indies than could be furnished by the free Ports, and return
for the import of British manufactures and dry goods to the
Spanish Indies was better paid in bullion. On the other
hand, the market as an outlet for British manufactures was
of real importance. The Spanish colonies welcomed British
linens and cloth, woollen goods, hardware, including agricul-
tural implements and cooking utensils, and a great variety
of other articles. Unfortunately, it was just in this sphere
that there was growing competitiong±'rom the American and
neutral traders. Between 1797 and 1807, American exports
to the Spanish Indies greatly increased, with Cuba in parti-
cular becoming an object of their attention. The neutral
entrepte at St. Thomas and CuraQao sold enormous quantities
of manufactured goods to the Spanish.
Clearly, the Entrep't Trade was maintained with difficulty
during the war. The merchantmen..plying between the Spanish
Main and the Free Ports were a prey both to enemy privateers
arid seizure by cruisers of the Jamaica station. The intro-
duction of the licencing system did help to protect them from
the latter, but by the end of the period, there was increasing
competition from American and neutral vessels. Perhaps the
most surprising thing was that the free Port system survived.
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CHA.P2ER 5
CARIBBEAN IARITIL TRAflE, 1783 - 1802
Part ii: the illicit traffic and the struggle
ainst the privateers
The inflexibility of the English Navigation Laws and the
restrictions imposed on trade between the British West Indies
and the United States after 1783, inevitably promoted smuggling
on a large scale. It has earlier been shown how vital to both
was the exchange of tropical produce f or provisions, lumber and
plantation stores. 445 Every attempt to prevent this free
intercourse only led to its continuation illicitly. Within
a few months of a trade embargo being declared at the end of
1783, the authorities in both Jamaica and the Leeward Islands
became aware of widespread evasion. In November 1784, the
Governor of Jamaica wrote: 'There is every reason to believe
that the fraudulent inipbrtat ion from the United States is very
considerable ... probably equal to that which is imported
legally'. 446 And Governor Shirley of the Leeward Islands
asserted that: ' ... a great deal of American produce is intro-
duced into these islands by methods contrived to evade the
restrictions ... t
445. See chapter 4, pp. i85.'
446. CO 137/85: Governor Hamilton to Lord Sydney, November 11,
1784.
447. CO 137/86: Governor Shirley to Lord Sydney, December 2,
1784.
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In fact, merchants and shipmastersfroin ports all along
the eastern United States seaboard were willing to run the
risks of smuggling to the English and Prench islands, in return
for high profits and quick gain. Charleston, South Carolina -
the closest major American port to the West Indies - was heavily
implicated. Her merchants had not in the past considered the
Caribbean a prime market; their main interest bad been the
export of South Carolina rice and cotton to Europe, But in
1775, and again in 1793, they did not hesitate to capitalize on
opportunities of war; and their illegal trading in the Carib-
bean was often shielded by complaisant customs officials and
sympathetic court judges.448
Other American ports were as deeply involved. Large
numbers of vessels from Boston, Philadelphia and New York traded
illicitly with the Caribbean. At the latter port, customs
officers who attempted to prosecute illegal traders, often
found the courts against them; at one time the grand jury of
New York City was entirely composed of merchants. 449 The most
flagrant traffic, however, was carried on by the state of Rhode
Island. With a long-established reputation as astute colonial
traders, the merchants of Newport and Providence were adept at
evading the restrictions.	 Iloreover, their clandestine acti'v'i-
ties were facilitated by the fact Rhode Island remained semi-
autonomous long after the Declaration of Independence. With
448. Carl Ubbelohde: 'The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the AmericarRevolution ...', p . 26.
449. See next page
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little fear of interruption at borne, their main problem was to
escape detection in the West Indies. 	 If unable to operate
under Flag of Truce commission, they resorted to more dangerous
methods. Having cleared for Jamaica or another British colony,
their ships relied on Sorged or "coloured" papers to conceal
their actual voyage to an enemy port.45°
As well as being the essential outlet f or American food-
stuffs and lumber, the West Indian islands were a convenient
emporium f or the illicit procurerrtent of European manufactures.
There was a strong stimulus for this traffic as long as the
Navigation Laws continued to force trade between Europe and the
British West Indies through the entrep6t of Great Britain.
The holds of American merchant ships, in particular, were
frequently filled with European merchandise on the return
voyage from the Caribbean. Before reaching their home port,
the vessels used to transfer the illicit cargo to an "experience
coaster", before entering harbour to declare the remainder of
the cargo in the normal way. The abundance of sheltered bays
and quiet creeks on both the North American and Caribbean
littoral - allied to judicious use of the hours of darkness -
facilitated such operations.451
Another major cause of illicit trade in the Caribbean
449, 450. Carl EJbbelohde: 'The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the
American Revolution ... ', p. 27 and p. 30.
451. Laurence A. Harper: 'The English Navigation Laws', p. 263.
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arose out of the predicament which faced the French West Indies
in time of war. Without a big enough merchant ma.rine or an
adequate fleet in the Caribbean to protect the islands, France
was compelled to admit the large-scale use of neutral ships as
carriers for her colonial trade. The practice began during
the Seven Years War when large numbers of small Dutch vessels,
operating particularly from the islands of St Eustatius and
Curaçao, almost monopolised the traffic to and from the French
islands. St Eustatius especially became a very important
rendezvous in three respects: for the incoming North American
vessels bringing foodstuffs and lumber to the French colonies;
1' or the outgoing tropical produce of those islands; and, for
the marketing of goods of European origin, especially
manufactures.452' 453
After the outbreak of war in 1793, the French islands
made every effort to keep their trade in being by continuing
to rely on neutral ships as catiers. The original pretext
f or admitting them to their ports - the scarcity of food and
consequent threat of starvation - was made on every possible
occasion and often abused. Another frequent device was the
use of ships under Flag of Truce commission. Oste.nsibly
restricted to the exchange of prisoners-of-war, the system
452, 453. See Richard Pares': 'War and Trade in the West Indiea
pp. 375 et seq; and the same author's 'Yankees and Creoles',
p . 60.
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offered every opportunity for the undeclared shipment of badly-
needed provisions. In the early months of the war neutral
ships often succeeded in reaching the French islands unchecked.
But after the amphibious campaigns of 1793/1794 and the British
occupation of Martinique, St Lucia and Tobago, the station
squadrons closely blockaded the last remaining French possessions
Guadeloupe and San Domingo. 454
 At this juncture their survival
entirely depended upon illicjt trade.	 In fact none of the
French islands could in wartime dispense with professional
smugglers - Dutch, Danish or American. Guadeloupe survived
for many years by no other means.
The neutral Caribbean islands, too, played a significant
part in the illicit trade. Each quarter of the Caribbean Sea
possessed at least one such refuge to which the smugglers could
resort. In the north, St Eustatius stood pre-eminent as the
vital entrepZt of the North American and French West Indies'
traffic. Nearby, the Danish islands of St Thomas and St Martin
were much used by privateers, smugglers and traders to the
French West Indies. St Croix, the other Danish island, was
lees important as a smuggling centre during the period, because,
unlike St Eustatius, it bad little but its own produce to offer
and its trade was liable -to arbitrary interference from Denmar5
454. See chapters 1 and 2, pp. 39; 81-2,
455. Richard Pares: 'The Yankees and Creoles ...', p. 61.
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In the central Caribbean the Spaniards opened a Free Port at
Monte Cristi, on the north coast of Hispaniola only a few miles
from the border with French San Domingo. Formerly an important
trade lin.k between North America and French San Domingo, it had
rather lost its importance as the Free Port system began to
develop elsewhere in the Caribbean after 1763;456 but it
remained a major hide-out for smugglers and privateers. In
the south, the Dutch island of Curaao was the chief resort
for professional traders and smugglers operating between the
Spanish Indies and the Windward Islands.
Nor was illicit trade confined to the French colonies
or the Neutral Islands. Large quantities o± foreign produde
reached the British market via her West Indian colonies as a
result of the French, the Dutch and the Danes operating in
league with unscrupulous English inarchants. The trade was
risky but extremely profitable. Small craft laden with sugai
rum or coffee used to run into the creek mouths of the British
colonies under cover of darkness. After unloading, the goods
were taken overland to the island's nearest port and later
declared as being of local origin. In this way, large quanti-
ties of foreign produce were fraudulently imported into Britain
at the lower rate of duty. In an attempt to end the abuse,
456. See chapter 4, p. 215,
22.7
an Act of 1788 stipulated that sugars exported from the British
plantations had to be accompanied on declaration by certificates
of origin, but these were often forged.
In 1791, Governor Orde of Dominica believed that half
the island's sugar export of six thousand hogeheads was really
of French colonial origin: ' ... quantities are often reported
as sworn to be made at certain estates wJien it is notorious
that such estates are not making sugar at all or never make
one half of the quantity certified to be their production'.457
A similar situation existed in the Virgin Islands. Its chief
port of Tortola, one of the main smuggling centres of the
Caribbean, was believed to be shipping off annually.four times
the actual quantity of sugar made in those islands. 458
 The
surplus was obtained by droghers trading illicitly with the
Danish islands of St Croix, St John and St Thomas. As well
as trading in sugar, Tortola specialized both in the illegal
import of other foreign produce f or eventual shipment to Britain
at the lower duty, and in receiving American provisions, lumber
and other merchandise for distribution amongst the British
West Indies.459
457. CO 71/18: Governor Orde to Grenville, January 18 and
April 16, 1791.
458. ADM 1/315: Rear-Admiral La±'orey to Stephens, March 15, 1792
459. CO 71/18: Governor Orde to Grenville, May 5, 1791.
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Shortly before the outbreak of war, the station admiral
gave a disturbing report on the extent of illicit trading in
the Leeward Islands. 46 ° He emphasised that, as the distance
between most of the British and foreign islands was very short,
smugglers could operate large numbers of small craft at many
points simultaneously. It was therefore very difficult to
check such trade, but he attached great importance to the
squadron being equipped with as many small nd fast sailing
vessels as possible. Rear Admiral Lafordy then went on to
describe the situation on each 1slan1. St Kitte received many
of its supplies, pripally by sugar drogher, from St. Eustatius
the passage between which is not more than three league
flontserrat was on the direct trade route f or vessels linking
the French, Danish and Dutch islands. Anguilla drew all its
provisions from St. Martin, ' ... between which there is but
a narrow channel'. Tortola, as has been shown, took large
quantities of sugar and American provisions from the Danish
islands, and both Dominica and St Vincent carried on much the
same trade with Guadeloupe and, in. the early months of the war,
with Martinique. In every case, as Laforey did not fail to
emphasise, the trade was entirely illicit.462
As the war progressed there was plentiful evidence of
460, 461, 462. ADM 1/315: Rear-Admiral Laforey to Stephens,
March, 15, 1792.
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illegal trafficking between the neutral islands and the enemy.
In November 1794, it was reported from Jamaica that Quantities
of ammunition and provisions were reaching the French garrisons
at Port-au-Prince and along the south coast of San Domingo,
through neutral vessels sailing from the Danish West Indies and
North America. At the same time, as many as twenty Dutch
merchantrnen had been observed at anchor in Curaçao harbour,
loading cargoes for enemy ports in San Domingo. 463 Two years
later, the commander-in-chief of the Leewards station, Rear-
Admiral Harvey, included in a report to the Admiralty a list
of nineteen inerchantmen which had been detained by his squadron
during one month alone. All were flying neutral colours but
had been stopped on suspicion of carrying French or Dutch
property aboard. The vessels were bound 1' or a number of
different ports - Suririani, St Thomas, Cayenne, Boston - a clear
indication of the extent of the illicit trade.464
In the earlier Anglo-French wars of the century, the
enemy's maL,n weapon had been the despatch of frequent raiding
squadrons to the Caribbean. 465 But it was a feature of the
Revolutionary War how few French warships larger than a frigate
operated there. Without the squadrons available in 1793,
463. CO 137/94: Governor Williamson of Jamaica to the Duke of
Portland, November 14, 1794.
464. ADM 1/319: Rear-Admiral Harvey to Nepean, September 13,
1796. The period in question was from July 20 to August 20,
1796.
465. See next page.
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Prance relied heavily upon the strategy of "guerre d e course",
and unquestionably the chief danger to British seaborne trade
in the Caribbean caine from enemy privateers. Prom the outbrea1
of war until the Peace of Amiens in 1802, they inf1cted heavy
losses upon merchantmen and seriously disrupted the normal
course of trade. When the privateers and Caribbean bases
belonging to the Dutch and Spaniards were added to the ranks
of the enemy in 1795/6, the danger increased.
Who were the privateers; how and where did they operate?
Why, in particular, were they able to damage British Caribbean
trade more severely than squadrons of heavier warships had in
the past?
Immediately before the declaration of war in 1793, the
Prench Convention authorized the fitting out and arming of
merchant ships to cruise against the enemy. A decree of
January 31st promised every assistance to privateers; as soon
as it was sanctioned, special couriers were despatched post-
haste bearing the instuctions to the French seaports.466
465. For instance - in the 1739 - 1748 War: Caylus, L'Etandure
Conflans and Macnmara (1745 - 174&); de la Motte (1747)
- in the Seven Years War: de Salvert (1756);
Beauffreniont Kersaint (1757); La Clue (175); Bompar (1759);Blenac (17623
- in the American War of Independence:
d'8tain (177); dhasse and lamotte-Pioquet (1779);
Guichen (1780) de Grasse (1781 - 1782).
466. See Appendix 2Z , for the decree in full.
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One clause of the decree emphasised the Convention's deterraina-
tion to wage a vigorous "guerre de course": 'Le miriistre de
la Marine pour aco16rer kes armements en course, 	 out
lieu, d&ivrera des lettres de marque ou permissions en blanc
a'	 it7d'armer en guerre, et oourir stir lee ennemis de la Republique..'.
It is not known how many letters of marque were first
issued, nor how many Prench privateers operated in the Caribbean
during the early months. But it was certainly a large number
to judge by the damage they inflioted. Between February and
May 1793 more than seventy British, Dutch and Spanish merchant-
men were captured by French privateers based on Guadeloupe,
Martinique and St Lucia. 468 Two years later, those operating
from Guadeloupe &ne were described as being: 	 ... numerous
almost beyond credibility'. 469 By 1795/1796, much greater
numbers of privateers were being used, as the serious situation
which arose at Jamaica testifies. "The Royal Gazette" of
Kingston published in January 1796 a list of 159 merchant ships,
bound to and from Jamaica, which bad been taken during 1795.470
Many of these were small local brigs and schooners; but there
were also a large number of mercbantmen on oceanic passage to
467. See Appendix 2Z	 , article 2, for the decree in full.
468. Gomer Williams: 'History of the Liverpool Privateers ...'
(Heinemann; 1897), p. 312.
469. flalfe: 'The Naval. Biography of Great Britain ...' (London;
1828), vol. I, pp. 237 - 238 (on Laforey).
470. Listed in full in appendix 23
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and from England carrying valuable cargoes, and, most serious
of all, three Post Office packets with important mails.
Such losses produced a storm of complaint and criticism
from Jamaica merchants and planters, which reached London in
the early part of 1796. The following are only a selection
of what was said: 'Our coasts are blockaded by privateers,
nothing escapes ... every day announces a ship cap, tured by
these marauders ... they come into our very harbours';471
the coast is become so full of privateers, ... the shipper
refuset, p send their goods on board'; 472	' ... at present
every part of the islands swarm with privateers of every descrip-
tion, from four swivels to sixteen guns and full of men and
small arms, who often attack in full daylight' .473
After two unsuccessful squadron raids in 1794 and l795,
Prance made no further attempts to despatch ships-of-the-line
to the Caribbean, CE even to reinforcethe dwindling number of
frigates stationed there. By June 1797, French warship strengtl
in the lesser Antilles had declined to one frigate and two
471. The Spencer Papers (N.R.S.) vol. I, p . 247: Charles Mitche]
to Du.ndas, January 30, 1796.
472. Ibid. p . 249: Captain Dawkins Carr of the Jupiter to
Spencer, January 30, 1796.
473. Ibid. pp. 254 - 255: Unknown correspondents to Spencer,
in letters dated January 26 and February 12, 1796.
474. The first in June 1794; the second in January 1795 -




 eight months later the last s ,urviving frigate
was laid up at Pointe Pitre, Guadeloupe. 476
 Thereafter all
remaining naval officers and crew were gradually transferred
to privateere, to supplement the local manpowexi. 477 It was
the same situation on San Domingo, where the enemy's naval
force hd by 1797 been reduced to a handful of frigates and
corvettes, stationed at Cap Pranqoie. Henceforth, enemy off en-
sive strategy was entirely based on the use of numerous privateei
Had the attack on British trade in the Caribbean been
conducted by French privateers alone or been limited to their
operating from their own bases, the situation, although seriois
enough, might Possibly Lbeen contained. But it was eatly
worsened on account of the sympathy shown to the privateers
by the Neutral Islands and the United States and by the entry
of Holland and Spain into the War in 1795/6. Without these
developments French privateering might well have collapsed.
Pursuing a cardinal principle of maritime strategy, which
argued that an enemy might be destroyed by the occupation o±
her colonies and thus their ports and bases, the British naval
and military forces had by the middle of 1794 gone far towards
achieving their objectives. The campaign in San Domingo,
475. ADM 1/320: Harvey to Nepean, June 22, 1794.
476. La Pense, 28.
477. ADM 1/321: Harvey to Nepean, February 9, 1798.
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the conquest of Martinique, St Lucia, Tobago and the temporary
occupation of Guadeloupe seriously weakened the French privateer
With vessels predominantly small in size and strictly limited
in range and endurance, they needed safe anchorages close to
their cruising areas, if they were to operate at all. Yet
they did survive and indeed grew more numerous. If Britain
thought she could destroy French privateering in the West Indies
by occupying her colonies, she failed to take into sufficient
account the vital fact that, when pressed, the enemy could
fall back on other resources to hand.
As alternative operational bases, as nurseries for crew
to man their privateers, as furnishers of provisions and naval
stores, the French found many of the neutral Caribbean islands
extremely useful. Those belonging to Denmark and
	 Sweden
were particularly helpful. For instance, Admiral Jervis in
September 1794 warned the Admiralty of what was happening on
the small Swedish-held island of St Bartholomew. In defiance
of the squadron, the Governor there was giving: 	 ... open
and disgraceful encouragement to freebooters and privateers
which was of the most dangerous import to the trade and naviga-
tion of the Antilles'. 479
 He reported that the enemy's
privateers were being supplied with flour and arms by Swedish
478. ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, September 8, 1794.
479, 480. ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, September 8, 1794.
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and American ships, which he had no means of preventing. The
caine sort of collaboration was reported from the Danish
possession of St Thomas, off Puerto Rico. 480 Three months
after this, Jervis' successor to the Leewards command, Vice-
Admiral Caidwell, condemned the Swedee as being ' ... more
hostile than an open enemy'. 481 At the same time, Lloyd's
Committee in London heard from the master of a captured brig
that five French privateers were permanently based on and
operating from St. Thomas.482
Another way in which the neutral islands helped the
privateere followed as a direct result of the British occupa-
tion or close blockade of the French colonies. With their
ships thus bottled up in harbour by the blockade, large numbers
of French seamen were idle. It was not long before they were
shipped across to the neutral islands, to form a vital nucleus
1' or manning the privateers. In January 1795, the ports of
St Bartholomew and St Thomas were described as swarming with
Frenchmen ready to serve aboard the first privateer which
entered harbour. 483 Admiral Caldwell quoted a very typical
example of what was taking place. The previous December one
479, 480. ADM 1/316: Jervis to Stephens, September 8, 1794.
481. ADM 1/317: Caldwell to Stephens, January 3, 1795.
482. ADM 1/3992: Thomas Tayler, master of Lloyd's Committee,
London, to Stephens, December 2, 1794 - enclosing a report from
the vessel Maria from St. Lucia.
483. ADM 1/317: Caidwell to Stephens, January 3, 1795 - quotin
several instances.
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of his eloops had stopped a Swedish brig coming out of Pointe
a Pitre, Guadeloupe, where she bad been secretly armed and fitted
out as a privateer. Four French naval officers were found on
board, and it was clearly the intention that after r eaching
St Bartholomew she should be manned by French seamen and begin
operating as a privateer. The Swedish captain refused to admit
the evidence, maintaining that he had purchased the brig by
order of the Governor of St Bartholomew for use on that island
and that he must be allowedto proceed. The vessel's papers
as a neutral were in order and in the circumstances a he could
not be prevented from doing .484 The incident exactly
describes how easily the enemy could make use of neutrals to
further their privateering activities, which could only be
interrupted at the risk of serious political repercussions.
Nor did the co-operation of the neutral islands end with
the provisioning and manning of the privateers. Prom the same
islands oame reports of the enemy being allowed to dispose of
captured prizes in their harbours, without the authorities even
waiting for a form of condemnation. 485 The President of the
Virgin Islands early in 1795 cited instances of men from captured
British merohantmen being imprisoned on St Bartholomew.486
Other reports told of the French sending British prisoners taken
484. ADM 1/317: Caidwell to Stephens, December 18, 1794 -
enclosing the log of the sioop Inspector.
485, 486, 487. ADM 1/317: Caidwell to Stephens, January 30, 1795
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by their privateera to the island of St. Thomas and elsewhere
for exchange. 487 Further south, the Dutch island of Curaçao
established a reputation during the war as a place where the
privateers might take their prizes and dispose of the crews.488
Prom the neutral United States also came support for the
privateers. The reason lay partly in the afliance forged
with Prance during the course of the American Wa of Independenc€
more valid during the period was the commercial profit to be
gained from capturing British merohantmen. There were numerous
cases of vessels being fitted out as privateers in North Americar
ports under French colours but manned chiefly by Americans89'49
In January 1795, Lloyd's agent in New York reported that there
were six French privateers in the harbour and several British
West Indianieri which they had captured, alongside. 491 Charlestor
in South Carolina, already noted as a major smuggling centre,
was equally known as a haven for fitting out and victualling
enemy privateers 492
487. ADM 1/317: Caidwell to Stephens, January 30, 1795.
488. ADM 1/3992: Admiralty in-letters from Lloyds. Bennett &Co., (Lloyd's Committee) to Nepean, July 8, 1797 - re the ship
Mary.
489. Gotwer Williams: 'The Liverpool Privateers ...', p. 311.
490, 491. ADM 1/3992: Lloyd's Conunittee to the Admiralty,February 28, 1794 - re the capture of the John and Elizabeth.
492. ADM 1/246. William Parker to Nepean, June 29, 1795.
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But the main external benefit to the privateers came
after the entry of Holland and Spain into the war. Not only
were their privateers added to the ranks of the enemy. At
one stroke a great number of ports, harbours and inlets on
the coasts of Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and
Curaçao were thrown open to the Prench. This was of immense
strategic importance. Deprived of almost all their colonial
bases, they were at once furnished with others just as good.
The use of the Spanish colonial ports after October 1796 was
particularly important. Along the long southern coastline
of Cuba, such bases were ideal for preying upon the trade
proceeding from Jamaica homeward via tJle Gulf of Plorida.
The ports of Puerto Rico and eastern Hispaniola were well placed
for attacking the local traffic amongst the Leeward Islands.
In the south, Spanish Trinidad was equally suitable for raiding,
northwards against the Windward Islands and eastwards along the
coast of Guiana. By 1802, it has been estimated that there
were between two and three hundred french privateers alone
operating from spanish ports in the Caribbean.493
Geographical features peculiar to the area favoured
privateering. The Caribbean had always supported the predator
rather than his victim. An abundance of uninhabited islands
493. Lucy Horsfall: 'The West India Trade', pp . 147 - 148.
(chapter in 'The Trade Winds ...'; edited by C.N. Parkinson).
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and secluded harbou,rs provided inaccessible bases; narrow
sea-passages amid dangerous reefs made it difficult for vessels
of size to locate and surprise the privateers. Tropical fish,
fruit and other food in plenty allowed the enemy to be self-
supporting in. remote areas and, even in the British colonies,
the local populace were inured to smuggling and often in sympath
with -the privateers. Throughout the period, the margin between
privateering and piracy was always hard to define. Even
regularly-commissioned French and Spanish vessels had been
known to turn pirate, b eing under little restraint from their
distant governments. 494 Most notorious of all were the picaroo
privateers of -the San Domingo coast. Using smailcoastal craft
propelled by oars and crammed with negroes, these native pirates
preyed on -the merchantmen of every nation. 495 After Toussaint
l'Ouverture had overrun San Domingo in 1798, the picaroons
established a reign of terror off its coasts.496
The types of vessels they used, their armament and crews
and the skill with which they were handled, also brought advant-
age to the privateers. The enemy's proficiency here made it
possible for -their privateere to elude, outsail, and sometimes
even destroy, the larger r1t1sh warships sent against them.
Not unjtl late in -the period, despite every effort by the statio
494, 495. G.W. Allen: 'Our Navy and the West India pirates.'
(Salem; 1929), pp. 2 - 3.
496. See chapter 2, pp. 113.
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commanders, were captures made by the cruisers evidence of
their beginning to gain the upper hand.
The principal characteristics of the privateers were
their small size and fast sailing qualities; their rapid and
inexpensive construction in local yards; the excellence of
their design according to the conditions of the area; finally,
their heavy armament and complement in relation to displacement.
The journals of the station admirals contain many accounts of
the privateers' ability to escape capture by virtue of superior
speed or sailing qualities. 497 In point o± naval architecture,
their design was often much admired, as, for example, when
Admiral Hyde Parker described two recently-captured privateer98
as being: ' ... such remarkable fine vessels andfast sailers
that I shall survey them f or H.M. service'. 499 During the
American War of Independence, France had gained first-hand
knowledge of the excellence of American naval design in the
smaller types of vessels. As a result, many of her later
privateers were built to incorporate the speed and manoeuvra-
biity of the Baltimore clippers and Virginia pilot-cutters.
497. The qualities of American sailing ships of the period are
well described in three works by Howard I. Chapelle: 'The
History of' American sailing ships ... ' (Putnam; 1936); 'The
Baltimore clipper; its origin and development' (Salem; 1930);
and 'American pilot-baots' (New Hampshire; 1934).
498. La flagioienne, 16 and Le Bienvenu, 14.
499. ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to the Admiralty, March 12, 1798.
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The versatility of the enemy privateers may be appreciated
by an examination of some of those which operated during the
period. For instance, between September 12th 1796 and November
10th 1798, 91 enemy privateers - French, Spanish and Dutch -
were captured on the Leeward Islands station. 500
 A break-down
by nationality, type and armament gives the following results:-
1 • TABLE OF P1IVATER^ CAPTUREP O' TTtT
!HE LVARDS SPION, 1796 - 1798
Number of Vessels
(a)
By Nationality French Spanish Dutch Prizes Unspecified Total
71	 6	 2	 12	 0	 = 9].
(b) Sohooners Sloops Brigantines Brigs Cutters Unspeci- TotalBy Type	 fied
34	 14	 1	 13	 6	 23	 = 91
with 2 with 4 with 6 with 8 with 10 with 12By Armament
nS	 S	 ne	 ns	 ns
8	 15	 13	 12	 10	 5
with 14 with 16 with 18 Unspecified Total
guns	 guns	 guns
7	 1	 3	 17	 .91
501
500. Compiledfrom Rear-Admiral Haryey's cespatohes to Admiralty,
September 1796 to December 1798.	 (ADM 1/319 to 1/321).
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The table demon8trates the preponderance of French privateera
operating in the Leeward Islands. A remarkable feature, also, is
the fact that in spite of their limited size and displacement, nearl:
one-third of the privateers were armed with ten guns or more.
By comparison, the record of privateere captured on the Jamaica
station over a shorter period - April 1797 to May 1798 - yields
the following results:-
2.	 TABLE OF PRIVATR CftPPtTT	 OW PTtE
JM&&ICA STATION, April 1797 - May 1798
Number of Vessels
(a)By Nationality French Spanish Dutch Prizes Unspecified Total
15	 8	 0	 0	 24	 = 47
(b) Ships	 Sohooners	 Brigs	 Sloops	 CuttersBy Type
1	 20	 4	 1	 0
unboats Armed Barges Rowboats Unspecified Total
1	 3	 15	 2	 47
(0)	 -Swjyels & with 2 with 3 with 4 with 6 with 8 with 9By 
Armament mquetoons guns guns guns guns guns guns
18.
	2	 1	 0	 3	 1	 1
with 10 with 12 with 14 with 16 with 18 Unspeci- Tots
fled
3	 1	 1	 2	 0	 14	 47
5o
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The analysis reveals how widely the enemy's privateeriug
strategy varied according to area. Both stations, indeed,
had to contend with privateers in the open sea, but the Jainai.ca
command faced an additional hazard in coastal waters. Not
only off the Jamaica coast, but in the Gu1f of Gonaive and the
Mole, San Domingo, and in the restricted channels through the
Bahamas, the enemy appeared in force with small gunboats, armed
barges and row-boats. Shallow of draught, heavily crewed arid
armed with swivels or sometimes a crude sort of howitzer in
the bows, these craft used to thrust out from the coastal inlets
to attack passing nierchantmen and retire with their prey, before
any retaliation could be effected. In this way, a heavy toll
was taken of the costal trade, particularly of the small sugar
droghers carrying the produce of the plantations to the assembly
ports. Many of the coastal privateers, especially those operat-
iug off San Domingo, were neither Prench nor Spanish but picaroor
That these types of craft caused considerable damage to
the trade is evident from the contemporary accounts. Twice
in the course of the San Domingo campaign, in 1795 and again in
1797, merchant ships arriving off that coast from Jamaica and
501. Compiled from Rear-Admiral Harvey's despatches to the
Admiralty, 1796 - 1798, in ADM 1/319, 1/320 and 1/321.
502. Compiled from Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker's despatches to the
Admiralty, June 13, October 8, 1797 and March 12, 1798, inADM 1/248. See pp. 255/tor the full list of captures.
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North America were seriously harassed.503' 504. The worst
attacks -took place around an area to the south of the Mole
St Nicolas, known as the Platform. Here picaroon row-boats
and barges lay in wait for unsuspecting merchantmen as they
rounded the headland before coming into harbour. 505
 Even
after the Mole had become a permanent base for the squadron's
warships, the Platform continued to claim its victims.5
Further south in the enclosed waters of the Gulf of
Gonaive and the Bight of Leogane, email French and picaroon
privateers -took full advantage of local conditions. In -the
Gulf, the wind used often to drop unexpectedly, leaving merchant
men bacalmed and vulnerable; in the Bight, navigation was
difficult and ships proceeding -to Port-au-Prince had -to follow
a narrow channel close inshore. 507
 Just such a situation
occurred on January 1st, 1800, when the schooner Experiment
escorting a convoy of' four merchantmen was at-tacked off G-onaive
503. ADM 1/244: Ford to Admiralty, May 3, 1795.
504, ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Admiralty, August 26, 1797.
505. ADM 1/246: William Parker to Admiralty, June 29, 1795.
In this despatch, Parker also pothntedcout to -the Admiralty that
the only vessel available from the squadron to act as guard-
ship at -the Mole, was the poorly-armed Dispatch, quite incapable
of: ' ... chequing the rowboats from the P1atform boarding
vessels coming into the Mole'.
506. ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Admiralty, October 8, 1797.
507. Thid: same to same, Ilarch 13, 1798.
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Island. In a flat calm, ten picaroon barges manned by between
four arid five hundred pirates put out from the shore and began
rowing towards them. Unable to go to the assistance of her
charges, Experiment managed to sink tbree of the nearest enemy
craft but two of the inerchantnien were seized.508
The Spaniards, too, were adopting the same methods:
our coastal trade is being attacked by the enemy who have
taken to building at San lago de Cuba row-boats upon the princi-
ple of launches that carry from thirty to forty men, armed with
one heavy gun. and rowed by twelve to eighteen oars. These
skulk under the points of bays and are a very great annoyanoe
-to the trade. Prom their rowing and being able to unship
their oars, they cannot easily be seen by our cruizers aixi by
their quick movement from place to place it is impossible to
destroy them even although we have six vessels now cruizing
about the island (Jamaica). They are under Spanish colours
but mostly manned with Prenebmen ... these vessels certainly
do a great deal of niisohief.'509
In other areas as well, the enemy found the use of
shallow-draught vessels close inshore profitable. They infested
the Grand Bahama Bank, as Captain Hardy of LM.S. Suirrel
pothte out to Admiral Hyde Parker: ' ... it is impossible to
508. GW. Allen: 'Our Navy and the West India pirates ...' ,
pp. 2 - 3.
509. Spencer Papers (N.R.S.), vol. III, pp. 23 - 284: Hyde
Parker to Spencer, Pebruary 24, 1800.
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protect the coasting trade among the Bahama islands, without
a vessel of' force of a small draft of water in order to go
across the Banks • , 510 In the shallow Bay of Honduras
and off the Guiana coast similar craft were to be found. In
the estuary of the Orinoco the Spaniards constructed a number
of shallow-draught "lanchas", specially designed to operate
off the river mouths and attack merchant ships while they waited
for the tide to carry them over the sandbars. By 1802, over
£200,000 worth of damage to the Guiana coasting trade had been
caused in this way.511
Certain factors dictated where the enemy privateers most
often congregated f or their attacks upon trade. On the Leewards
station the most important was the geographical position of the
British colonies - particularly Barbados - as first landfall
for the incoming oceanic trade. Thus the wide area of sea
to windward of the Antilles chain was a favourite hunting-ground
for the privateers. All merchant ships coining into the islands
from the Atlantic, including those ultimately sailing on to
Jamaica, followed predictable courses. There was very little
scope for variation due to the direction of' the prevailing winds
and, more important, the inability at that time of establishing
510. ADTI 1/248: Hyde Parker to Admiralty, enclosing Captain
Hardy's report of March 12, 1798.
511. ADM 1/327, f. 62: Seymour to the Admiralty, March 17, 1802.
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longitude at sea. 512
 
Because of the latter, incoming ships
could only be certain of making landfall by reaching the most
suitable parallel of latitude and sailing along it to the
recluired destination. Such circumstances greatly favoured
the privateere; their area of search could be concentrated
upon the limited areas of lancif all or along the narrow tracks
the trade must follow.	 Of course, it was just in those areas
that the stations placed their cruiser patrols, but there were
never su1ficient warships available. Moreover, following
such predictable courses did not endanger well-escorted convoys,
but often proved fatal to stragglers or mercbantmen sailing
independently.
In July 1795, the Admiralty 1.iad to remind the station
commander, Vice-Admiral Caidwell, of the -ulnerability of the
area to windward of Martinique, especially for rnerchantmen who
had lost their convoy. 513 Some time later the windward
approahes o Barbados became infested with privateers and
Admiral Laforey was forced to increase the cruiser patrol force
there at the sacrifice of other areas. 514 It was not however
until after Spain's entry into the war in 1796 that the approa-
512. For the problem of longitude at sea, see two important
articles by G.W. Nockolds in the 'Proceedings of the Antiquarian
Horological Society', entitled: 'Early tiniekeepers at sea':
vol. IV (September 1963), p. 110 - 113; vol. V (January 1964),
pp. 148 - 152.
5l3.Spencer Papers (N.R.S.), vol. I, pp. 51 - 52: Middleton
to Spencer, July 1, 1795.
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ohes to the southern Windward Islands suffered in this way.
In fact it proved less of a problem there, since few merchant-
men approached Grenada or St Vincent directly from.windward,
their first landfall being Barbados. As a result, Spanish
and French privateers based in the Gulf of Paria, Trinidad,
tended to operate more against Deinerara and other parts of
Guiana. 515
 Their objective was the coastal traffic rather
than the incoming oceanic trade.
The position of G-uadeloupe as a focus of privateer
activity was somewhat different. After a very temporary
occupation by British military forces in 1794, it remained
for eight crucial years the sole surviving French possession
in the Caribbean.	 In size the largest of the Antilles,
Guadeloupe geographically dominated the smaller British Leeward
Island colonies to the north and north-west and Domjnjca
immediately to the south. Inevitably it became a key enemy
privateer base, and the seas round Guadeloupe and the neigh-
bouring islands of Marie Galante and Dsirade were always
dangerous to trade. Never more so than during the critical
years of 1795/1796 when: 'their privateers ... daily sallied
out from the ports of the island and scarcely ever returned
successless ... a considerable number of vessels, many of
considerable size, were made prizes of ... ,•516
514, 515. ADIII 1/317: Laforey to Nepean, March 13, 1796.
516. James Ralfe: 'The Naval Biography of Great Britain(4 vole; 1828), vol. I, p. 237.
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At that time Admiral laforey estimated there were between twenty
six and thirty privateers based on the main port of Pointe-'a-
Pitre, Guadeloupe, alone and their armament ranged from eight
to fourteen guns each. An unknown number of others operated
from the smaller harboure and from creeks.517
Different factors determined the location of enemy
privateers on the Jamaica station. The main elements there
were the long and vulnerable sailing route to and from Jamaica
and the geographical position of the hostile islands ol' San
Donhingo/Hispaniola and Cuba.
The routes which ships bound to and from Jamaica had to
follow, have been described in the chapter on the Convoy
System, 518 The same had also to be taken by the independent
"runner 8 , the straggler and the small coasting vessel - and
it was upon these that the privateers mainly preyed. During
the voyage to Jamaica, the greatest danger occurred as merchant-
men sailed along the south coast of San Domingo. Here many
captures were made by enemy privateers operating from Aux Cayes
and Jaomel. 519 Off the former, l'fle de Vache bad an evil
reputation for the number of privateers lurking off its shores.
517. ADM 1/317: Laforey to Nepean, August 6, 1795.
518. See chapter 3, pp. 150-4
519. ADM 1/245: Ford to Admiralty, December 31, 1794.
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After 1795 it became necessary for the station admiral to
520.
institute a regular cruiser patrol between Jaomel and Altavella.
On the homeward route from Jamaica, the early stages of the
voyage were less perilous. Via the Windward Passage, greater
security followed the capture early In 1794 of the Mole St Nicho-
las, 521
 which commanded its entrance. Via the longer Florida
Straits route, French privateers were less able to attack the
trade because of the great distance from their bases. In fact
this route presented more of a problem after 1796, when Spaints
entry into the war opened up the Cuban ports to her own privateer
and those of her allies.
Security for the homeward-bound trade was much less satis-
factory after it had passed through the Windward Passage. The
maze of channels and numerous islands of the Bahamas were an
ideal area of operations for the privateers. It proved quite
impossible to patrol such a large area adequately from distant
bases in Jamaica and there was no suitable major anchorage in
the Bahamas themselves. French and pioaroon privateers operatin
from Jean Rabel and Port de Paix on the north coast of San Domingc
and, later, Spaniards from Barracoa in Cuba and Monte Cristi in
Hispaniola operated almost at will.522
520. ADM 1/246: Parker to Nepean, November 3, 1795.
521. See chapter 2, pp. 78.9•
522. ADI 1/246: Parker to Admiralty, June 29, 1795.
ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Admiralty, August 26, 1797.
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An illustration of the damage caused by the enemy in
this way comes from the Post Office records. Between 1795
and 1797 six Palmouth packets were taken by privateers in the





Taken by Date	 Value of cargo
Queen Charlotte Republique April, 19th, 1795 £ 3,281 14 10
Prince William
fleniy	 Vngeance April 7th, 1796
	
£2,464 17 7
Active	 Voltigueur September 30th,
1796
	








Sandwich	 Duguay, 18 Larch 10th, 1797
	
£ 2,073 12 4
In every case the captor was a privateer and not a man-of-war;
two of the packets - Prince William Henry and Active - were
taken in the Caicos Passage, a principal exit route tbrough
the Bahamas. This passage, although the most direct to England
was often avoided by merchant ships on two counts. It was the
most eaeterl and therefore the nearest to the enemy at San
Domingo; moreover, as it faced directly north-east, the winds
523. In minutes of the proceedings of the Committee of West
India Llerchante, London, March 24, 1794. Also in the corres-
pondence between its chairman Mr. Beeston Long and Messrs.
Chesterfield and Leicester of the General Post Office, March 15
to April 14, 1797.
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were often dead against. But the packets had taken those
risks in an attempt to reach England more quickly and had paid
the consequences. As early as June 1795, the station commander
at Jamaica had seen, ' ... the need to appoint escorts to the
several packets through the Passages to the northward, where
524
privateers look to interrupt the homeward-bound running ships...
He had tried to minimize the danger by despatching a sloop525
from the Mole to cruize in the passage, but, with pressing
commitments elsewhere, it was a very makeshift arrangement.
San omingo played as important a role in determining
the location of privateers on the Jamaica station as Gi.iadeloupe
did on the Leewards. The use of ports and harboure on her
southern coast by privateers attacking the inward-bound trade
to Jamaica, and on her northern against the Bahamas' passages,
has already been described. 526 But her assistance to the
privateers did not end there. Prom the many small liarbours
in the two large peninsulas jutting out westwards at Cape St
Nicholas and Tiburon, armed barges, gun-vessels and row-boats
played havoc with the coastal trade. 527 This was partleularly
so during the San Domingo campaign, when the passage of merchant
524. ADM 1/246: William Parker to Admiralty, June 29, 1795.
525. Le Serin, 16.
527. ADM 1/248: Hyde Parker to Admiralty, August 26 and October
8, 1797.
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MAP 9. Major Areas of Enemy Privateer Activity, 1793 :1802
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ships from Jamaica to the island was at times almost brought
to a standstill by the privateers. Losses were so severe in
1795 that a deputation of Jamaica merchants trading to San
Domingo wrote a joint memorandum to the station admiral, one
of their complaints being that, ' ... insurance is become so
high as to be almost a prohibition to the Trade'.528
The various activities and operational zones of the
privateers may be summarised as falling into seven groups,
and these are set out in the accompanying map. 529 The baáis
of division is primarily geographical, dictated by the limited
range of the vessels used. But in some areas the line of
demarcation was crossed, where more than one type of privateer-
ing was undertaken. San Domingo, for instance, harboured
not only privateers operating in her coastal waters, but those
which struck northwards against the Bahamas and south-westwards
against the noxti shores of Jamaica.53°
The divisions of privateer activity which have just been
suggested show that in the Ieewards comnand it emerged as two
distinct problems: the defence of the inward-bound trade,
especially to windward of the islands; and the need to reduce
Guadeloupe's power as the main enemy privateer base. These
conclusions are borne out by an examination of privateers cap-
tured on that station over a period of twenty-six months:-






























July 6	 La Legere
July 8	 Ia Va-Tout

























































Date	 Privateer	 Ginia Type
	 Captor	 Remarks
1. September 12,1796 La Viotoire	 6 schooner Zebra
2. September 21 Iris	 6 privateer L'Aiznable
3, November 23 Galgo	 18 Spanish Alarm	 with $80,000
brigantine	 aboard
4. December 28 Maria Topaze	 10 privateer lapwing
5. January 31,1797 L'Espoir	 4 privateer Iapwing
6. February 15 St Christopher	 18 Spanish brig Iapwing
7 • March 7	 Heureuse Catherine 	 6 schooner Iapiing
















24.August 1	 Ia Regu].ua
25. August 4	 Is Pont d'Arcot
26.August 8	 Ia Renard
27.August 10 L'Utile
28.August 15	 La Cocq
29. September 13 L'Agrable
30. September 28 Ia Barazine
31.December 2 Ia Hazard
32. December 4 Ia Dragon
33. December 7 Dix-huit de Fructidor
34. December 16 La Decide
35. January 3, 1798 Ia Desiree
36. January 8	 Ia Pro serpine
37. January 9 Intrigue
38. January 16 Ia Caye au Poulet
39. January 20 Ia Rencontre
40. February 2 I. Battren
41. February 9 La Cores






















No. Date	 Privateer	 Guns Type
	 Captor	 Remarks
43.February 18 Ia Mutine	 8 schooner Lapwing
44. February 19 La Parfaite	 10	 -	 Roebuck
45. February II Le Hardl	 8 schooner Concorde
46. February 13 Ia Hazard	 2 schooner Concorde
47. March 16	 Ia Furie	 2 privateer Hawke
48. March 31
	
Ia Hardi	 4 privateer lapwing
49. April 1	 La Roaire	 - privateer Concorde
50 • Atril 3	 La Vio].ette	 - sloop	 Amphitrite
51. April 6
	
Jeune Nantaise	 - sloop	 Garland
52.March 29	 Ia Vautour	 10 sloop	 Matilda
53. March 31	 L'Aigle	 12 brig	 Matilda
54. April 1	 Mutine	 6 sloop	 Requin















































































53].. Compiled from Rear-Aibniral Harvey's dispatches in DM ]J319, ]/320 and ]./3Z
532.There is a long list of French privateers taken between 1793 and 1834 in
C.B. Norman's S 'The Coreairs of France...', appendix xviii, pp.429-450.
But the vessels are listed by name only and there are no details of place
of capture.
533. Plus 8 other privateera, whose place of capture is not recorded in
the despatohee'-	 (1) Spanish privateer Ia Casca, 6, captured on February
15, 1797. (2) 7 French privateere captured during November ,1798 -
La Guadeloupienne, 10; La Prize de Marthe,8; La Proeperite,8 - echooners.
Le Bordelais,6 - sloop. L'Independence,12; & Le Quatorze Jufl.let,]4 -brigs.
La Zombie, 8 - cutter.
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If this information is plotted according to viere the
privateere were captured, 534 a distinct pattern eniercs.
Liaking allowance for the fact that some of the privateers were
taken en route to and from their cruizing areas, the result
oon.firms theexistence of three quite separate areas of privatee]
activitf within the command:535
Area A: The northern Leewards group - against which a large
number of privateers, based on Spanish Puerto Rico
and the neutral islands of St Thomas, St Martin,
St Bartholomew arid St Eustatius, operated.
Area B;; The wide arc stretching from Antigua to Martinique,
dominated by French privateers based on G-uadeloupe,
The scale of enemy activity is apparent from the
large number of captures made in this area.
Area C: The IWindwards Group, an area quite different from
the foregoing. Here the scale of privateering
was much less, owing firstly to its distance from
the French bases and, secondly, to the less numerous
and less effective Spanish privateers from Trinidad,
The main activity derived from the larger French
privateers operating at long range from Guadeloupe
and attacking the inward-bound oceanic trade as it
made its landfall to eastward of Barbados. 	 536
Heretofore, the struggle against the privateers bas been
discussed mainly from the point of view of the privateers
themselves. It has been suggested that the reasons for the
534. See Map to on p.258,
535. Because of their small size and limited range, the priva-
teers were usually confined to one area for some time. Normall
they could operate in a second area, only if a base there was
already assured.
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MAP 10 Approximate Location of Enemy Privateers
--
captured on the Leeward Islands Station
September 12, 1796 to November 10,1798
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enemies' success lay in the large number of privateers operating
the skill with which they were handled, and the favourable
geographical circumstances which they found in the Caribbean.
But another very important reason remains to be considered;
namely, the inadequate means and resources provied for the
British naval commands in the area, with which to fight them.
Repeated again and again in their despatches to London, the
station commanders throughout the period condemned the lack
of small warships in their squadron, both in number and o± the
right type, Such deficiency was a fundamental cause of failure
against the privateers.
What in fact could the station commanders do against
the privateers? Six possibilities were discernible; four
direct and two indirect. Within the first category fell:
conquest of the enemy islands and seizure of thdr bases;
raids and "cutting-out operations"; blockade; and sinking
the privateers at sea. To each of these methods there were
serious strategic objections. The first would have been
decisive against the privateers, but required large numbers
of troops and a series of costly amphibious operations. The
second demanded a battle-fleet, which could not be provided;
also, direct attack upon enemy shore-batteries meant acceptance
of casualties and damage to the squadron beyond the repair
capacity of the Caribbean dookyarde. As regards the two
latter direct methods, the past had shown that the seas were
260
too wide and there were too manr enemy ports to ensure success.
As a result, the station commanders had to fall back
upon the two indirect methods: a convoy system, and the
organization of regular cruiser patrols. If the enemy could
not be attacked directly, then the seaborne trade must be
defended and the privateers prevented from reaching their prey.
This strategy was certainly sound but here a serious d ilemnia
arose. To ensure success, both methods had to be used
simultaneously; and in either case large numbers of am.11
warships of the right type had to be available as patrol
cruisers and as convoy escorts. But it was just here that
both commands were grossly uprovided for.
In the Leewards command, the difficulties began early.
Vice-Admiral Caidwell found in the spring of 1795, that the
few frigates he had were proving quite unsuitable for hunting
privateers in the restricted waters and narrow channels of
the command. Although adequately gunned, they lacked the
speed and rnanoeuvrability for the task. Worse was the lack
of numbers; at that time there were not even enough small
537
warships to organize a proper cruiser patrol around Guadeloupe,
and the French privateere sailed so fast that: ' ... unless
it blows so strong, the frigates cannot come up with them'.538
537. ADM 1/317: Caidwell to Nepeari, April 16, 1795.
538. Nat. Mar. Mas.: Caidwell Papers (cAL/115): Same to same,
April 19, 1795.
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A few months later, his successor, Rear-Admiral Laforey, was
anxiously trying to obtain small vessels locally by every
possible means. 539 But he met serious obstacles in the way.
There were seldom opportunities for commandeering the types of
vessel he particularly sought - brigs, sloope and echooners.
When any were found in local use, it was discovered upon investi-
gation, that they were either hired by the island authorities
for local defence or owned by merchants for protection of their
trade under letter of marque. Those vessels which remained
and were offered -to the Navy often proved quite unsuitable.
A major difficulty arose through most of them being small and
unarmed; no suitable cannon could be found in the royal dock-
yards with which to mount them. The cost of purchase and
conversion was always high; at the end of 1794, two local
sloops were fitted out at the Antigua yard at a cost of £ 2,100
and £ 2,300 apiece. 54° At the root of the problem lay the
Admiralty's reluctance to allow overseas commands the power
of purchasing ships locally to add to their squadrons. Long
delays always ensued before permission to purchase or convert
was granted.
Attempts were therefore made to enlist the support of the
islands to contribute towards their own maritime defence against
539. ADM 1/317: Laforey to Nepean, August 6, 1795.
540. Ibid.
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the privateers. The results were disappointing. In January
1795, Caidwell asked the island legislatures: 'to fit out at
the public expense ... each a copper-bottom'd vessel from
sixty to one hundred and twenty tons, armed with ten to twelve
guns and carrying thirty to forty men'. 541 Only Antigua
furnished the type of vessel required - a ten-gun sloop, the
Polly, which was immediately despatched to Guadeloupe on cruiser
A	 545
patrol.-" ". Barbados and Montserrat gave two small sohoonere
which proved useless in service and there were no other
contributions.
Having found local resources inadequate, the station
commander next tried to obtain some Virginia pilot-boats from
the United States. 546 He had heard of their good sailing
qualities, and from the dockyard point of view an added advant-
age lay in the fact that: ' ... only a small quantity of
cordage was used in them'. 547 But his efforts were defeated
by the francophile attitude o± the United States at that time.
Only danger on their doorstep eventually spurred the
colonies to action. In the autumn of 1795 the privateer
541 - 544. Nat. Mar. LIus.: Caldwell Papers (CAL/108); Caldwe]l'i
Journal - January 3, 25, 26 and 28, 1795.
545. = The private schooner Lord Hawkesbury, 12, supplied by
Barbados; the schooner Charles Ker, 4, supplied by Monteernat.
546, 547. Nat. Mar. Ihis.: Caidwell Papers (CAL/108) - contain-
ing a retrospective report by Admiral Jervis to Stephens,
April 6, 1795, after his return to England.
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threat against Dominica became so alarming, that its Governor
was forced to take me initiative: 'At a 'eat expense to
government I have been obliged to purchase and hire vessels
and to arm some of' them -to cruize between Marie Galante and
this island ... I have also attempted to purchase a guarda-
costa from Bermuda'. 548 The latter proved unsuccessful as
the vessel had already been bought by the commander-in-chief'
of the North American station, Rear-Admiral Lurray. Laudable
though these individual efforts were, the fact remained that
small local craft were no match for the enemy privateers, nor
could they be easily integrated into the squadron. 	 In spite
of all the difficulties, the situation began to improve in the
Leeward Islands after 1796. Greater numbers o± small warships
of the right type arrived from England and the effectiveness
and range of the cruiser patrols slowly increased. That this
was the real answer to the privateers is proved by the long
list of successes on the station during the period Rear-Admiral
Harvey was in comniand.549
The difficulty in repulsing the privateers was eq,ually
apparent in the Jamaica command. Even before war broke out
in 1793, it had been noticed how easily Virginian pilot-boats
and schooners, trading illicitly between the United States and
the British West Indies, had been able to outsail any vessel
548. Spencer Papers (N.R.S.), vol. I, pp. 57 - 58: Governor
Hamilton to Spencer, October 31, 1795.
549. See pp. 255-&,
the Jamaica squadron could put against theta. 55° Just such
material was to form the principal weapon of the privateers
after the war had begun.
Unfortunately, when the Admiralty at length realised
that the squadron must be equipped with a sufficient number
of the right type of warship to outmatch the privateers, much
valuable time had been lost. An extract from a letter written
by a Jamaica merchant 551 to his London agents early in 1796,
clearly demonstrates the official lethargy and muddleheadedness:
tI am just now informed that fourteen Virginia pilot-boats are
arrived at Cape Nichola Mole ..... what these are now to do for
us I cannot tell. A few months ago they might have been
serviceable on our coasts against the smaller privateers, but
we have now brigs and schooners of fourteen to sixteen guns to
contend with and these boats, it is said, cannot carry above
ix guns ... in. short, some more frigates and sloops of war
must be sent out'.552'
William Parker, the station admiral, had known about the
proposed reinforcements for some time. The British consul-
general at Virginia had informed him of his authority from the
Governinent to purchase and send twenty-five schooners and pilot-
550. ADM 1/244: Inglefield to the Admiralty, June 30, 1792.
551. Simon Taylor, esq.,
552, 553. Extract of a letter written to Messrs. isher &
Hibbert by the rantham packet, February 16, 1795, and quoted
in Spencer papers, (K.I.S.), vol. I, pp. 250 - 251.
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boats to the Mole and a similar number to Martinique, for the
Leewards station. 554 Parker's doubts about their value were
confirmed not long after they had arrived in January 1795.
Swallowing his fears and aware that no further reinforcements
were likely for some time, he set about arming them for cruising
with six three-pounder cannon arid six swivels each. But a
preliminary survey showed the uselessness. Of the twenty-four
vessels which had reached the Mole, (one had been captured en
route), only four were found either large enough to be converted
or considered as standing any chance in an encounter with enemy
privateers. Parker transferred the others to the military
forces operating in San Doruingo; six to the artillery as
gun-vessels, six to the oaissariat, four to the quartermaster-
general and four to the engineers.555
Even before this unfortunate episode, Admiral Willi.ni
Parker had no doubt that his squadron could only defeat the
privateers if provided with commissioned Royal Navy warships
espatched from England. Past experience had shown that
neither local vessels nor foreign purchases, hired at treat
cost in time and money, were feasible alternatives. He also
saw the Admiralty's failure to anticipate developments. The
incident of the Virginia purchase was only one example amongst
554. ADLI 1/247: William Parker to Nepean, January 6, 1796.
555. Ibid.: Same to same, February 28, 1796.
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many, in which steps to solve an earlier problem had taken
so long, that the enemy had had time to place a greater one
in its place.556
In a series of important despatches to the Admiralty
during the second half of 1795, Parker defined the station's
requirements. At the head was the need for at least ten
more warships of the smaller type, particularly sloops and
frigates. 557 Because of the demands of the San Domingo
campaign, the brunt of trade protection had to be left in the
hands of sloops or even smaller warships. Since ' ... San
Domingo engrosses most of the king's ships to protect the posts
there •,•,,558 few ships remained for cruiser patrol or convoy
escort. Only five sloops were attached to the station in
June 1795, and only four six months later. 559 The number was
reduced still further at the end of the year by the departure
of HeMeS. Lapwing for England escorting a convoy. 560 Another
major reason for Parker's asking for more sloops was the use-
lessness of the schooners in squadron service.561
556. A later instance is described in: ADI1 1/248: Hyde Parker
to the Admiralty, Ilarch 4, 1797.
557 - 559. ADM 1/246: William Parker to the Admiralty, June
29, September 3 and November 3, 1795.
560. ADM 1/246: William Parker to Spencer, November 3, 1795.
561. Of the three then attached to the squadron - MosQuito and
ying Fish were indifferent sailers and armed with only 4 guns
each. - Dispatcli, the smallest, had neither guns nor swivels
butoonly small arms and muequetoons.
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Accompanying his report to the Admiralty of November 3rd, 1795, Parker
enclosed a plan of the disposition of the smaller warships on the station,
including those for which he had asked as reinforcement. Even with the
potential additions included, the disposition ahowa to what an extent the
San Domingo campaign had usurped the station's resourceaI-
PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF &ATJR WZRIPS:
JAMAICA	 U.DRON - NOVAB 1795
Large	 &ial].
Fmction	 Frigates Frigates Sl9ons
a. At Port-ai-Prince, yrotecttn army .	 1	 1	 1
b. At Iroj.s & St. Marc, protecting army.	 -	 2	 -
c. At the Mole, to escort COflYO8 through
- Windward Paasae	 1	 1	 -
d. To crtiize off Jeremie, against the Petit
- Gonaive and Loane privateera	 -	 -	 1
o • To oruize north of Gonaive to protect San
Domingo trade, especiafl,y from Port-au-
Prince an& the Mole	 -	 -	 1
f. To cruize off Monte Cristi and Pointe
-	 1	 1
h. To cruize along the aouth coast of
San Domingo between Jacquemel and
Altavella.	 -	 1	 1
i • To cruize off T.buron	 -	 -	 1
j. To cruize off the north coast of
- Jamaica	 -	 1	 2
k. To escort convoys between Jamaica and
SanDomingo.	 -	 1	 1
Total - 26 warships:	 2	 8	 10
562
562. .ADM ]J246: Enclosed in Parker's deapatch to the Admiralty of November 3,
1795. Note that the figures include ships which the command had not yet
received.
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In other directions, the Jamaica squadron's strategy
against the privateers differed from that used by the Leewards
station. Thiring 1797 and 1798 a series of vigorous and enter-
prising "cutting-out t' operations were carried out against
selected privateer bases. This strategic change of plan
became possible only after the station's force of small war-
ships had greatly increased.
	 It was also due to the belated
realization that cru'sing and partial blockade could not in
themselves produce a decisive result.
	 In any event, these
raids were carefully planned, boldly executed and almost always
successful. Between April 1797 and the following July there
are accounts of six major operations of this kind, during
which many enemy privateers, merchantmen and prizes were
captured or burned and shore-batteries disabled or destroyed.563
In the later months of 1798, growing attention was paid to
the Spanish privateer bases on Puerto Rico and Hispanolia.
In conclusion it was not the fault of the station
commanders that the privateers were not defeated. The main
reason was the insufficiency of small warships on both stations,
563. Prom the accounts contained in ADM 1/248: Harvey's
despatches to the Admiralty, these were:-
April 6, 1797: Night-attack by frigates and their ships-boats
against Cape Roxo by Captain Rickette, with REGIJIUS, 44 and
ITA.GICIENN, 32. 13 privateers and their prizes captured or
burned; 2 batteries destroyed.
A ru 20/21, 1797: Night-attack on Jean Rabel by Commodore
ugigot with frigates HERMIONE, IThRLIk] and QUEREC, sloop
DRAKE, and cutter YANEL0PE. Nine prize merchantmen retaken.
Hay, 1797: Raid on Monte Cristi during which boats of CERES
and GANNET 'cut out' a Guinea slaver. (see next page)
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a deficiency which was not entirely remedied even by the end
of the period. Many other factors wexeesponib1e: the
Admiralty's failure to recognize the need for warships of the
right type; the athy of the British colonies in contributing
to their maritime defence; 564
 the folly of many merchant
shipmasters who played into the hands of' the privateere by
refusing to take convoy; the great difficulty of manning and
equipping warships in the Caribbean and 565
 the inadequacy of
repair facilities in the dockyards there; the ease with which
the enemy were able to man their privateers by the exchange of
prisoners-of-war under a flag of truce.
Above all, the sequence of' events during the period
emphasized the fact that the only complete answer to the priva-
teers lay in the capture of' every enemy-held island and base.
Otherwise, as fast as they were captured more were built.
563 (cpnt.) June 30/July 1, 1797: Raid on Port-au-Plat by sloop
TARTAR and cutter SAROVT. - 1Ywo private era and four prizes taker
December 27, 1797: 'Cutting out' expedition against Guadilla
Bay, Therto Rico, by Commodore Ricketts with MkGICIEIIThE, REG-IJIUS
and DILIGENCE. Six enemy privateers and inerchantnien taken.
July 1798: Two raids against privateer bases on the Puerto
Rican coast by ACASTA, CERES and REtJLUS. Captures included
a large enemy privateer, M LIUIINE, 18.
564. The colonies' chaotic system of coastal defence and forti-
fication are well described for an earlier period in Richard
Pares': 'War and Trade in the West Indies,' pp. 234 - 252.
565. This problem is mentioned repeatedly, e.g. in: Spencer
Papers I, 250 - 251; ADII 1/247, WIlliam Parker to Admiralty,
June 19, 1796; and ADLI 1/248, Hyde Parker to Admiralty,
December 23, 1796.
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fluch, indeed, had been achieved ae a result ci' the amphibious
operations of 1793/4 and 1797/8. But complete success was
never obtained.	 Guade].oupe remained in Prench possession;
the campaign for San. Domingo ended in failure; the neutral
islands and Spanish Caribbean colonies still liaz'boured the
enemy. Prom these essential bases, the privateers continued
to operate arid tl]rive.
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CHAPTER 6
ADMIRALTY AND CABINET - 1. : 1788 - 1794
Important as were the parts played by the local oommcin.ders
at Jamaica and the Leeward Islands, 566
 the ultimate powers of
decision and responsibility for strategic planning always lay
at home. The deliberations of Pitt's chief ministers in
Cabinet, the influence of the King, the debating and lobbying
in Parliament were the prime factors in shaping the nation's
policy. Apart from the Prime Minister, four men were in a
position to decide how the available naval and military resources
should be used once war broke out.
Henry Dundas, First Viscount iIelvi11e, 567 was the most
important. As Pitt's intimate friend and trusted lieutenant,
as the holder of several key offices simultaneously, his
influence upon the conduct of the war was profound especially
in its early years. Jovial, aggressive and ambitious, he was
a skilful politician and keen debater. His faults were as
great as his virtues; a capacity for intrigue and patronage
and a love of power, which resented competition and criticism.
Dundas blatantly exploited his influence over Pitt to gain a
566. See chapters 1 and 2.
567. Biographical details in D.N.B. vi, pp. 186 - 191 and thefollowing lives: by J.A. Lovat Fraser (Cambridge, 1916);
H. urber (Oxford, 1931) and C. Matheson (1933).
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dominant position in the Calinet. Appointed Solicitor-General
for Scotland in 1766 at the age of twenty-four, he then became
Lord Advocate and was for thirty years the most powerful man
in Scotland. In 1782 he became Treasurer of the Navy and
two years later a Commissioner of the India Board, and its
President in 1793. In June 1791, Pitt brought him into the
Cabinet as Home Secretary and gave him full charge over
colonial affairs.
Against mounting criticism as the war progressed Dundas
never wavered in his belief that Britain's strategy should be
colonial rather than continental, nor that commercial gains
were in the long run as important as military victories.
This docbrine explains his obsession with the West Indies,
where the seizure of prosperous enemy colonies and the opening
up of markets for British manufactures offered a tempting prize.
Although the strategy was sound in principle, Dundas chose to
ignore the many practical problems involved. Therein lay the
seeds of failure of the two major expeditions sent to the West
Indies in the period. Even after the heavy casualties in
San Domingo and against strong opposition from his colleagues
in the Cabinet, Dundas continued to urge the despatch of more
forces. It was fortunate that after 1797, Pitt chose to listen
to them rather than Dundas.
William Wyndhcim Grenville, Baron Grenville, 568 a cousin of
568. Bikographical details in: D.N.B. VIII, pp. 567 - 581.
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Pitt, was appointed Home Secretary in June 1789. Two years
later he became Foreign Secretary, an office he held with
conspicuous success for eleven crucial years. Able, industri-
ous, painstaking and with a legalistic mind, Grenville possessed
many of the qualifications needed for the office. But his cold
unsympathetic manner and tendency to violent outbursts of temper
made him unpopular. Quite different to Dundas in haraoter,
there existed a mutual dislike which frequently provoked disunity
in Cabinet. G.renville also often disagreed with Pitt's policy,
particularly his neutralism. As an intransigent conservative,
he detested revolutions and favoured the most repressive measures
against France. As a result, he was freq .uently to be found in
Cabinet at the head of the war party in opposition to Pitt.
There, too, he opposed Du.ndas for other reasons. Grenville's
forte was European diplomacy and he skilfully undertook the
complex negotiations between Britain and her continental allies.
In his view, only a direct attack upon Prance in Europe would
secure viotory and he naturally regarded Dundas' obsession with
colonial campaigns as a wasteful. diversion.
John Pitt, second Earl of (Thatham, 569
 eon of the "Great
Commoner" and elder'brother of the Prime Minister, succeeded
Lord Howe as First Lord of the Admiralty in July 1788. Indolent,
569. Bioraphica1 details in: D.N.B. XV, pp. 1230 - 1231.
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incompetent and quite out of place at the Admiralty, he resembled
his distinguished father in face and person only and his manners
were said: ' ... to prohibit all familiarity and forbid apprgh'
For six important years he remained at the head of the
Admiralty only by virtue of his brother' s position and being
a favourite of the King. His views on West Indian strategy
are difficult to assess, because he made so little positive
contribution towards solving any of the Navy's problems. One
can discern a preference for keeping the fleet in European
waters and opposition to joint overseas campaigns with the army,
but that is all. Often the management of his extensive estates
in Sliropsbire and Ireland supplanted all other interests. Even
after his dismissal from the Admiralty in December 1794,571 he
remained in the Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal and then Lord Presi-
dent of the Council, to act as a thorn in the side of his
successor.
Chatham's incompetence at the Admiralty was compensated by
the ability of the Comptroller, Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Middletor
Son of a customs collector at Leith and distantly related to
Dundas on his great-uncle's side, Middleton rose to a dominating
position at the Admiralty, culminating in his appointment as
First Lord in 1805 at the age of eighty. After various commands
570.Wraxall: 'Memoirs ... ', iii, p. 129.
571.See pp.
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including service in the leeward Islands during the Seven
Years' War, he was made Comptroller in August 1778, with charge
of the Navy Board. His ability became widely recognised,
although a proneness to give advice to his superiors was
resented in some quarters. Thus he incurred the anger of
Lord Howe in 1787, who tried to prevent his promotion to rear-
admiral. 572 '	 After struggling for years to improve the
Navy Board and general naval administration, Middleton resigned
the Coinptrollersliip in March 1790, disgusted at the Government's
delay in implementing his recommendations. 574
 For the next
four years he was Chatham's closest adviser at the Admiralty,
in spite of the fact that he had no official capacity there
until joining the Board in May 1794. Thus, although neither
a politician nor a member of the Cabinet, Middleton came to
exert a strong influence upon strategic planning because of
his closeness to Cliatham and great knowledge of naval affairs.
As will be shown, it was the latter which enabled him to expose
the weaknesses in Dundas' West Indian strategy.575
These then were the key figures, most responsible for the
572.Barham Papers, (N.R.S.), vol. II, intro.
573.A. Aspinall: The later correspondence of George III, vol. I
p. 355: The King to Pitt, December 15, 1787, which describes
the quarrel.
574.NR.S.: Barham Papers, vol. II: Middleton to Pitt,
February 8 and March 15, 1790.
575.See pp. 3134.,
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conduct of the war - Pitt, Dundas, Grenville and Chatham in
the Cabinet and Middleton at the Admiralty. Cf the six others
in the Cabinet in February 1793, four were little concerned
with strategy, 576
 and the two remaining members, Amherst,
commider-in-ohief of the Army, and Richmond, master-general
of Ordnance, were quite ineffectual and very much under Dundas'
control.
Within the Admiralty the six Lords of the Admiralty Board
played little part in overall strategic planning. Their role
was to implement the decisions of the Cabinet ineoThr as they
affected the Navy. Between June 1791 and April 1793 the
composition of the Board did not change, its two outstanding
members being Lord Hood and Vice-Admiral Alan Gardner.577
Hood's main concern was with the Mediterranean Fleet and the
operations at Toulon, but Gardner became directly involved in
the early stages of the West Indies campaign. 578
 The function
of the First and Second Secretaries of the Admiralty was
primarily to insure that the instructions of the First Lord
and the Board reached those concerned. The Admiralty were
fortunate to have such an able and experienced First Secretary
576.Gower (Lord Privy Seal); Camden )Lord President of the
Council); Loughborough (Lord Chancellor); and Hawkesbury
(President of the Board of Trade).
577.See AppendixZ
578.See chapter 1, pp. 192.
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in the person of Sir Philip Stephens, who remained in that
office for thirty-two years (June 1763 - March l795).
Prom the first days of the war, two views prevailed as
to the best strategy to be adopted in the West Indies. The
Admiralty expected the enemy to concentrate on a 'guerre de
course', in which case the Navy would operate defensively
giving protection to the islands and seaborne trade. Dundas
and the War Office, on the other hand, envisaged major opera-
tions against the enemy colonies, including the despatch of
expeditionary forces from Britain. The latter, it was claimed
by their adherents, would fully realize Pitt's own very limited
war aims: a short war in which entanglement in Europe would
be avoided and French overseas possessions would be seized as
commercial gains and bargaining counters at the peace conference
table 580
Sir Charles Middleton championed the Admiralty cause,
clearly expressed in two memoranda he prepared for Chatham
during 1793 . 581 , 582 Because of the numerical inferiority
and poor state of their ships-of-the-line, the French were in
579. Biographical details in D.N.B. XVIII, pp. 1066 - 1067.
580. Holland Rose: 'Cambridge History of the British Empire',
vol. ii, pp . 48 - 49.
581. B0 30/8: Chatham Papers - vol. 365, part Ii, if 54 - 7.
Memorandum to Chatham, entitled 'War with Prance', (March (?)
1793.
582. N.E.S.: Barham Papers, vol. II, pp. 360 - 368: Long
memorandum to Chatham, entitled 'State of the Navy and War Aims',
October 1793.
al,
no position to make a direct fleet challenge. Their plan would
therefore be to deepatch small flying squadrons from the Atlantic
ports and operate them from bases in the Caribbean, while
privateere searched across the latitudes to windward of the
British Antilles to intercept the incoming trade. Rather
than ships-of-the-line, the station commRnders there would
need large numbers of frigates, sioops, brigs and cutters to
perform the vital functions of regular cruizing and convoy
escort. As the war unfolded, the shrewdness of Middleton's
analysis was repeatedly confirmed.
Unfortunately, however, it was the alternative policy
advocated by Dundas and the War Office which carried the day
with Pitt and the Cabinet. Until the summer of 1794, the
launching of military expeditions against the enemy colonies
was the predominant theme, with the Navy relegated to the
subordinate role of providing support. At first, events
favoured this strategy. In the early months of 1793, the
island of Tobago fell without a strug1e583
 and the enemy's
retention of Martinique and Guadeloupe was made precarious
by a civil war in which the rival royalist and republican
factions fought to gain the upper hand. Most important of
all, the enemy's richest colony, San Domingo, openly invited
583. A. Aspinall: The later correspondence of George III
vol. II, p. 46: The King to Dundas, June 1, 1793: 'I am
rejoiced at the information of the taking of Tobago, which I
trust will ... be followed by that of other valuable islands...'
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British intervention.584
The summer however brought a serious check. Earlier
rumours of enemy warships sailing from Brest with the Caribbean
as their probably destination, 585
 were reinforced in June by
more definite intelligence. Six, or possibly seven, Prench
sail-of-the-line were observed coming out of Brest by a frigate
on blockade patrol. 586 Another Admiralty source of information
declared they were bound for the West Indies and that the
transports they were escorting carried troops. 587 Pitt at
once called a Cabinet, which met the day after the news was
received. In view of the emergency, the Cabinet agreed o
the immediate despatch of a powerful squadron of 9 ships-of-
the-line under Vice Admiral Gardner, in order to reinforce the
Leewards station and, if possible, reach there before the
enemy. As Pitt himself admitted, this squadron had been
intended for the Mediterranean where It was badly needed.
The hurried change of plan decided upon by the Cabinet was the
first instance of other theatres of war being sacrificed on
account of the situation In the West Indies.
584. See chapter 2, p.71.
585. A. Aspinall ... vol. II, p. 19: Chatham to the King,
March 13, 1793: ' ... the destination of the ships observed
coming out of Brest must be a matter of conjecture ...
586, 587. Porteecue MSS (Dropmore Papers): vol. II, pp. 402 -
403: Pitt, at Downing Street, to Grenville, June 30, 1793.
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Although Gardner arrived there before the enemy his
subsequent operations, especially the attack on Martinique,
failed dismally. 588
 The repulse caused a stir in England
and it was apparent that much greater military and naval forces
would have to be sent out in order to conquer the enemy islands.
Thie very situation laid bare the fundamental errors in the
Ministry's strategy. With inadequate military forces available,
the Cabinet were faced with undertaking large-scale overseas
expeditions at the same time that the country had drifted into
costly and negative campaigns on the eontinent, from which it
was hard to withdraw. Most to blame for this dilemma was
]Dundae; in his position as War Minister he should have firmly
resisted the temptation to undertake other campaigns, however
attractive, before anything else. In July, he admitted to
Grenville it was becoming increasingly difficult to find the
necessary troops and that perhaps foreign detachments would
have to be enlisted. And yet he stubbornly refused to abandon
further operations in the West Indies, which remained in his
view the first priority.589
Dundas' plan which received Cabinet approval in July,
envisaged the despatch of a major expeditionary force from
Britan to achieve the decisive result which had eluded Gardner.
588. Portescue ?SS (Dropmore Papers): vol. II, p. 405:
Buckingham to Grenville, July 17, 1793.
589. Ibid. pp. 407 - 408: Dundas to Grenville, July, 1793.
In order to surmount the reasons for the earlier failure -
lack of troops in the theatre and the fact that Gardner had
commanded a naval squadron and not art expeditionary force -
as many troops, transports and storeships as could be got
together would be despatched. Dundas confidently expected
the main convoy would be ready to sail from Portsmouth on or
about September 2Oth, 59° followed shortly afterwards by a
smaller force created out of the recently reinforced garrison
at Gibraltar. All might have gone according to plan if the
Grey-Jervis expedition had been ready on time and if pressure
of events in Europe had not suddenly intervened. Delays in
obtaining transports and stores and in collecting the ships
at the rendezvous, repeatedly postponed departure until by the
end of October Dundas was becoming very impatient.591
Worse was to follow. A sudden deterioration in the
military situation in Flanders threatened the army' s main base
at Ost end. Troops were urgently needed, but none could be
found. In desperation, Pitt gave the order for four infantry
regiments belonging to the expedition and at that moment actually
embarked aboard transports in Portsmouth harbour, to be taken
off and rushed across the Channel to defend Ostend. 592 Notwith-
590. Portescue I1SS (Dropmore Papers): vol. 1.1, pp. 407 - 408:
Dundas to Grenville, July 1793.
591. A. Aspinall: 'Later correspondence of George III,' vol. II,
p. 113: Dundas to the King, October 26, 1793.
592. Portescue Papers (Dropniore LISS), vol. II, p. 443: Pitt
to Grenville, October 11, 1793.
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standing the crisis, the expedition's commanders, Grey and
Jervis, naturally deplored the disruption of schedule and
Dundas was furious at the prospect of further delay. 593 Pitt
tried to soothe him by saying that it was only a temporary set-
back and in any case there was no alternative. But the Home
Secretary suspected that his cherished West Indies project was
being sacrificed and hotly denied the accusation that he was
prepared ' ... to starve the garrison in Flanders', in order
to get his way.594
The events following the dramatic and unexpected seizure
of Toulon in September further disorganized the expedition.
The troops from the Gibraltar garrison scheduled for the West
Indies were hurriedly diverted to Toulon. By mid-November
Dundas was forced to admit that the expedition would have to
sail in greatly-reduced strength. At a Cabinet held on the
16th, 595 he could not deny the force of his colleagues' argument
that the situation at Toulon. presented a uniclue strategic
opportunity, to be seized at all costs. Dundas therefore
accepted the reduction; not, however, because he thought
Toulon. was more important but because he realized that bad he
593. Portescue Papers (Dropinore iiiSS), vol. II, p. 444: Dundas
to Grenville, October 12, 1793; and A. Aspinall ... vol. II,
p. 105: Dundas to the King, October 2, 1793.
594. IbId. Same to same, October 21, 1793.
595. Mentioned mA. AspinaU ... vol. II, p. 123.
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not done so, there was a very real danger of the whole West
Indies plan being abandoned 596 even so late in the day.
Indeed, long before the problem of acting in concert with
the Royalists in Prance arose, the Toulon crisis focussed
attention upon the crucial question: should Britain's offensive
operations be concentrated in Europe or overseas? Doubts
were beginning to be voiced in Cabinet and in the House of
Commons regarding Dundas' obsession with the latter and the
danger of persisting with both simultaneously. The King saw
the risks very clearly: ' ... the feeding of Toulon with troops
and at the same time attempting large operations in the West
Indies is quite impossible'. 597 Rightly, he could see no
reason why the expedition should not be postponed another six
months until the Mediterranean situation had clarifiec.
Grenville at the Foreign Office, never a supporter of
overseas campaigns, rather surprisingly opposed the abandonment
of the expedition. He felt to do so at the last moment would
create an impression of alarm and panic, which would more than
offset the material gain of having more British troops available
in Europe. 598 Grenville must have felt very strongly about
596. Fortescue Papers (Dropmore MSS), vol. II, pp. 121 - 122.
Dundas to the King, November 15/16, 1793: 'Nothing can be more
adverse to the whole train of Mr. Dundas' thinking than a
derelinquishment of an offensive campaign in the West Indies ...'
597. A. Aspinall ... vol. II, p. 122: The King to Dundas,
November 16, 1793.
598. Portescue Papers (Dropmore 1iSS), vol. II, p. 464: Grenville
to Auckland, November 11, 1793.
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this to give such support to Du.ndae, since at that moment they
were on very bad terms. A bitter quarrel had broken out
between Pitt and Dundas on the one side and Grenville and his
brother, the Duke of Buckingham, on the other over a question
599	 60(of patronage	 which was only settled the following January.
On every other occasion the Foreign Secretary condemned sending
more troops overseas when every man was needed in Europe.
Lord Auckland in the Government and Burke and Windham in Oppo-
sition shared his criticism of operations in the Caribbean.
The two latter were particularly hostile, becall9e such diversionE
adversely affected all their plans for helping the Royalists
in france.601
In spite of all the delays and opposition, the West Indies
expedition finally sailed from Portsmouth on November 26th, 1793.
Although much smaller than originally intended,joint commanders
had reluctantly to accept the fact. The fortunes of the
expedition in the West Indies have already been described;602
it remains to consider the reactions in England to its progress
and the developments which followed.
00. Fortescue ... vol. II, pp. 482 - 490 - quotes a long series
of exchanges between both parties over the issue.
601. The Windhani Papers (edited by the Earl of Rosebery;
2 vole., 1813). vol. I, p. 171: Windham to Burke, November 7,
1793.	 p. 175; Burke to Wiridham, November 14, 1793.
602. See chapter 1, pp. 52-4.
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On January 21st, 1794, important debates took place in
both Houses following the King's speech opening the fourth
session of Parliament. No news had by then been received of
the expedition's progress, but the members still found a great
deal to say about West Indies strategy. In the Lords, the
Earl of Wycombe described the at-tempt on Mar-tinique as so
inadequately planned and shamefully executed that it merited
a Parliamentary enquiry. He emphasized the vulnerability of
Jamaica to enemy attack and concluded his speech by saying that
he hoped the Grey-Jervls expedition would do well, but rather
doubted it, as ' ... their force had been so maimed and curtailed
previous to their final departure' •603 This was certainly
true. Colonel Tarleton then rose to condemn the extent of
the National Debt and the Government's gross inactivity in the
first year of the war, especially in the West Indies. 604 He
was answered by the Earl of Mornington in support of the
Government, pointing out -the early successes in Tobago and
San Domingo.605
The debate in the Commons was even more critical of the
603. Cobbett: Parliamentary History of England from the earliest
period to the year 1803, (36 vole.; Hansard; 1817). Vol. xxx
(December 1792 - March 1794). Debate on the King's Speech,
January 21, 1794. pp. 1098 - 1099.
604. Ibid. p • 1102.
605. Ibid. p. 1115.
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Government. In a speech which was said to have electrified
-the House, Sheridan condemned the whole naval campaign in the
West Indies and said that the prospects of the latest expedi-
tion had been ruined by procrastination and inefficiency.606
He was followed by Dundas, who in a long speech stoutly defended
the Ministry's conduct of the war. 607
 The kernel of his
argument was that, far from being guilty of neglect, the
Government had succeeded in mobilizing unprecedented iumbers
of soldiers, seamen and warships during the period. He then
turned to the West Indies. Admiral Gardner's operation against
Martinique had rertainly been a severe disappointment, but its
condemnation was unjust. With only 1,400 troops in the theatre
and no transports attached to Gardner's squadron, it was hardly
surprising that the unexpectedly strong opposition encountered
had not been overcome.
In moving the amendment to the Address Pox, the leader
o± the Opposition, vigorously attacked Du.ndas' strategy.608
Why, he demanded with characteristically effective oratory, had
the nation's precious military strength been frittered away in
a diversion to the West Indies, when it ought to have been used
to strike at the heart of Prance?609 In the benches behind him,
606. Cobbett: Parliamentary History of England from the earliest
period to the year 1803. (6. vole.; Hansard; 1817) Vol. xxx
(December 1792 - March 1794). Debate on the King's Speech,
January 21, 1794.
	 p. 1214.
607. Ibid pp. 1247 - 1251.
608, 609. Cobbett ... vol. xxx.	 Debate on the King's Speech,
January 21, 1794.
	 pp . 1259 - 1269.
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Burke and Windham gave vociferous support. Above all, Pox
went on, it was supreme folly to divide the limited military
and naval forces available in such a way that no impact was
made anywhere. He concluded his speech by disputing Dundas'
assurances regardin rT the protection of trade in the Caribbean.
On the contrary,
610to be true.
the situation in Jamaica showed the reverse
After the Prime Minister had wound up for the
Government, Pox's amendment to the address was defeated by 277
votes to 59. The figures are misleading; although they
express the iaucity of Whig Opposition in the Commons they do
not indicate what was much more significant - the very real
feelings of doubt and alarm over the Ministry's strategy, which
had been repeatedly expressed during the debate.
The same were heard two weeks later when the Commons
debated the Army Estimates. 611 On this occasion, the Govern-
merit's standing was not enhanced by a feeble opening speech
delivered by the Secretary at War, Sir Charles Yonge. Pox
again condemned the preference given the Caribbean over all
other theatres of war, particularly the Mediterranean. The
Ministry was at that moment under heavy fire over the forced
evacuation from Toulon, which was deplored throughout Britain.
610. Cobbett ... vol. xxx. Debate on the King's Speech,
January 21, 1794. pp. 1259 - 1269.	 ... Has he forgot the
situation in which commerce was left in the West Indies? Has
he forgot how long the whole Jamaica fleet waited for convoy, and
under what convoy it was at last obliged to sail?'
611. Ibid. House of Commons Debate on the Army Estimates,
Pebruary 4, 1794.	 pp. 1329 - 1346.
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Pox described it as yet another example of the Government's
selfish and cynical strategy which was bound to have a shame-
fu]. reaction upon the French royalists. Moreover, he cleverly
showed that the decision to abandon Toulon opened up the whole
question of what was the real strategic object of the war.
Caribbean expeditions were only defensible if the main purpaee
was to acquire overseas possessions. But if the object of
the war was to defeat Prance, as indeed Pox said it must be,
the possession of Toulon. would be more instrumental than
Liartinico, Guadeloupe, San Domingo and all the other West Indian
islands together'. 612
 Against such cogent reasoning, the
Ministry could give no satisfactory reply.
Eighteen months of hostilities had been long enough to
expose the Ministry's amateurish and haphazard conduct of the
war. For a time its failings had been concealed by the early
successes in the Caribbean, culminating in the achievements
of the Grey-Jervie expeditionary force. In a sense, too, the
Ministry could use the situation there to offset glaring failureE
elsewhere, in Flanders and at Toulon. But the reasons for
the temporary successes in the West Indies were conveniently
forgotten. They were the outcome of the enemy's extreme
vulnerability in that theatre and not brilliant strategic
planning in London. The reckoning came in the middle of 1794,
612. Cobbett ... vol. xxx: Commons debate on the Army Estimates,
February 4, 1794.	 pp. 1339 - 1343.
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as the tide turned in the West Indies. The enemy were allowed
to regain the initiative and build up their strength to inflict
a series of sharp reverses on the British forces. As soon
as this happened, the administrative machinery at home was
shown to be quite incapable of dealing with the situation.
Since January 1793, the composition of the Cabinet had
remained unchanged 613
 and when the crisis came it was proven
ill-fitted for its task. Pour of its ten members had no
knowledge of strategy and three of the rest bad already shown
their incompetence - Chatharn at the Admiralty, Amherst as
commander -in-chief of the Army and Richmond as the Master-
General of Ordnance. 614
 As a result, decision-rn8king in the
Cabinet during the first eighteen months of the war rested with
Pitt, Dundas and Grenville. Moreover, Grenville's predilection
with European diplomacy and Pitt's detestation of war meant
that most of the strategic problems were delegated to Dundas.
He revelled in his widespread powers and jealously sought to
retain them. But by the summer of 1794, it was apparent that
the war effort was becoming adversely affected by Dundas'
multiple responsibiitiee:Hozne Secretary, Colonial Minister,
613. See Appendix lj..
614. The office of Secretary at War, titular head of the War
Office, did not at this time carry with it Cabinet rank. The
holder, Sir George Yonge (1731 - 1812), was a nonentity.
See DJIB. xxi, pp. 1239 - 1240.
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Treasurer of the Navy, President of the India Office, chief
Minister in the Commons and master of Scottish affairs - there
seemed iio department of the nation's business in which his
hand was not felt.615
Political developments in July 1794 gave Pitt the oppor-
-tunity he needed, to make changes in the Cabinet and to tighten
up the whole war administration. Ever since the French
Revolution, the Whig Opposition had been split into two halves,
the extreme Prancophiles led by Fox and the moderates under
the Duke of Portland. 616 In order to strengthen the Ministry's
position, Pitt had long tempted the latter with offers of
coalition and by July 1794 he was finally successful. The
Portland Whigs joined the Government. In spite of the many
political advantages, however, the junction brought a number
of problems in its train.
The chief concerned the respective positions of Portland
and Dundas. As the price of their support for the Ministry,
the Portland Whigs insisted that their leader became Home
Secretary. The condition put Pitt in a dilemma. Anxious
at all costs to gain the adherence of the moderate Whigs, he
615. As early as June 1793, he was Lending off criticisms of
delay and inefficiency from Grenville. Dundas admitted then
that he was: ' ... rather overloaded by pressure upon my time
from various quarters ... ' Portescue Papers (Dropmore hS)
vol. II, pp. 395 - 396: Dundas to Grenville, June 1, 1793.
616. William Henry Cavdndish Bentinok, 3rd Duke of Portland
(1738 - 1809). A dull but reasonable politician; rich, urbane
but a poor orator and quite ineffective in Cabinet. Had no
interest in strategic matters. 	 See D.N.B. II, pp . 302 - 304.
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knew nonetheless that Dundas would refuse to vacate the office,
as tantamount to a reduction of his powers. It was not merely
a question of the Home Secretaryship; under its mantle, as
has been shown, Dundas wielded power in three directions - home
affairs, the colonies and conduct of the war. Ivkreover, Pitt
was himself affected. Intent on change, he was yet loth to
jeopardize in any way the close working links which existed
')etween Dundas and himself.	 'I feel it quite impossible to
venture the experiment of leaving the War Department in the
Duke (of Portland)'s hands ... if all the details of the war
were to be settled by communication with a person new both to
me and to others, 617 I am sure the business could not go on a
week. This is the leading consideration with me and seems
decisive ...	 I own besides I could neither expect to establish
the same sort of communication with the Duke which I am used
to w ith Dundas, nor would I be content on the other hand to
leave that department to his separate management	 ,6l8
In desperation the Prime Minister turned to Grenville.
On July 5th, he asked him to give up the Poreign Office in
favour of Portland and take over a remodelled Home Department;6
617. Pitt's italics.
618. Fortescue Papers (Dropniore LSS), vol. III, pp. 595 - 596:
Pitt to Grenvile, July 5, 1794.
619. Ibid. Same to same, July 5, 1794.
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the manoeuvre being an attempt to satisfy both Dundas and the
Duke. G-renville replied the same day, generously accepting
the personal sacrifice involved. 620 Fortunately, however,
Portland declined the offer. He told Pitt on July 7th that
the Foreign Secretaryship was the office he least wished to
accept, adding that it could not be in better hands than
Grenville's. He had therefore made up his mind to accept
the Home Department, without the management of the war, but
with the colonies. Pitt agreed with alacrity to this proposal
and believed that the whole matter had at last been settled
satisfactorily. 621
 The wide and overlapping powers which
Du.ndas as Secretary of State had hitherto exercised were now
split into three distinct responsibilities, each under the
control of a Cabinet Minister. Dundas having left the Home
Office, retained overall control of strategy by being appointed
to the new office of Secretary of State for War. The Duke of
Portland succeeded him as Home Secretary, which office continued
to carry with it responsibility for colonial affairs. The
third post was filled by an entirely new figure, who took over
the enlarged functions of the War Office as Secretary at War,
an office which for the first time became one of Cabinet rank.
He was William Wincmaru, the Whig statesman and close supporter
620. Fortescue Papers (Dropmore kisS), vol. III, pp. 595 - 596:
Grenville to Pitt, July 6, 1794.
621. Ibid. Pitt to Grenville, July 7, 1794.
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of Portland. A strong personality and a keen advocate of a
direct attack upon Prance and aid for the Royalists in Brittany
and Vende, Windharn at once made his mark in the Cabinet.
From the first he was a strong opponent of Dundas' schemes.622
Pitt's hopes that everything had been settled were
shattered by Dundas' threat to resign two days after the Cabinet
changes had been made. He bitterly resented having to surrender
control of the Colonies to Portland, because of his particular
interest in the affairs of India and the West Indies. 623 The
King shared his misgivings and only gave way to the change
with reluctance: 'Though I do not quite approve of the West
Indies being added to the Home Department, I will acquiesce
in the arrangement, but at the same time call on hr. Secretary
Dundas to continue Secretary of State for the War
	
,624
addition, Dundas realized that the promotion of the office of
Secretary at War to the Cabinet with Windham as its holder,
was bound to circumscribe his overall direction of the war.
In a long letter to the Prime Minister on July 9th, Dundas
gave further reasons for opposing the changes. 625
 The division
622. Por biographical details, see D.N.B. xxi, pp. 643 - 646.
623. H.M.C.: Stanhope Papers, vol. II, p. 255: Dundas to
Stanhope, July 9, 1794.
624. A. Aspinall ... vol. II, pp. 222 - 223.	 The King to Pitt,
July 9, 1794.
625. Melville Castle Muniments: Scottish Record Office.
Series GD/5l/24-l: Dundas to Pitt, July 9, 1794.
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of the Secretary of State's department into separate functims
would, he thought, result in divided counsels and undermine
the whole war effort. In particular, the idea of a separate
War Ministry would prove unworkeable in practice: 'The
operations of war are canvassed and adjusted in the Cabinet
alone', and the function of the departmental ministers was
merely to carry out its decisions. Moreover, Du.ndas was
strongly in favour of a small Cabinet, in which two or three
of its members exercised sweeping powers. He therefore viewed
with alarm Windham's elevation to the Cabinet; partly because
it threatened his own position, partly because the direction
of the war at Cabinet level was in enough hands already:
besides, you will recollect that the Master-General of
Ordnance, the first Lord of the Admiralty and the Commander-
in-Chief are all in the Cabinet'. 626 As Pitt retained the
greatest cotifidence in Dundas as War Minister and would agree
to no other arrangement f or the War Department, both he and
the King brought the strongest pressure on him -to stay. The
Prime Minister's plea was phrased in the most personal terms,
that he could not carry on the Government without him and wo,ild
be 'completely heartbroken' 627 if he adhered to his decision.
After one more day of suspene, Dundas gave way and agreed to
626. Llville Castle Muniments: Scottish Record Office,
GD/51/l/24-l: Dundas to Pitt, July 9, 1794.




The political changes and Cabinet re-organization of
July 1794 have been described in detail, because they had
important repercussions upon West Indies strategy both at the
time and in the months which followed. In the first place,
Dundas was no longer in control of both military and colonial
affairs in the Islands. This fact intensified the differences
which already existed between the colonial governors, merchants
and planters on the one hand and the naval and military comman-
ders on the other, as to the best means of resisting the enemy.
As a result, a disastrous clash of interests occurred in the
last months of 1794 and at the beginning of 1795, particularly
in Jamaica. The merchants and planters voiced their complaints
to the new Colonial Secretary, Portland, while the military
commanders continued to address themselves to Dundas. Secondly,
this period was one of stagnation for British strategy in the
Caribbean, the interval between the major efforts made by the
expeditions of 1793/4 and 1795/6. Why this happened has hithert
been attributed to the force of the Prench counter-attack in
the Caribbean. Much more important, however, was the trans-
formation which had taken place in the instrument which shaped
the British etraiegy - the Cabinet in London. Until its new
ministers had found their feet, and Dundas bad grown accustomed
628. Melville Castle Muniments: Scottish Record Office,
GD/51/1/24-3: Dundas to PItt, July 10.
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to no longer running the war single-handed, there was inevita-
bly a pause and lack of forceful. direction.
By September 1794, however, the awareness of danger in
the West Indies and need for urgent action had returned. On
successive days that month, Dundas bombarded the First lord
of the Admiralty with demands for the immediate deepatch of
naval reinforcements to that theatre. 629 With the loss of
Guadeloupe, lack of progress and heavy casualties in the San
Domingo campaign and the news that eight ships-of-the-line
were about to sail from Prance, 630 Dundas realized that only
one thing stood in the way of complete disaster: ' ... I con-
clude without any hesitation that our security in the West
Indies for many months to come depends entirely on a commanding
and extensive naval force' •631 That Chatham did not know this
already and the fact that Dundas had to urge him, twice in as
many days, of the need for urgent action were indications of
incapacity at -the Admiralty which were not forgotten in the
ensuing months.
At a full Cabinet held onctober 10th 632- and one of the
629. PRO 30/8: Cha-tham Papers. vol. 368, part i: if. 26 - 29;
30 - 32: Dundas to Chatham, September 13, 1794; same to same,
September 14.
630. A. Aspinall ... vol. II, p. 17: Dimdas to the King,
September 14, 1794.
631. PRO 30/8: Chatham Papers, vol. 368, part 1: f. 31.
632. Present were: Lord Chancellor, lord President of the
Council, Portland, Mansfield, Grenville, Amherst, Hawkesbury,
Dundas, Pitt, Chatham & Windham (=11).
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first at which the new Ministers, Portland and Windham,
attended - Dundas repeated his assertion that the naval forces
in the Caribbean should be reinforced immediately. There is
no record of Chatham's part in the discussion which followed,
nor whether he did oppose Dundas, But the realization that
he had neither foreseeen such a situation nor been the first
to remedy the deficiency, proclaimed his incapacity to every-
body present. When the meeting was over, the minutes were
sent that evening to the King for his approval. The Cabinet
strongly recommended, in view of the intelligence that an enemy
squadron was about to sail from Brest bound in all probability
for the West Indies, that the British naval forces there should
at once be augmented. Orders should therefore be sent to the
commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to detach six ships-of-the-
line from his fleet and send them at once to the Leeward
Islands. 633
 The King approved the Cabinet's decision, but
commented that only a threat as serious as the appearance of
a large enemy squadron in the West Indies, could justify such
a weakening of the Mediterranean fleet.634
One final ministerial change took place in 1794. For
many months it had been obvious that the Earl of Cliatham was
633. B.M. Add. ISS 40102: Dandas Papers, f. 1: Record of
Cabinet minute, October 10, 1794.
634. Ibid ... 40100, f. 145: the King to Dundas, October 11,
1794: arid A. Aspinall ... vol. II, p . 257: same to same,
October 25, 1794.
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unequal to his situation as First Lord of the Admiralty.
Criticism had been voiced openly as early as September 1793.
Although not at that time in the Cabinet, Windham did not
hesitate to blame him for: ' •.. the very censurable neglect
and mismanagement, so conspicuous in the Admiralty' •635 Nor
did Chatham's frequent lack of attendance and interest pass
unnoticed by his staff at the Admiralty; the burden of work
and responsibility carried by the Secretaries, Sir Thilip
Stephens and John Ibbetson, and the Board itself, became that
much heavier. Most affected by the situation was Sir.Charles
Middleton. Ever since resigning as Comptroller of the Navy
in March 1790, be had acted as unofficial adviser to the First
Lord, taking over much of his work and shielding his incomnpetenc
to the outside world as much as possible. He made no secret
of the fact that 'the whole of the Admiralty busines 636 was
virtually in his hands. But by the summer of 1794, even
Middleton's dynamic energy was beginning to feel the strain
of combatting the lethargy with which the First Lord had
infected the office.637
Chatham, however, had been allowed to remain; partly
because he was the Prime Minister's brother, partly because
635. The Windhams Papers (edited by the Earl of Rosebery;
2 vole.; 1913), vol. I, p. 153: Windliam to Spencer,
September 18, 1793.
636. Barhani Papers (N.R.S.), vol. I, p. 8: Middleton to
Spencer, December 19, 1794.
637. B.M. Add. MSS. 41079: Dundas Papers, if. 11 - 12:
Middleton to Dundas, July 29, 1794.
he enjoyed -the King's favour and confidence. 638 Moreover,
the victory of' the fleet in the Glorious Piret of June 1794
action, vicariously gave some lustre to Chatham's tarnished
reputation. Nevertheless by this stage, Pitt felt he could
no longer ignore the feelings of disquiet which were being
widely expressed about the Admiralty. When in July, Chatham
made objections to Dundas' new powers and functions as
Secretary f or War, he got no sympathy from his brother. Pitt
told him very firmly that -the new arrangements wou]d not in
any way impinge upon the Admiralty's sphere of influence.639
Jealous of Dundas' continuing control over strategy,
hatham also resented his way of viewing Navy merely as a
subordinate instrument in the planning of overseas campaigns.
Nowhere was this more obvious than inthe West Indies. It
was Chatham's opposition to this doctrine just as much as his
incompetence, which ultimately led to his downfall. In
September 1794, Chatham took his grievances to the King and
in a long memorandum set out the reasons why, in his opinion,
the Navy was being prevented from carrying out its proper
±unctions. 640 In at least three respects Dundas' colonial
638. Windhain doubted if the Prime Minister would ever sacrificehis brother. Windham Papers ... vol. I, Wiridham to Spencer,
September 18, 1793.
639. PRO 30/8: Chatham Papers, vol. 101, f. 125: Pitt toChatham, July 12, 1794.
640. PRO 30/8: Chatham Papers, vol. 101, if. 1 - 4:
Memorandum by Chatham to the King, September , 1794.
sot
strategy was entirely to blame:
1. The large foreign detachments made and kept
abroad, without reference to the naval force to
be opposed to them ... which policy has never
allowed us that commanding 8Uperiority in these
seas (i.e. Home and Mediterranean waters)
2. The major inconvenience arising from perpetual
requisitions made for frigates to attend the
movements of troops with transports.
3. The whole system of frequent convoys •• 641
The First Lord was at fault in the third instance. He
failed to appreciate how much the Navy would be called upon
to provide this form of trade protection and, earlier in the
same memorandum, speaks of ' ... the clamorous and unreason-
able demands of merchants and underwriters for convoys
	
,642
On the other hand he was undoubtedly correct in the other two
assertions.
In. a second memorandum written to the King two months
later, Chathani aired further grievances. Not only had the
Fleet's proper function been adversely affected by the strategy
employed in the Caribbean; the sheer demand in ships and men
for service there had seriously weakened the Home and Mediter-
ranean fleets. The state of the latter in the early autumn of
641, 642. BO 30/8: Chatham Papers, vol. 101, ff. 1 & 3.
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1794, was causing anxiety at the Admiralty and Chatham tried
to reinforce Lord Hood with every capital ship that could be
found. 643
 But his efforts were utterly frustrated by the
Cabinet's decision of October 10th, authorizing the immediate
detaclhment of six ships-of-the-line from the Mediterranean Fleet
for service in the West Indies. Chatham was very angry at
the order; it was the epitome of a strategy he most deplored.
In his view, the Navy's most powerful ships should be concen-
trated in the areas where the enemy's naval strength was
greatest - in the Mediterranean and off the Atlantic coast
o± France. Thereby the opportunity of forcing a decisive
fleet action would not be missed. But here were six of the
Ilediterranean Fleet's best ships being sent to the West Indies,
where there were already six others, making twelve there
in all, and a vast volume of vessels to be opposed to no naval
force at all, but to supply the want of Land Troops ••,,644
Even after the Cabinet decision, Chatham persisted in trying
to reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet but failed to do so in the
short time in office which remained to him.645
643. PRO 30/8: Chatham Papers, vol. 364, f. 235: Memorandum
by Chatha to the King - undated bit clearly written during
December 1794 or January 1795.
644. Ibid. The capitalization of the words 'Land Troops' is
as in the original; perhaps deliberately intended by Chathani.
645. Ibid. During October and November, Chathani had managed
to get together five ships-of-the-line and some storeships for
the Mediterranean. Although they sailed from Portsmouth early
in December, contrary winds forced them back to harbour.
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The situation led to an open breach between Chatham and
Dundas in December, which finally determined PItt to replace
his brother at the Admiralty. On the 8th he told the King
that relations between the Admiralty and the other Government
departments had so deteriorated that something would have to
be done immediately. 646
 The department most involved was the
Secretary for War's. Although he did not say so to the King,
Pitt was determined In view of the crisis which had arisen
over Dundas' position in July, to support him against any
further opposition. He proposed that Chatham and Spencer,
then Lord Privy Seal, should exchange offices. Knowing that
his brother was bound to resist, Pitt then asked the King for
his co-operation in making -the change less awkward by intimating
to Chatham that receiving the Privy Seal would be a personal
mark of royal favour.647
The King disliked the whole idea. Chatharn had always
enjoyed his favour and confidence, and when he replied to Pitt
on December 9th, he emphasized how well he thought Chatharn had
done at the Admiralty. 648 Purthermore, the King was at that
moment incensed with Pitt for the proposal to remove his son,
the Duke of York, from the command of the army in flanders.
646, 647. A. Aspinall: 'The later correspondence of George III',
vol. II, pp. 278 - 279: Pitt to the King, December 8, 1794.
648. A. Aspinall ... vol. II, p. 279: the King to Pitt,
December 9, 1794.
Lastly, the King only echoed general feeling when he pointed
out that the offer of the Privy Seal could never disguise what
was clearly an abrupt dismissal from office.
Yet the King finally yielded to Pitt, on the grounds that
the change might be for the 'better convenience of government'.
With the greatest reluctance, he wrote to Chatham on December 9th
offering the Privy Seal. 649 But the First Lord predictably
declined the invitation and ended his reply with the words:
I do not entertain a thought of withdrawing at such a
period from an arduous situation'. 65 ° For five days there was
deadlock; Chatham clinging to office - isolated in the Cabinet,
but sustained by some support outside. His staunchest ally
proved to be Ltiddleton. In his anger at what was happening,
Middleton not only championed Chatham but vowed never to serve
under another Pirst Lord. 65	Moreover, be warned Du.ndas that
if the rumours of Chatham' s departure were true, it would be:
a bold man who ventures to succeed him in the present
situation of affairs, but particularly the naval'.652
Finally on December 14th, 1794, Chatham gave way to the
649. A. Aspinall ... vol. II, p . 279: the King to Chathain,
same day.
650. Thid, p. 279: Chatham to the King, same day.
651. PRO 30/8: Chatham Papers, vol. 365, part 1, f. 126:
Iliddleton to Chatham, December 12, 1794.
652. B.M. Add. S 41079 (Barhan/Dundas correspondence, 1788 -
1806), if. 21 - 25: Middleton to Dundas, December 10, 1794.
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mounting pressiwe and resigned. He left the Admiralty with
feelings of intense bitterness against Pitt, Dundas and his
appointed successor. But it was not into retirement; he
continued to enjoy the King's favour, to have Middleton's
loyalty at the Admiralty and to retain his seat in the Cabinet,
and his presence cast a shadow over the months ahead.
306
CHA.PJER 7
ADMIRAILY AND CABINET - ii: 1795 - 1802
The person chosen by Pitt to replace Chatham as First
Lord of the Admiralty on December 17th, 1794, had much to
recommend him. George John Spencer, second Earl Spencer, who
assumed the office at the age of thirty-six,was an energetic
and hard-working politician, a symbol of Pitt's determination
to improve the efficiency of the armed services and the conduct
of the war. An influential and wealthy member of the Whig
aristocracy, Spencer had been a junior Lord of the Treasury
during the short Rockingham ministry of 1782 and became a Pitt
supporter on the break-up of the Whig party in 1793. When the
Government was strengthened by the junction of the Portland
Whigs in June 1794, he was appointed Lord Privy Seal with a seat
in the Cabinet.653
Despite these atttributes, other traits in Spencer's
character and the situation he faced on taking office, combined
to ensure that his early years at the Admiralty were marked by
a succession of crises. He took over lacking experience of
high office and with little knowledge of naval affairs. Noone
disputed the need for re-organization at the Admiralty, 654
 but
653. Biographical details in: 'Gentleman's Magazine' (1835),
1, p. 89 and D.NIB., xviii, pp. 763 - 764.
654. PRO 30/8: vol. 369, part ii, if. 311 - 312 contains an
anonymous letter received at the Admiralty on December 26, 1794.
The writer congratulated Spencer on his appointment and urged
him to pursue a more energetic naval policy than his predecessor,
especially as regards the protection of trade.
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until he had mastered his duties Spencer would have been well-
advised to proceed cautiously, relying on the guidance of the
more experienced members of his Board. Bu.t this, unfortunately,
was against his nature and his aristocratic self-assurance aroused
tension and opposition which were aggravated by a clash of
personalities.
In a matter of weeks Spencer had fallen out with four of
the six members of the Board. 655
 Lord Hood, the senior naval
Lord, resigned from the Admiralty in IJarch 1795 after a quarrel
with Spencerr and was relieved of the command o± the Mediterranean
fleet two months later. In June another of the senior members,
Admiral Sir Philip Affleck, was dismissed from the Board. He
complained bitterly to Pitt of treatment received at the hands
of Spencer. 656
 Although then over seventy, he had in the past
been a great help to Chatbam at the Admiralty, while the other
sea lords were frequently absent on active service.
A third senior and respected member, Admiral A]a ,n Gardner,
was as abruptly treated: 'Yesterday noon (Pebruary 26th)
I received a letter from Spencer acquainting me that a new
arrangement of the Board has been fixed upon, in which my name
is not included; this is the first intimation I have received
655. The six members at the time of Spencer's assuming office
were: Hood, Gardner, Affleck, Middleton, Perceval and Pybus.
See AppendixZ.
656. PRO 30/8: Chatham Papers, vol. 107, part ii, ff. 193 - 196:
Admiral Affleek to Pitt, June 8, 1795.
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my smsaion	 ,657
Bu.t the worst trouble arose out of the new First Lord's
relations with the most capable member of the Board, Sir Charles
Middleton. The latter's powerful position at the Admiralty,
both as Chatham's confidential adviser and as a member of the
Board since May 1794, has already been shown. 658 At the end
of 1794 he was in effect senior naval lord at the Admiralty,
although Hood was senior by promotion. 659 Prom the start
Spencer and Middleton never got on. To differences in age,
temperament and experience were added Middleton's resentment of
a new master. By virtue of his abilities and Chatham's lack
of them, he had achieved a dominant position at the Admiralty.
Despite, perhaps even because of, his unique knowledge o± naval
administration, Middleton was not easy to work with. No one
knew this better -than Du.ndas, who warned Spencer of the fact
soon after he came to the Admiralty: 'Lliddleton has very great
official talents and merit, but he is a little difficult to act
with from an anxiety, I had almost said an irritability of
temper, and he requires to have a great deal of his own way of
doing business ,• ,660 Nevertheless, Du.ndas strongly advised
657. I0 30/8: Chatham Papers, vol. 366, part ii. f. 278:
Gardner -to Chatham, February 27, 1795.
658. See chapter 6, pp. 2154,
659. Hood was promoted Admiral in April 1794, Middleton in
June, 1795.
660. Althorp LSS: Spencer Papers (N.R.S.), vol. I, pp. 5 - 6:Du.ndas to Spencer, December 14, 1794, marked 'very private'.
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Spencer to bear with his faults, as his departure from the
Admiralty would be an irreparable loss. 661 As it was, Spencer
had been in office only a short time before Tvaddleton was
complaining to Dundas that much ground had been lost since
Chatham's departure 662 and threatening to resign unless the
Admiralty business was carried out in the way he wished.
Outside the Admiralty, too, Spencer faced considerable
difficulties. His initial inexperience and junior position in
the Cabinet made it difficult for him to resist the domination
of Dundas. Not only did the Secretary for War tend to inter-
fere in purely naval matters; in strategic planning his practice
of subordinating naval to military needs was resented and feared
at the Admiralty. All these stresses and strains duly played
their part when the future West Indies' strategy came to be
considered.
News of disaster in the West Indies first reached England
in the spring of 1795. Pollowing the evacuation of Guadeloupe
and the beginning of the Carib revolt in the Windward Islands,
the British Government decided that only the despatch of a
second major expeditionary force from home would retrieve the
661. Du.ndas' advice to Spencer was not altogether altruistic.
He and Middleton were not only distantly related by blood;
there was a strong mutual sympathy which boded ill for Spencer.
662. Melville Castle L!uniments: Scottish Record Office:
GD. 51/2/31: Middleton to Dundas, December 27, 1794.
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situation. The decision was correct, but both in its planning
and execution the expedition met difficulties and opposition
never encountered by its predecessor in 1793/4.
By 1795, the war had widened in range and complexity and
the demands made upon the country's naval and military resources
had risen accordingly. There were not sufficient troops
available at a time when. the areas of operation had multiplie3
The task of mounting a second major effort in the West Indies
within eighteen months - with all the cost in men, money and
supplies which that implied - had therefore to be weighed
against commitments elsewhere. Thus, although the need to
protect the West Indian colonies continued to be recognized,
the prospect provoked strong opposition in the Commons and
disunity in the Cabinet.
Dundas remained the champion of further colonial expedi-
tions in preference to all other strategies, a policy which
still received Pitt's full support. But increasingly in Cabinel
the Secretary for War found himself bitterly opposed by GrenvillE
and Windham. To the latter in particular, there seemed only o.€
way to strike decisively against the enemy - by launching a
663. A year later, during a speech in the House of Commons,
Dundas admitted a major cause of the disastrous situation in
the West Indies in 1795 had been the failure and delay in sendln€
reinforcements from the United Kingdom in time. He blamed
commitments elsewhere, especially the decision to send an
expedition to seize the Cape o Good Hope. 	 'The Times',
April 29, 1796, pp. 1 - 2. EM. Newspaper Library, Colindale.
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direct attack on the french coast and act in conjunction with
the Royalists. Por a time, these views prevailed over Dundas'
violent opposition, and the Quiberon expedition was launched
in July 1795. It was only after its abysemal failure that
the Cabinet reverted to the situation in the West Indies.
Even had Quiberon succeeded, Dundas' convictions would
not have changed: 'Either with a view to peace or war, and
whatever may be the success of His Majesty's arnie elsewhere,
a coinplea-t success in the West Indies is essential for this
country ... no success in other quarters will palliate a neglect
there; by success in the West Indies alone you can be enabled
to dictate the terms of peace •,•	 He held unwaveringly
to this view at a crucial fabinet meeting held on August l4th.66
Judging by the length of the minutes which have survived,
the meeting was protracted and stormy, but in the end Dundas
and the "colonialists" carried the day. It was agreed that
immediate preparations should be made for offensive operations
both in the Leeward Islands and San Domingo. In the case of
the former, the early reconq.uest of Guadeloupe and St Lucia
were considered essential, for which 15,000 regular troops would
664. B.M. Add.MSS 40102: Dundas Papers (1794 - 1805), if. 89: Dundas to the Duke of York, July 20, 1795.
665. Attended by the full Cabinet, except f or the Lord President
of the Council (Mansfield). Those present were: Pitt, Dundas,
Lord Chancellor (Loughborough), Grenville, Chatham, Portland,
Spencer, Cornwallis, Windham & Hawkesbury.
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be required. A second force of 12,000 would be needed to gain
possession of the strategic posts and harboura along the coast of
San Domingo. At the meeting Dundas pressed for a major effort
against San Domingo, to reinforce the British troops already
there since their efforts had been brought to a standstill by --
disease and the nature of the terrain. If only a small force
were sent, the Prench would remain in control of their main base
at Cap Prançois and constitute a dangerous threat to Jamaica and
the Windward Passage. As he pointed out in a letter to the
King enclosing the Cabinet minute, anything less than, possession
of the ports and harbours on both sides of the island would be
quite inadequate 666
Even after the Cabinet had reached a decision, much anxiety
and doubt remained over the size and scope of the expedition.
Where were 27,000 troops to be found, without jeopardizing
operations elsewhere or even the safety of Britain itself? The
King flatly refused to allow 3,000 of the Brigade 0± Guards to
join the expedition and had serious misgivings about the entire
projeot:	 I cannot but think it greatly exceeds our
resources. The truth is we attempt too many objects at the
same time, and we forget for them that we must keep some force
666. A. Aspiriafl: "The later correspondence of George III":
vol. II, pp. 380 - 381: Dundas to the King, August 15, 1795,
enclosing the Cabinet minute of' the previous day.
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at home' •667 Hi8 was not the only criticism; at the Admiralty,
Middle-ton unerringly exposed the strategic weakness which under-
laj the plan: ' ... a system of unlimited concluest that cripples
us everywhere and diverts the Fleet from its natua-iai oourse.'668
Serious difficulties, too, arose over the expedition's
ob3ectiv-ee in particular the order of priority.	 It has been
said that the Cabinet envisaged a two-pronged attack, simulta-
neously delivered against San Domingo and -the enemy garrisons
in Guadeloupe and St Lucia. But when the practical planning
began at the Admiralty and War Office, it soon became obvious
that the expedition would have to remain cohesive and concen-
trate upon achieving one objective before passing on to the
next. The whole force would have to be convoyed across the
Atlantic under strong naval escort to its landfall at Barbados,
whence the campaign could begin.
At once the problem of priority gave rise to divergences
of opinion. Middleton rightly put the re-occupation of
Guadeloupe as the prime strategic necessity: 'If Guadeloupe
is made the object of attack, it cannot possibly hold out, and
if it is taken the other islands in French possession cannot
667. A. Aepinall: "The later correspondence of George III":
vol. II, p. 348: the King to Dundas, August 19, 1795.Ann Arbor 1SS, Michigan.
668. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society): vol. I, part I -




p669 Abercromby was of the same
mind. He told Pitt in July that, because the enemy bad been
able to get reinforcements to Guadeloupe in spite of the
blockade, its recapture was fundamental to the security of the
entire British Antilles. 670
 In spite of his having been at
the Admiralty only a ebort time, Spencer, too, grasped the whole
problem, as is shown by an able memorandum he prepared in Augu.st.
In favour of attacking San Domingo first, he noted:
- the added security its full possession would give to Jamaica
- the greater safety given to the important trade using
the Windwoard Passage.
- the importance of such a large and prosperous colony as a
bargaining counter in future peace negotiations.
In favour, on the other band, of attacking Guadeloupe first
there bad to be considered:
- the serious threat its continued possession by the French
had upon all the British Leeward colonies and Doininica
to the south.
- the inability of the naval blockade to prevent supplies
and reinforcements reaching Guadeloupe.
- its major importance as an enemy privateer base.
At this stage, in inid-Augast, Spenoer bad not made up his
mind. Unfortunately, by September, other counsels and Du.ridas'
in particular had prevailed. In a second memorandum written
669. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society): vol. I, part ii -
Abercromby/Cbristian expedition: plans and preparation -
pp. 149 - 150: ILiddleton'e appreciation of the West Indies'
expedition, August 25, 1795.
vol. 107, part i: Aberoromby670. PRO 30/8: Chatham Papers,
to Pitt, July 17, 1795.
671.Spencer Papers ... vol. I,
Spencer: August 1795.
pp . 139 - 140: memorandum by
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that month, Spencer very reluctantly gave San Domingo the
preference. 672 There is evidence that he did so against his
better judgemen 7 nd only after Dundas' insistence upon the
economic importance of San Domingo. Moreover, in giving way,
Spencer saw that any chance of capturing Guadeloupe after the
conclusion of operations against San Domingo must be a remote
possibility. Lack of troops, fever casualties, the shortness
of the campaign season and the formidable nature of the San
Domingo operation - all argued against it.
Dundas, however, never doubted for a moment which should
come first. The wealth of San Domingo and the effect its
possession would have upon British influence in the Caribbean,
glittered temptingly before him, blinding every strategic
consideration. By Septemberl795, therefore, he had ensured,
by gaining Pitt's full support, that the expedition's main
object would be to further opjtions against San Domingo, as
soon as control had been restored in the Windward Islands.
So it was that the vital attack upon Guadeloupe was postponed
and tilt imately abandoned.
While the problems over where to attack first continued
to be argued, an even more serious situation began to develop
672. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. I, pp. 223 - 227
43. Thid.: ' ... with the enemy in possession of Guadeloupe,
it cannot be too often repeated ... that a naval defensive war
cannot under those circumstances be carried on with success on
that station'.
316
over the choice of the expedition's nava]. commander.
Spencer's handling of the matter and the repercussions which
followed, led to a major crisis in Admiralty and Cabinet in
the autuipn of 1795 and bitter recriminations throughout the fleet
Two thoughts were uppermost in Spencer's mind when he
began to consider the appointment. It was essential to select
an admiral who would both work happily with the army commander
and understand the complex transport arrangements of the
expedition. In the first case, Spencer was guided as a prece-
dent by the admirable oo-opertion which had been displayed
by Grey and Jervis during the 1793/4 expedition. 674 Moreover,
he had already made up his mind who was the most suitable naval
officer to meet the second requirement. But at the end of
July, before his decision was announced, the army as the prime
mover of the expedition named its commander. Dundas chose
Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, 675
 an able, experienced
but prickly soldier, who certainly had no intention of sharing
control of the expedition with anyone • Thus a third factor
forced its way into Spencer's calculations - the realization
that ])undas and Aberoromby were clearly determined that the
military side should predominate. It was brought home to
Spencer that in order to achieve the harmony so fundamental to
674. See chapter 1, pp. e uq..
675. Biographical details in: D.N.B. I , pp. 43 - 46.
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the expedition's success, he would have to accept the fact
that the naval commander should play the subordinate role, in
a manner never contemplated Juting the Grey/Jervis expedition.
At the beginning of August, Spencer announced the appoint-
ment of Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Clowberry Christian, 676 whose past
experience with the Transport Board and proven ability during
the expedition's initial preparations, suggested the right
qualifications. But very serious objections, the importance
of which were quite unappreciated by Spencer at the time, out-
weighed the advantages. Christian was then only forty-eight
and a very junior rear-admiral in the Navy List, having just
got his flag in the promotion of June 1st, 1795. 677 Many
more senior admirals could stake a prior claim to the command.
Moreover, it was known that while serving with the Transport
Board, Christian had become a close friend of William Huskieson,
whom Dundas had appointed Under-Secretary of War in March 1795
and entrusted with superintending the preliminary arrangements
for the expedition. Resentment was aroused at the Admiralty
and amongst senior officers in the Fleet by whispers that in
making the appointment, pressure had been put upon Spencer by
Du.ndas, through Christian's association with his protege,
676. Biographical details in: DNB, iv, pp. 278 - 279; Ralfe,ii, pp. 265 - 270; Naval Chronicle, vol. xxi, p. 177.
677. Admiral Christian's previous service career was: flag-
captain to Commodore Rowley (1778 - 1780); three frigate
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Huskisson.
An even greater difficulty over Christian' s se]tion -
namely the effect it would have upon the position of the naval
commander already at the Leeward Islands - was overlooked, and
here again Spencer failed to appreciate the serious consequences
which would follow. Whereas General Abercromby would clearly
be the senior army commander in that theatre, the existing
station admiral there, Admiral Sir John Laforey, was immensely
senior to Christian. Although at the time of the appointment
Spencer made no definite statement as to the position of
Laforey, both Dundas and Abercromby were later to claim -that
they had got the clear impression from him that, when the
expedition reached the Leeward Islands, Laforey would transfer
to the Jamaica station and take over the command there.678' 679
This would leave Abercroxnby free to work with Christian, with-
out any risk of interference by a more senior naval officer.
Although Spencer later denied having ever suggested that
Laforey should leave his command, there is conclusive evidence
supporting the claims of Du.ndas and Abercromby, in the shape of
an diniralty memorariduni prepared by Spencer on August 25th.680
678. Dundae Papers (National. Library of Scotland): Z/l075 (c),
f. 16: Diindas to Spencer, October 20, 1795.
679. Melville Castle Muniutents (do.): MS/ 3835, f. 130:
Abercromby to Dundas, October 22, 1795.
680. Reproduced in: Barham Papers (Navy Records Society),
vol. III, pp. 2 - 5.
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This document clearly states that as soon as the expedition
reached the Caribbean, it was the First Lord's intention that
Laforey should embark in one of its battleships and: '
proceed and take the command on the Jamaica station' ,681
Suddenly in September, Spencer changed his mind. He aw
Christian at the Admiralty and told him that as soon as he
reached the Leeward Islands, he was to place himself under
Laforey's command. 682
 Spencer informed neither Dundas nor
Abereromby of the change. Why this happened is not clear.
But Middleton was absent through illness from the Admiralty
for several weeks about the time Spencer appointed Christian
and decided on Laforey's transfer to Jamaica. It is very
probable that when Middleton returned to duty, he made it clear
to the new First Lord the serious objections to the transfer.
In particular, he pointed out the impossibility of replacing
Admiral William Parker, the station commander at Jamaica, by
Laforey, just in order to make room f or Christian.
Matters came to a head in October, with a flurry of
correspondence and angry exchanges between Spencer, Du.ndae
and Abercromby. Nine le.tters written in as many days (October
12th to October 22nd), indicate the exten of ill-feeling which
the dispute bad aroused. On .ctober 11th, there was a stormy
681. Reproduced in: Barham Papers (Navy Records Society),
vol. III, intro. p.x.
682. Mentioned by Christian in a letter to Evan Nepean,
first Secretary of the Admiralty, September 24, 1795. ADM 1/311.'
IN letters.
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meeting between Spencer and t)undas. In the course of it
Spencer admitted that he had changed his mind but, face to
face with Dundas, he refused to commit himself about what was
to be done about Laforey. It was not until the following
afternoon that he fully explained his attitude in a long letter
to Du.ndas.683
Admitting at the outset that his views of the problem
had changed since their meeting the previous day, Spencer
explained why he now had second thoughts about the recall of
Laforey: ' ... I do not feel, on reflection,that it would be
justifiable to euperoede an Admiral so high on the list as
Sir John Laforey without having a direct charge to produce
against him, more especially in order to replace him by so very
young a flag officer as Christian, who from his standing in
the List of Admirals can certainly not be considered as equal
-to a command of such an extent
	 ,64- Clearly, Spencer had
at last begun to feel the weight of disapproval at the Admira1t
and in the fleet. He closed his letter to Du.ndas on October
12th, with a stout defence of Laforey: ' ... were the chief685
comnici-nd in the Leeward Islands to be entrusted to Christian,
683. Rational Library of Scotland: Uncat. L1SS - acc. No. 2553,
f. 164: Spencer to Du.ndas, Admiralty, 4.30 p.m., October l2,l79
684, 687, 688. National Library of Scotland: Uncat. S -
acc. No. 2553, f. 164: Spencer to Du.ndas, October 12, 1795.
685. Spencer's own underlining in the manuscript.
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all its senior officers ... would have just cause to complain
and the officer now there, though old and therefore perhaps a
little less active than one could wish, is however perfectly
acquainted with that station, 686 and would be unprecendently
and 1njustly degraded in the eyes o± the whole service'.687
Having made this stand, Spencer still faced a dilemma: how
to avoid a clash which clearly might arise between Christian,
as naval commander of the expedition, and Laforey, as resident
station admiral. In his letter to Dundas, he could only
suggest that clear instructions be given to both, defining
their separate functions.688
Du.ndas was alarmed and angry by Spencer's letter. He
replied the same evening evidently in great haste, since it
is known that Spencer's letter was not sent off from the
Admiralty until after 5 o'clock that afternoon. 689 Dundas
began by telling Spencer that be had received many independent
reports of Laforey's incapacity and unpopularity in the West
Indies and warned him not to ignore public opinion. Describing
the dangers of a divided command, he pointed out that both
686. Laforey was in his second term as commander-in-chief of
the Leewards station. His first appointment there ran from
1789 to 1793 and his second began in June 1795. See chapter 1,
pp.
687, 688. See footnotes previous page.
689. See Spencer Papers (N.R.S.) vol. I, p. 168, footnote.
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Aberoromby and himself had taken it for granted that Laforey
would be transferred to Jamaica in order that the entire
responsibility over the expedition in the theatre would rest
with the two commanders appointed. He ended his letter with
a strong note of warning to Spencer: '... one thing is obvious
that the problem must be immediately decided with the intention
of its being communicated to Abercromby and be be permitted
to judge for himself; for I am sure if he entertains the
smallest apprehension of being involved in any dispute with
the department of the Navy, no consideration on earth will
induce him to risk his reputation by the command, and if he
will not ... you have not another -to call upon to undertake
it ••	 As the crisis worsened, Thlndast determination
that Aberaromby's wishes should be the deciding factor, became
increasingly obvious. The reasons are not far to seek. As
he had said in his letter, Abercromby was unquestionably the
best soldier for the command and therefore must at all costs
not be deterred from taking it. Moreover as Secretary for
War, Dundas was personally involved in the success of the
expedition. It was an open secret that he favoured -the milit-
ary element of the project at the expense of the naval; there-
fore he would not allow anything to stand in the way of that
690. Du.ndas to Spencer, evening of October 12, 1795. Reprinted
in: Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. I, pp. 168 - 17C
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side of the operation.
At this critical juncture, Abercromby came upon the scene
and his attitude shattered any faint hopes which remained, of
Spencer and Dundas being able between them to reach a compro-
raise solution to the problem. Having studied the letters
which bad IBesed between Spencer and Du.ndas on October 12th,
Abereroraby wrote in high dudgeon to Dundas four days later.691
He condemned the fact that a matter of such great public Import-
ance had remained so long undecided and concluded by bombarding
Spencer's compromise solution with a salvo of explosive
questions:	 ... Is not Christian deprived of the fleet now
in the West Indies, should Laforey be of the opinion that it
should be otherwise employ'd? Is not the whole unity of
design and execution destroyed by this divided cotnraand?'692
The general was undoubtedly correct there. However
neatly the Spencer solution, devised in London, might seem to
get over the difficulties, it was an invitation to disaster as
soon as the expedition reached the Caribbean.
	 On October 20th;
Aberoromby completed his intervention in the affair by writing
to his friend Huskisson at the War Office. He told him that
the dispute had become so involved and distasteful, his
691. Abercromby to Dundas, October 16, 1795. Reprinted in:
Spencer Papers ... pp. 171 - 172.
692. Ibid. Abercroniby's views were repeated, with even greater
force, in a second letter to Dundas on October 22. See:
Melville Castle Mmniments: National Library of Scotland.
rss/3835, f. 17.
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acceptance of the command wqa in the balance and would have
-to await the outcome of events. 693 This letter was probably
shown by Huskieson to his superior in the department, Dundas.
Already by October 18th, the ripples of the dispute bad
widened. In a private conversation with Dundas that day,
Pitt spoke of his uneasiness; 694 he saw the unfavourable
publicity Spencer would incur if Laforey was recalled. Even
more serious in his opinion, was the risk of an open breach
between the services. 695 Under the threat of the whole
matter getting out of hand, Pitt ordered that his prior approva]
be obtained before any final decision was takn.
On October 19th, Spencer made a last attempt to persuade
Du.ndas and Abercromby to agree to his compromise solution.
He was clearly very surprised at the vehemence of Aberoromby's
reaction and, in a letter to Dundas that day, tried to answer
the general's objections point by point. 696 Spencer maintainec
that the proposed relationship between Christian and Laforey
bad been totally misunderstood by Abercromby and that in any
case it was not the root of the matter, which was Christian's
693. WO 1/789: Abercromby to Huskisson, October 20, 1795.
(War Office IN-letters - Transport Office (1794 - 1797)).
694. Mentioned by Dundas In his letter to Spencer, October 18,
1795.
95. Ibid. Dundas described Pitt's chief anxiety as being the:
feeling that the serviees still remain in danger of
collision
696. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. I, pp. 173 -l7
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junior status as an admiral • In support of his argument he
added: ' •.. had I supposed it was necessary at the outset
of the expedition that the admiral who was to concert it with
Abercromby would supersede laforey as commander-in-chief in
the Leeward Islands, I should certainly not have proposed
Christian for this situation ••• 	 This statement by
Spencer does not stand up to scrutiny. It will be recalled
that in his earlier memorandum of August 25th, 698 the intention
had been to transfer Laforey to Jamaica in order to make way
f or the expedition's arrival. Before that memorandum was
written, Spencer had already nominated Christian. Had all
gone according to plan, therefore, it is quite clear that
Spencer fully intended that Christian should take over as
commander-in-chief. The best that can be said for Spencer's
statements in this letter of October 19th, are that they
reflect his own desperation. In the middle of a situation
much of his own making, he realized that the climax had come
and was prepared to throw everything into the scales.
Hard as he strove to retrieve the situation, Spencer was
forced to recognize matters were getting beyond his control.
He concluded his letter to Dundas on October 19th, by saying
that the dispute would have to be resolved by a meeting of
697. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. I, p . 175.
698. cj.v. ante, p. 319w
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the Cabinet. 699 Less than a day later came Dundas' reply,
in a long and closely-argued letter which brought Spencer no
700
comfort.
The Secretary for War at once demolished the idea of
resorting to Cabinet: 'It is a subject on which you cannot
expect any Cabinet minister will give an opinion. The
responsibility rests with you and you must act upon it •,•,•701
He added that Pitt also did not hink the business appropriate
for the Cabinet to discuss. Dundas then went on to reiterate
all the arguments against creating a divided command in the
Leewarda, mentioning in particular Abercromby's strong feelings
on the subject. The way in which Dundas presented the situa-
tion was most cunningly contrived. The following passage in
his letter, for instance, seemed to offer the Pirst Lord o±
the Admiralty a wide range of choice in solutions to the
dilemma: ' ... you have it in your power either to allow
the service to remain on the footing now proposed, or to leave
Laforey in the command without any restriction, or to recall
Laforey, or to supersede both Laforey and Christian and to
name another senior admiral to go out ... •702
699. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. I, p. 176:
Spencer to Du.ndas, October 19, 1795.
700, 701, 702. National Library of Scotland - Du.ndae Papers:
flS / 
.O75, part c: West Indies (1791 - 1819, f. 16: Dundas
to Spencer, October 20, 1795.
328
But it was an empty offer. As both Dundas and Spencer
well knew, the eupercession of both admirals at that stage
would have brought ridoule to the Admiralty. Neither could
the 'footing remain as proposed', nor Laforey be left in
command, owing to Abercromby's strong objections.
	 In order,
moreover, that Spencer should be fully aware of his complete
support for Abercromby, Dundas added emphatically: 'Be the
result what it will, I shall not acquiesce in his declining
the command, but send him His Majesty's orders to proceed on
the service.' 703
 Far from giving Spencer full freedom of
choice this crucial letter shows Dundas, with the support of
Pitt and Abercromby, bringing heavy pressure to bear on Spencer,
in order to force the decision they required - namely, that
he should give way and recall Laforey.
On October 22nd, Spencer capitulated and the reply he
wrote to Dundas on that day is in many ways a humiliating
document. The copy which *ias survived is a heavily-corrected
draft, which testifies to the strain he was then undergoing.704
Spencer did not attempt to conceal his anger both with Dundas
for telling him how to administer the Admiralty, and with
Abereromby for his comments on the choice of naval commander.
703. Dundas' own underlining in the manuscript.
704. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. I, pp . 179 -182: Spencer to Dandas, October 22, 1795.
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Understandably sensitive of what might be said later, he
went out of his way to emphasize it was not they who had
forced him to retreat. The day before he wrote to Dundas,
Spencer discussed the whole subject of the West Indies command
with the Prime Llinister. No record of their conversation
has survived, but it is clear from Spencer's letter -that Pitt
was able t o exert a timely and moderating influence upon the
dispute.
Valuable though his advice was, it is also very apparent
that Spencer only gave way with the greatest reluctance. Too
late, he became aware of the deep sense of resentment felt
by the Admiralty and the navy at the threat to Laforey's
position. But in the dilemma he now found himself, he could
see no other way out: ' ... but that I must revert to the
determination of removing Laforey as the only means of securing
a cordial co—operation of the two branches of the service on
this very important occasion. Laforey will therefore be
ordered to return with some of the line—of—battle ships now
on that station and Christian will therefore remain in the
command of the intended expedition •• 	 Thus the
individual was sacrificed in the hope of achieving unity for
the expedition.
Then, and for many years afterwards, Spencer blamed
705. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. I, p. 181.
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Abercromby for what bad happened. Neither he, nor any other
military officer, had, Spencer felt, the right to refuse a
command on the grounds that his naval counterpart on an
expedition was not to his liking. He was certainly correct
on that point; but, in the final analysis, the main blame
lay with Spencer himself. It was he who chose Christian,
without first obtaining expert advice from his ubordinatee,
especially Middleton, at the Admiralty. It was his inexperienc
of naval custom and tradition which caused him to ignore the
effect the appointment would have upon the position of Laforey.
Even Spencer's finaldecision did not bring the dispute
to an end. While satisfactory to his political colleagues
and the army, it produced animmediate and lasting c risis at
the Board of Admiralty. Notwithstanding the bitter feelings
aroused there and throughout the fleet, Spencer had hoped in
his position as First Lord, to obtain conformity to the
decision. He reckoned, however, without the determination
of Middleton. In this issue, Middleton was not only the
champion of the navy against the army; be had regarded Laforey
for many years as a close personal friend. The day after
reaching his decision, Spencer wrote to Middleton giving the
reasons why he had done O.706 He ended his letter by saying
706. Barham Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. II, pp. 418 -
420: Spencer to Middleton, October 23, 1795.
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that, since the expedition's preparations were nearly complete
and sailing orders would shortly have to be given to Christian,
the order for Laforey's recall should immediately be prepared
at the Admiralty and signed by each member of the Board.707
Middleton was disgusted at this ultimatum. Months later,
he described it to Spencer's predecessor as a: ' ... bullying
708letter unbecoming the rank and office of the writer ...'.
Sure of his ground, Middleton considered that he had done
everythin in his power to dissuade his superior from taking
the irrevocable step. He knew how unjust it was to Laforey
and how unprecedented an action it would be regarded in the
service. 709 Twice be had drawn Spencer's attention to
Laforey's professional ability and great reputation in the
Navy, mentioning a particularly gallant exploit which had won
him fame. 71° But Spencer's letter had trampled over these
considerations and Middleton's immediate retort was to have
nothing to do with the order: ' ... I have put your letter
into Mr. Nepeans's 7 hands ... my reputation is too much
707. Barham Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. II, p. 420.
708. Chatham Papers: PRO 30/8 - vol. 365, part 1, if. 135 - 136
Middleton to Chatham, November 8, 1795.
709. Ibid ... f. 136.
710. When Laforey had been picked by Admiral Boscawen to board
an enemy 74 in Louisbourg harbour with boats, July 25, 1758.
711. Sir Evan Nepean (1751 - 1822), Piret Secretary of the
Admiralty, March 1795 - January 1804.
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concerned to take art active share in the business •••
Spencer was taken aback by the vehemence of Middleton's
reaction, but wrote again to him on Sunday night October 2th,
in a final effort to obtain his concurrence. 713
 While
admitting that matters would have stood very differently had
his refusal rested on personal considerations alone, Spencer
regarded Middleton's attitude as a direct challenge to his
authority. Smarting under Thindas' suggestions that he had
been shirking his responsibilities, the Pirst Lord was in no
mood to accept the dictates of a subordinate. He therefore
demanded that Middleton sign the order of Laforey's recall,
as a public duty and in obedience to himself.714
The response was swift and immediate. 	 ' ... No consider-
ation on earth will induce me to concur in what I think an
unjust measure ... as your lordship seems to insinuate a
removal from office, I can only say that my seat is at your
lordship's service'. 715
 To avoid any possibility of misunder-
standing, Middleton wrote a second letter the same day tender-
ing his resignation.716
712. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. I, pp. 182 -
183, Middleton to Spencer, October 23, 1795.
713. Ibid ... p. 183.
714. Barhani Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. II, pp. 421 -
422, Spencer to Middleton, October 25, 1795.
715. Spencer Papers ... vol. I, p. 183: Middleton to Spencer,
October 26, 1795.
716. Ibid •.. Same to same, October 26, 1795. (second letter).
Thus the crisis over the Leeward Islands command led to
serious repercussions within the Admiralty itself. The
departure of Middleton left the inexperienced First Lord with-
out a naval adviser of the first rank. Spencer certainly
knew what he was losing, because he twice tried without
success to persuade him to change his mind. 717
 But Middleton
was not to be moved, ending the final letter of their corres-
pondence with the words: ' ... I shall certainly quit my
seat with more pleasure than I came into it'. 718 After his
resignation, Middleton was appointed chairman of the commission
to enquire into the Civil Affairs of the Navy and continued
to act in that capacity for several years. In private, he
lost no time or opportunity in condemning Spencer's administra-
tion. To both Chatham and Dandas,719' 720 he described his
constant exclusion from important Admiralty business, and the
existence of "an interior cabinet of Admiralty", 721
 whose
members discussed together and made the decisions before they
ever reached the Admiralty Board. His resignation was the
717. Melville Castle Mu.niinents (Scottish Record Office):
GD/51/2/36-1: Middle-ban to Dundas, undated. Barham Papers(Navy Records Society), vol. II, pp. 423 - 424: Spencer toMiddleton, October 26, 1795; and Middleton's reply, October 27
718. Thid, p. 424.
719. Chatham Papers: PRO 30/8, vol. 365, part 1, if. 135 - 136
!Iiddleton to Chatham, November 8, 1795.
720, 721. Barham Papers, vol. II, pp. 424 - 430: a long
memorandum from Middleton to Dundas, November 9, 1795.
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climax of a long-felt sense of injury, for not having been
treated by Spencer or the junior Lords of the Admiralty with
the consideration which his age and official experience entitlec
him to expect. The Laforey dispute was thus the occasion,
but not the cause, of his departure.
The crisis over the naval command and Middleton's resigna-
tion did not mark the end of the expedition's troubles. For
six months - between October 1795 and March 1796 - Cabinet,
Admiralty and War Office wrestled with a succession of problems
and setbacks, which effectively destroyed the impetus and
direction of the original plan. It has been said that in
August 1795 the Cabinet envisaged sending 15,000 troops to
the Leeward Islands, and simultaneously a second force of
12,000 to San Domingo. By October it was plain that commit-
ments elsewhere - operations in Holland and off the French
coast and especially the decision to send an expedition to
seize the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope - had consumed
part of the available manpower. The expedition's scale had
to be modified. Although Dundas clung to the original plan -
pressing Grenvifle to find ways of getting soldiers from
Germany722 - Pitt was persuaded by both Abercromby end Christiai
that, to undertake simultaneous operations in the Leewards and
722. Dropmore Papers (H.M.C.: Portescue MSS), vol. III,
p . 102: Dundas to Grenvllle, October 17, 1795.
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San Domingo with a reduced expeditionary force was out of the
q.uestion. 723
 They suggested that 5,000 troops and part of
the naval squadron, originally destined for San Domingo,
should be diverted t o Barbados in order to reinforce Abercrornby
in the Leeward Islands. In this way control of Guadeloupe
and St Lucia might well be regained within two months. Mean-
while the rest of the San Domingo expedition would garrison
the posts already held there, until the arrival of the main
force would enable its conquest to be completed during the
remainder of the campaign season. Pitt agreed to these
proposals and in November requested Spencer and Dundas to
supervise a revision of the expedition t s plan. 724 Because
time was short, this could be done without reference to Cabinet.
The instructions were duly altered, although flu.ndas regretted
the necessity.
Even the modified plan depended for success upon its
prompt execution. Bu.t here fresh difficulties arose. Aithougi
Admiral Christian hoisted his flag at Spithead on September 15th
serious failures in the military and transport arrangements
postponed departure. On Octiber 24th, Grenvllle received a
letter from his brother, who described the ifielay as scandalous:
723. Melville Castle Mu.nimerits (Scottish Record Office):
GD/5l/1/675 - Pitt to Dundas, November 21, 1795.
724. Thid.
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I understand and from the best authority, that there
is no coiffidence whatsoever in Abereromby's army ... the
ordnance are still unprepared; when I last heard from Ports-
mouth only three of their ships from the river had got round
When two weeks later the expedition had still not sailed,
Dundas gave vent to his anger and impatience: ' ... I really
feel it a disgrace to the executive government of this country
that an expedition determined on six months ago should not be
in a state to sail seven weeks after the appointed time.'726
A chapter of accidents and disorganisation lay behind the
failure to get away. It had been realized at the outset that
the availability of shipping would be a major problem. Only
40,000 tons could be got together by the Transport Board in
England, although the expedition's minimum requirements,
including vietuallers and ordnance-vessels, was for 100,000 tons
of shipping. The balance had to be found from the incoming
East and West Indies trade and nothing could go forward at
Portsmouth until they arrived. The West Indiamen. were very
late; although their owners had promised the Transport Board
the ships would be available by the end of August, various
circumstances intervened. Most of the ships, having discharged
725. Dropmore Papers (H.M.C.: Portescue MSS), vol. III,
. 142: Buckingham to Grenville, October 24, 1795.
726. W0/ 6/5: Dundas to Abercromby, November 3, 1795.
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their cargoes in the Thames, did not complete the turn-round
until the end of September and several were held up in the
Downs until October 19th. 727
 As a result, the embarkation
of Abercroznby's 16,000 troops at Portsmouth was not completed
until November 2nd, although they had been assembled there
ready to board since October 15th. Moreover, a second mishap
occurred over the expeion's twenty-four storeships and
ordnance vessels. They bad collected at Woolwich and completed
loading there by October 20th. For some reason the Portsmouth
section did not weigh until the 25th, reaching the Downs on
November 2nd. There it was delayed over a week by contrary
winds and did not arrive at Portsmouth until November 10th,
many days late.728
With the exception of two undermanned ships which had to
be left behind, the whole expedition of 183 sail at last got
under way from Spithead on November 14th. Two days out, it
was struck	 a furious gale in the Channel. The convoy was
scattered; although some ships sailed on independently to the
West Indies, many were badly damaged or sunk and over two
hundred bodies were washed ashore at Lyrne Bay. 729
 Christian
727, 728. B.M. 9771. f. 7: "Pacts relative to the conduct of
the War in the West Indies, collected from the speech of the
Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas in the House of Commons on 28 April,
1796 ... '; London; J. Owen; 1796. pp. 41 - 44; 47;
49-50; 53-54.
729. PRO. ADM 1/317, f. 71: Christian to Nepean, November 18,
1795.
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struggled back to Portsmouth on November 29th and Dundas
posted down there to inspect the damage for himself. 73° The
King was as perturbed as anyone by the disaster. On receiving
Du.ndas' report from Portsmouth, he suggested further delay
would be avoided if the two sections of the expedition, at
Portsmouth and Cork, were instructed to make their own way
to the West Indies as soon as they had been re-equipped.731
On December 9th the main expedition sailed again from Ports-
mouth, but met a second gale; for several weeks Christian
fought to make headway against the westerly winds. Bat in
the end, they and sickness and lack of water on board the
ships beat him and the convoy straggled back to harbour on
January 26th, 1796.732 This further setback compelled a
drastic revision in the whole scheme of operations.
Abereromby saw at once that too much time had been lost
for the campaign to be completed as originally intended by
June 1796. If operations in the West Indies had only begun
by then, it was courting disaster if: ' ... 20,000 to 30,000
men were to remain Idle there during the sickly season'.733
730. Du.ndas Papers (National Library of Scotland): Uncat.
MZS 2553, f. 174: Spencer to Dundas, November 26, 1795.
731. Ann Arbor MSS Michigan: Dundas, at Portsmouth, to the
King, and his reply, November 23/24, 1795. Quoted in
A. Aspinall: "The later correspondence of George III",
vol. II, pp. 429 - 430.
732.P.R.O. ADM 1/317: Christian to Nepean, January 28/29, l796
733. Melville Castle Muniments (National Library of Scotland):
IV]SS 3835: Abercromby to Dundas, January 31, 1796.
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Moreover, the repeated delays made the Cabinet reconsider
the whole West Indies prospect. After a Cabinet meeting
held on January 2nd, Pitt and Dundas caine to the conclusion
that, since part of the campaigning season in the Caribbean
had been lost, the expedition's overall objectives would have
to be limited still further. They decided, therefore, that
once control of the Leeward Islands had been regained, San
Domingo should become the main objective and the plan to attack
Guadeloupe be postponed indefinitely. 734 To this end,
Abercrornby was ordered to proceed imeediately to the Leewards
in a fast frigate ahead of the main expedition, with instruc-
tions to commence operations there in conjunction with Laforey
and the local forces.735
At the Admiralty, Spencer had also to revise his plans
as a result of the expedition's failure to start. Christian's
second return to Portsmouth gave him an opportunity to try to
make amends for the Laforey fracas. In February 1796, Spencer
nominated Vice-Admiral Sir William Cornwallle 736 to the naval
command of the expedition in succession to Christian. More-
over, he was instructed to take command of the Leewarde station
734. UM.C.: Dropmore Papers (Porteecue MSS), vol. III,
pp. 166 - 168: Pitt to Grenville, January 3, 1796.
735. P.R.O. WO / 6/5	 : ]Yundas to Abercroniby, February 3,1796.
736. Biographical details in: D.N.B. TV, pp. 1169 - 1172.
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as soon as the expedition reached the Caribbean. 737 Spencer
could hardly have made a more unfortunate choice. Cornwallis
was a senior and experienced officer, but not easy to manage;
in particular, he had a rooted antipathy to the army and
detested its encroachment upon the affairs of the navy.
Throughout February, Cornwallis addressed a stream of complaints
to the Admiralty about the expedition's preparations, in dealing
with which Spencer showed great patience.
At last, on February 29th, the long-delayed expedition
put to sea onlyto meet bad weather for the third time. In
the middle of the gale, Cornwaflis' flagship collided with one
of the transports and, althoughthe convoy was able to proceed
on course across the Atlantic, he had to return to Portsmouth
with the Royal Sovereign. 738 Anxious that there should be
no further delays, the Admiralty ordered Cornwallis to shift
his flag to the frigate Astraea and sail at once to Barbados.
This Cornwallie refused to do, pleading ill-health and the
unsuitable impression which would be created by his arriving
to take up a new command in a small frigate. This was the
final straw to Spencer; he curtly told Cornwallis that he had
737. Laforey had vacated the command in December, 1795, but
died on board his flagship the day she arrived back at Porternout
738. See the "Times" leader of March 31, 1796, p . 2. The name
of the transport was the Belisarlus, and the "Times" of April 9,1796, pp. 3 - 4, for an account of the court-martial. B.M.
Newspaper Library, Colindale.
Ibeen discharged as commander-in-chief and ordered his court—
martial. The court, which took place at Portsmouth on
April 4th, found the admiral guilty of errors of judgement
in returning to port without orders and in not shifting his
flag to another ship, but not guilty on the all-important
charge of disobeying the order to proceed in the frigate.
Although thus acquitted, Cornwallis shortly afterwards struck
his flag and was not re-employed until after Spencer had left
the Admiralty.739
It was a direct consequence of this unpleasant affair,
that when the expedition did ultimately begin operations in
the Leeward Islands during the suntmer of 1796, they were
jointly directed by Abercromby and Christian. 740 By the end
of the campaign season, a certain measure of success had been
achieved; control had been regained over the islands of
St Lucia, Grenada and St Vincent. But this was by far the
least important of the three main objectives which the Cabinet
had set the expeditionary force in its directive of August
1795. 741
 All the delays, frustrations and changes of plan
which have been described thus combined with fatal results
to prevent the achievement of the two which really mattered -
739. Cornwallis Papers (C0R/4): Nat. Mar. Mus. !JZS Dept.
740. See chapter I, pp. 53.4.,
741. q.v. ante, p. 311.2,
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the conquest of San Domingo and the recapture of Guadeloupe.
Prom 1796 onwards, growing frustration and disillusionment
clouded the earlier hopes of achieving decisive success in the
Caribbean. Following the expedition's failure to gain it8
principal objectives, subsequent events showed a pattern of
steady decline, culminating in the withdrawal from San Domingo
in the autumn 1798. The causes of failure in the theatre
itself have already been examined. 742 But events in Europe
were as powerful a contributory cause.
The political attitude of Spain was a prime factor. Her
traditional jealousy towards the activities of other nations
in the West Indies was well-known. Neither Pitt nor Grenville
were in any doubt as to the effect expeditions against San
Domingo, or anywhere else in the West Indies, would have.743
Such activity was construed at Madrid as a threat to Hispaniola
Cuba and Trinidad. Nevertheless, so long as Spain and
Britain remained allies against France, the situation had no
worse effect than to keep relations cool. But in 1795 and
1796 there were dramatic changes.
The Pranco-Spanish peace treaty, signed at Basle on July
22nd, 1795, dealt a fatal blow to British strategy in the West
742. See chapter 2, pp. 109; 1i2
743. For example, in the Foreign Office records: P0 / Spain,
vol. 27: Grenville to St. Helens (the ambassador at Madrid),
July 19, 1793: 'The chief bar to Anglo-Spanish friendship
is the jealousy at Madrid about the West Indies ...
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Indies and heralded the eclipse of the San Domingo campaign.
Although Spain did not declare war until fifteen months later,
the treaty, "inter alia", ceded Hiepaniola - the Spanish half
of the island of San Domingo - to Prance, in return for her
recognition of certain Spanish claims along the Biscay coast.
At once the french forces and negro insurgents fighting in
San Domingo were given a bat-door and a supply line. At once
the task of the British expedition there became heavier.
Dundas clearly recognized the serious implications of the treaty
when he admitted that: ' ... it must have considerable
influence on future operations of the war in San Domingo.744
Pitt also realized what would be the effect of releasing for
service elsewhere, large numbers of Prench troops then guarding
the Hispaniola border.745
British diplomacy in the months which followed sought to
retrieve the position. Grenville advised the ambassador in
Madrid to assure the Spanish government that despite the
rapprochement with Prance, Britain did not seek a rupture with
her, nor had she designs upon Mexico or Buenos Ayres.746' '''.
744. P.R.0.: WO 6/5: fliindas to Williamson, August 3, 1795.
745.Chathara Papers: P.R.0. 30/8, vol. 101, ff. 135 - 136:
Pitt to Chatham, August 3, 1795.
746.P0 / Spain: vol. 37 - Grenville to Bute, December 25, l795
747. !0 / Spain: vol. 42 - same to same, June 18, 1796.
Pitt made numerous overtures to the Spanish chief minister,
Godoy, but they were rejected.
Events crowding in upon each other and the Government's
distractions elsewhere provided other reasons for the West
Indies no longer holding the central stage after 1796. The
Cabinet's attention in 1797 was focussed at home upon the
threats of invasion and the landings at Plshguard and Bantry
Bay; Spencer and the Admiralty Board had their hands full
with the naval mutiris at Spithead and the Nore. Moreover,
Pitt's first tentative attempts to negotiate peace with France
in 1797 had a decisive effect upon the purpose and scope of
further operations in the Caribbean. Henceforth, all future
acquisitions - the occupation of Dutch Guiana (176), Trinidad
(1797), Curaçao (1800) and the Danish and Swedish Caribbean
possessions (1801) 748 - were to be made predominantly for
their value as bargaining counters at the peace conference
table.
Complete failure in San Domingo, its appalling cost in
lives and money, was however the main reason for disengagement
in the West Indies. The decision to end the campaign in mid-
748. A. Aspinall: "The later correspondence of George III",
vol. III, p. 533: Earl St Vincent (Spencer's successor at the
Admiralty) to the King, May 10, 1801 - describes the occupation
of the islands of St Thomas, St John and St Croix (Danish)'
St Bartholomew (Swedish); and St Martin (Dutch and Prenchi.
Of course an additional reason for their occupation was
because they were major centres of privateering and illicit
trade. For this aspect, see chapter 5, pp. 2254,
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1798 coincIded with the Navy's recovery of command in the
Mediterranean. Thereafter the main strategic effort was
concentrated there. Only minor operations were undertaken
in the West Indies during the last three years of the war and
the defence of the British colonies rested solely on the
efficacy of the naval blockade of' the Western Approaches.
Even as ardent a disciple of colonial aggrandizement as
Du.ndas, was ultimately shaken by the reverses in San Domingo.
A early as December 1796, he admitted to Spencer that the
future of the whole campaign was being reconsidered by Pitt
and himself. 749 Six months later an important debate took
place in the Commons, on the motion of Mr. St. John for
withdrawing the troops from San Doniingo. 750 The major speeche
came from St. John himself, Dundas, Wilberforce and Pox. In
proposing the motion, St. John quoted figures of casualties
and expenditure which were in his opinion the strongest reasons
for withdrawal. Seven thousand five hundred men had died up
to the end of September 1796, only a fraction by the sword.
The cost of the campaign had soared from £296,000 in 1794,
to £2,211,000 in 1796 and £700,000 in January 1797 alone.75'
749. Spencer Papers (Navy Records Society), vol. III, pp. 294 -295: Dundas to Spencer, December 3, 1796.
750. Cobbett: "Parliamentary History of England ... to the
year 1803"; Hansard; 1817. Vol. xxxiii, pp. 576 - 593:House of Commons debate, May 18, 1797.
751. Ibid p. 579.
34'
His most telling point was the meagre results obtained at
such high cost. After a four-year campaign, with the exception
of Port-au-Prince, only three places on the island had been
added to the gains made during the initial landings.
In his reply, the Secretary for War was hard pressed to
rebut the arguments. He spoke at length of the economic
importance of the island, especially in sugar production, and
the greater security its possession would give to Jamaica and
the Windward Passage. Dundas thereby gained the support of
the colonial planter and merchant element in the Commons, but,
with thexception, he was addressing a hostile and critical
audience. Although he felt it necessary to oppose the motion,
Wilberforce 752 found serious fault with Du.ndas' views. He
did not agree that San Domingo was a source of great strength
to the enemy; their extreme repiblicanisin had reduced the
island to a state of utter desolation. Pox then rose to
vehemently attack Dundas' Caribbean strategy. His rooted
opposition to all colonial expeditions was well-known, but in
this particular debate he concentrated upon the Government's
lack of planning and gross wastage in San Domingo. 753 Although
752. William Wilberforce (1759 - 1833) the philanthropist and
abolitionist. Por biographical details, see D.N.B. xxi,
pp. 208 - 217, esp. p. 211.
753. The figures quoted by Pox differed somewhat from St John's-
9,000 casualties, including deserters and financial costs of
nearly £4,500,000 - but the net result was the same.
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the motion was negatived at the division by 116 votes to 31,
the Government had prevailed because of the weakness of the
Foxite Opposition and not through the support of the House.
The debate bad revealed a real sense of uneasiness and alarm.
Although the actual withdrawal did not occur until late
in 17981 Pitt and Dundas reluctantly concluded, six months
after the Commons debate, that it would be disastrous to
persist with the campaign. That the financial cost rather
than the wastage of lives had finally persuaded them, is
proved by Di.mdas' words at that time: 'The subject of San
Domingo is a very difficult one; it clearly exceeds all the
bounds of expense we had resolved upon, and what the country
either can or will bear ...
The end of the San Domingo campaign exposed the ineffeot-
iveness of the overseas strategy advocated by Dundas. There-
after, he and Pitt faced greater opposition in the Cabinet
than in the Commons. The Cabinet was much less united than
it had been. 756 Some of Dundas' colleagues - notably Grenville
and Win.dham - openly stated their lack of confidence in Dundas'
capacity as Secretary for War. 757 Both Wir]ham, and Burke in
754. See chapter 2, pp. 113.4
755. Dropmore Papers (H.M.C.: Portescue IiSS), vol. III, pp. 390
- 391: Dundas to Grenville, November 8, 1797.
756, 757. A. Aspinall: "The later correspondence of George III"
vol. III, introduction, pp. xiv - xv. The same source reprints
a memorandum by Dundas to Pitt, September 22, 1800, on the
subject of the Cabinet, in which he spçke of differences of
opinion: ' ... which daily enter into every separate
diUø10 which occurs on the subject of either peace or
war'.
opposition, made scathing censures upon the strategy employed
in the West Indies and Pitt's readiness to sacrifice the islands
which had been won -there, as a means of opening peace negotia-
tions with Prance. As Burke put it: 'Mr. Pitt is unfortunate-
ly in the condition of "paulo purgante". He cannot make peace
and he will not make war • ,758
Aware of' the hostility against him in the Cabinet and
shortly ai"ter the disastrous oonoludion of the Helder campaign,
Du.ndas wrote to Pitt in November 1799 asking to be relieved
of the responsibility for the War Department. 759 He added
that he -thought Chathani should replace him and Spencer be
removed from the Admiralty. Pitt immediately rejected these
extraordinary proposals and was able, after a good deal of
pressure, to persuade Du.ndas to remain in office.76°
Dundas made one final attempt to resurrect the Caribbean
as a major theatre of war. 761 In July, 1800 he prepared an
758. The Windham Papers (edited by the Earl of Rosebery;
2 vole. 1913), vol. II, p. 45: Burke to Windham, February 12,
1797.
759. Aspinall ... vol. III, p . 293, footnote 4: Duridas to
PItt, November 4, 1799.
760. Chatham Papers. PRO 30/8, vol. 157, f. 112: Pitt to
Dundas, November 4, 1799.
761. Even after his threat to resign, Dundas continued to
plead with Pitt for his agreement to more colonial expeditions,
in preference to other forms of strategy. See B.M. Add. MZS/
40102, f. 40: Dundas to Pitt, March 22, 1800.
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elaborate plan for the capture of Spanish-held Cuba.762' 763
The island's value, he saw, lay not only in its strategic and
economic importance within the Caribbean but as a gateway to
South America. He believed that as well as becoming one of
the Empire's richest colonies, it would open up the trade
of an immense continent f or the import of British manufactures
and export of tropical produce. Moreover, his plan envisaged
the capture of Cuba being followed by operations against
Buenos Aires, as a means of access to the rich provinces of
the interior.764
The expedition would need 20,000 infantry, one cavalry
regiment arid 1,200 negro auxiliaries and Dundas proposed that
the main force, under the command of General Abercromby, should
sail from Gibraltar in the early part of October 1800 and effect
a junction with the Black Corps in the Windward Is1ands.
The theoretical merits of the Cuba plan were however q.uite
destroyed by Its impracticability. Whatever the long-term
benefits, there was no possibility of the men or materials
for such a large expedition being forthcoming in 1800, at a
time when every available soldier was needed to defend the home
762. Melville Castle Muniniente (Scottish Record Office):
GD 51/1/725/1: Secret memorandum by Dundas, July 22, 1800.
763. B.M. Add. MSS/ 40102: Dctndas Papers: Memorandum, July l8OC
764. Ibid.
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country. Duridas appeared quite incapable of understanding
this, because, even after the plan had been flatly rejected
by the Cabinet and vetoed by Pitt, he sought to enlist the
t $ support, quite unsuccessfully.765
After the rejection of the Cuba plan, the Government's
remaining interest in the Caribbean until the Peace of Anilens
in March 1802, centred upon the future of the British conquests
there and their disposal at the conference table. Even before
the peace treaty, their fate had been settled by the terms of
the preliminary treaty, signed in London on October 1st, 1801.
In the closing months of 1800, Dundas had become seriously
alarmed at the prospect of all the hard-won gains in the West
Indies being sacrificed in the interests of securing peace.766
He regarded the negotiations being undertaken by Pitt and
Grenville with well-founded suspicion. The fact that the
trend of Grenville's diplomacy envisaged the restoration to
Prance and Holland of all their colonial possessions except
Ceylon and the Cape of Gocd Hope, filled him with dismay.
To his mind, the Poreign Secretary had given no thought to
the effect upon the balance of power in the Caribbean:
765. A. Aspinall: "The later correspondence of George III",
vol. III, pp . 401 - 402, Dundas o the King, August 26, 1800.
766.Dropniore Papers (H.M.C.: Portescue MSS), vol. VI, pp. 37 -38: Dundas to Grenville, November 24, 1800. ' ... my feelingis that no end of the war can justify such a rescikition'.
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If Holland is to have restored to it the colonies of
Surinam and Demerary, Domingo at the same time being an open
colony ... no part of the colonial trade there, that of
Jamaica excepted, will remain with this country. It will
all pass into the hands of Prance, Holland and America. ,767
With the fall of Pitt's ministry in March 1801 and the
accession of Addington, Dundas' worst fears were realized.
By the Preliminary Treaty o± Peace signed eight months later,
Britain handed back all her colonial conquests except Ceylon
and Trinidad, neither of which had been French. The costly
and bitter campaigns in the West Indies were ultimately for
nothing. Pitt, out of office, did not seem disheartened
by the peace terms, but Dundas arid Spencer openly condemned
the restoration of the enemy colonies. Having broken with
Pitt, the King had little choice but to support and approve
Addington'e methods of negotiation. Privately he was very
disappointed; only a year before, he bad told Pitt that no
peace terms could be considered satisfactory, which did not
secure most of Britain's conquests, particularly the Cape of
Good Hope and the West Indian islands.768
767. Dropmore Papers (H.M.C.: Fortescue LISS), vol. VI,
pp . 37 - 38: Dundas to Grenville, November 24, 1800&j feeling is ia ne en e he wa san sif e
a ronolution-'.
768. A. Aspinall: "The later correspondence of George III",
vol. III, introduction, p. xxii.
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Perhe the most Important defence of the British Govern-
ment's Caribbean strategy during the period came from its chief
protagonist, Dundas. During a Commons debate on the State
of the Nation on 1Iarch 25th, 1801, he looked back on the
underlying factors determining the decisions which had been
taken. 769 In his speech, he stressed that the nation's
small army had prevented large-scale operations in Europe,
particularly a direct attack on Prance. On the other hand,
the power of the Navy and Britain's dependence on commerce
and overseas empire clearly argued the adoption of a maritime
and colonial strategy. Moreover, if such were undertaken,
the bench colonial possessions would be seized, her overseas
trade ruined and new markets opened up for British manufactures.
The situation in the West Indies in 1793 exactly corres-
ponded with the requirements of Dundas' strategic doctrine.770
In the war years which followed and despite all the disasters,
Dundas never wavered in his belief that the West Indies was
the decisive theatre of war. But the longer the struggle
went on, the clearer it became that his strategic doctrine
was wrong. The enemy could not be destroyed by conquering
her Caribbean islands; even without the possession of naval
power in the theatre, she and her aflies survived there.
769. Cobbett: Parliamentary History. vol. xxxvi, pp. 1071 -
1072.
770. His viewpoints are also summarised in: Spencer Papers
(N.R.S.), vol. III, intro., pp. viii- x.
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k JvjpI
Ilor did Prance depend upon her colonies (r th6rIproduce.
Indeed the war showed her to be remarkably se]1-eufficient
economically, and colonial losses were more than offset by
conquests in Europe. But the most telling condemnation of
Dundas' strategy lay in the appalling casualties su±fered by
the army and navy during the campaigns. It was their sacri-
fice for so little gain which finally brought home the folly
of the entire strategy.
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APPENDIX 1
LIST OF NAVAL COMANDERS-IN-CHIEP
IN TI	 CARIBHEAN, 1793 - 1802
(a) LEEWARD ISLANDS STATION
May 1790 - May 1793





June 1795 - April 1796
April - June 1796
June 1796 - July 1799
July 1799 - July 1800
July 1800 -
December 1801




Admiral Sir John La±'orey (second
term)
Rear-Admiral Hugh Cloberry Christian
Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Harvey















Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker




1. Lords of the Admiralty (6)

































2. Secretaries of the Admiralty
First: June 1763 - March 1795: Philip Stephens
Second: January 1783 - March 1795: John Ibbetson
3. Comptroller of the Navy
1778 - 1790: Sir Charles Middleton
1790 - 1794: Sir Henry Martin
4. Treasurer of the Navy




During Pitt's Pizst Administration - second phase :
July 1794 - February 1802
1. LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY (6)
December March
	 November July	 September July	 February
1 794	 1795	 1795	 1797	 1798	 1800	 1801
Peroeval Perceva]. Peroeval Perceva]. Perceval Perceval Stephens
Hood	 Pybus	 Py-bus	 Seymour Stephens Stephens Eliot
Gardner Middleton Seymour Stephens Gambler 	 Gambler Troubridge
Affleok Stephens Stephens Gambler Young	 Young	 Adams
Pybus	 Seymour	 Gambler Young	 Wallace	 Man	 Markham
Midclleton Gambler	 Young	 Wallace Man	 Eliot	 Garthahore
2. SECRETARIES OP TEE ADMIRALTY (2)
First Secretary : June 1 7 63 - March 1795 : Philip Stephens
March 1795 - January 1804 : Evan Nepean
Second Secretary : January 1783 - March 1795 : John Ibbetson
March 1795 - January 1804 : William Marsden
3. COMPTROLLER OF THE NAVY
1790 - 1794 : Sir Henry Martin
1794 - 1802 s Sir Andrew Hamond
4. TREAtTRER OF THE NAVY

















Pitt's First Adminstration - First phase a
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	1780	 1790	 1792	 1794	 1796	 1798	 1800
(a) IMPORTS
FROM:-
Tamaica - 1,541. 6 2,082.5 2,029.2 2,537.0 2,011.5 2,653.9 3,612.5
Lntigua	 57.1	 104.8	 116.4	 235.3	 193.5	 141 . 1	224.0
arbados	 120.4
	
170.1	 298.8	 245.6	 295.4	 37 2 . 0	286,7
¶ontserrat	 44.7	 52.1	 49.8	 35,5	 32.9	 69.0	 70.7
levis	 45,8	 50.4	 63.9	 52.7
	
63.6	 59.6	 67.2
3t. Kitte	 323.4	 175.7	 175.8	 205.6	 188,7	 190.9	 261.3
bortola	 49.0	 43.0	 88.1	 95.9	 66.2	 80.1	 28.7
renada	 318.0	 407.7
	
269.6	 377.4	 85.7	 185.6	 2 07.0
)ominica	 162.4	 246.7	 339.0	 280.5	 290.4	 275.2	 288.4
t. Vincent	 103.4
	
150.8	 197.6	 210.4	 70.0	 203. 6	217.9
t. Lucia	 137.2	 18.6	 -	 59.6	 5.3	 -	 54.4
'obago	 78.9
	
-	 -	 43.7	 105.0	 133.1	 138.5
'rjnidad	 -	 4.2	 -	 27.5	 23.6	 70.6	 146.8
.onduras	 1.5
	
96.2	 54.9	 23.6	 3.0	 6.6	 10.1
)emarara	 -	 -	 -	 -	 233.4	 5 2 9.3 1,054.1





858.1 1,144.1 1,820.4 1,458.6 2,845.6 1,901.3
ntigua	 106.7
	
92.0	 147.5	 115.0	 104.5	 19 8 .0	 80.2










lens	 17.7	 30.3	 31.3_	 27.6	 45.3	 40.0	 13.5
t Kitts	 207.6	 90.7	 144.7	 96.3	 83.5	 112.4	 57.5










138.8	 97.3	 54.5	 59.5	 41.8
St Vincent	 66.2	 73.8	 206.0	 148.1	 95,8	 149.5	 80.9
St Lucia	 54.0	 -	 -	 11.9	 -	 5.7	 10.6
Tobago	 27.9	 -	 -	 79.4	 92.1 - 71.6	 40.5
Trinidad	 -	 2.0	 17.8	 -	 13.5	 93.1	 98.4
ondurae	 -	 12.5
	
21.2	 3.2	 -	 0.2	 2.3
Demerara (Guiana)-	 -	 -	 -	 36.6	 220.8	 360.4
Saurce: P.R.0. BT 6/185: 'State of the Trade of Great Britain in its
































APPflNDIX 4: BRITAIN - IMPORTS FROM BRITISH WEST INDIES, 1793 - 1797
Main Commodities by individual island
Source: P.R.O. : CUSTOMS - 17/15; 17/16; 17/17; 17/18; 17/19.
a) MUSCOVADO SUGAR





64.2	 195.6 1033.2	 35.1	 57.5 155.9
	
134.1	 44.9	 54.9	 2115.31794	 155.4	 130.2	 52.6	 199.7 1154.7
	 23.2	 39.3 1 46 .2	 128.6	 -	 67.3	 2Q97.2
1795
	
119.6	 107.2	 37.7	 28.3 1086.5	 22.1	 47.8 128.2	 57.5	 69.0	 36.4	 )a7l.O1796	 133.0	 130.6	 45.5	 11.5 1089.2	 22.0	 48.6 142.1	 39.8	 80.0	 53.4	 1715.71797	 114.9	 89.7	 49.1	 13.5 1049.5	 19.9	 50.9 85.3	 67.2	 76.6	 54,4	 1594.2
b) MOLASSES
hogsheads
1793	 373	 34	 10	 235	 78	
-	
9 182	 3639	 -	 -	 4564
1794	 244
	
-	 -	 436	 11	 -	 132 389	 582	 -	 -	 j789
1795	 -	 -	
-	 94	 -	 -	 155	 157	 9	 174	 -	 6101796	 -	 10	
-	 94	 -	 -	 -	 462	 -	 61	 -	 567











24.8	 34.7 30 27.0	 31.9
	


































1 794	 0.6	 1.8	 26.5	 6.5
	





1795	 1.3	 1.0	 29.2	 1.1	 82.1	 -	 -	 2.5	 0.4
	
-	 -	 181.3
1 79 6	0.6	 2.2	 31.6	 3.8	 39.2	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.3	 0.8	 78.3
1797	 0.2	 7.8	 30.4
	
2.8	 67.8	 -	
-	 3.3	 0.6	 0.1	 6.1	 119.1
e) COTTON
000 lbs.
1793	 75.5	 1152.0	 386.4	 2595.7 2163.4	 98.0	 6.8 309.0	 812.0	 176.1 467.6
	 8242.5
1794	 94,7	 1389.4	 392.5	 1880.1 2096.6	 52.1	 3.9 272.6	 612.3	 n.a. 691.3
	 7485.5
1795	 117.0	 3829.8	 120.8	 2328.5 2416.5	 o6	 - 328.0	 640.1	 339.3	 -	 *12431.31796
1797	 97.9	 2151 .2	 205.3	 1071.9
	 937.3	 26.7	 27.9 368.1	 390.1	 80.3 470.0	 5746.3






































g) DYEWOODS (including fustic, indigo)
tons
1793	 92	 324	 14
1794	 54	 -	 45
1795	 111	 -	 24
1796	 12	 -	 -
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APPE1DIX IC PROVISIONS, ETC • IMPO .T	 INTO BRITISH WEST ThDIES
Select Tables to illustrate volume; value and prices
(a) IMPORTS INTO r VINCENT. l79h. -
Scale	 from U.K. from B.N.A. from U.S.A.	 from U.S.A.




Bread & flour 000

































Source: CO 260/21, quoted in Ragatz
(b) VALTJE AND NATURE OF I"PORTS INTO JANAICA, 1787
From	 Value £000	 Commodities
U.K. direct	 758.9
	
British manufactures (686.7); Foreign
merchandise (72.3)
Ireland	 138.5	 especially provisions, linen.
Africa	 213.8	 including 5,345 neiroes at £40 each.
British North America 	 30.0	 inc1t1ing 20,000 quintals of salted cod
from Newfoundland.
U.S.A.	 190.0	 including Indian corn; wheat, flour,
rice, lumber, staves.
Madeira	 15.0	 500 pipes of wine at £30 each.
Foreign West Indies	 150.0	 under Free Port trade: cottonwool;
cacao; livestock; indigo; hides;
hardwoods; tortoiseshell; dollars.
Total	 1496.2
Source: Edwards... I, p.289
Cc) DOMI TICA - RISING PRICES OF FOODSTuFFS IN WTThE
Shillings/barrel	 17931	 17951	 17972
Mess beef	 148/6	 198/-	 330/-
Mesa pork	 165/-	 2ll1-	 330/-
Sources 1. CO 260/14: Governor Seton to Portland,
May 22, 1797
2. CO 73124








7965	 24133	 19440	 4218
4580 10612	 11673	 628
1504	 6979	 3473	 1528











































































Rio de la Hacha
Coro
Tr in ida da
Curracoa
Porto Cavella
APPNDI If: TtT PRT F PORT TRADE
(a) Wntries & Cle-1 rances from the Caribbean Free Ports during 1793
Antigua	 Dominica	 Grenada	 1Tamaioa	 Barbados	 St.Vincent	 Tobago	 Bahamas
ITo. 000t
Spanish	 IN	 -	 -	 26 0.7
	
185 4.9	 449	 18.9	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 67	 1.9
settlements OUT	 -	 23	 0.6	 300 12.6	 437	 18.0	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 76	 2.2
French	 -	 -	 18	 0.3	 36 0,9	 52	 1.9
	
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
settlements	 -	 -	 19	 0.3
	
31	 1.0	 52	 1.8	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Dubob	 -	
-	 5	 0.2	 8 0.3	 5	 0.2	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -




-	 -	 -	 -	 -
Danish	 5	 0.2	 7	 0.2	 5 0.1	 2	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
settlements	 5	 0,2	 8	 0.2	 13	 0.3	 9	 0.3	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Swedish	 1	 -	 1	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
settlements	 1	 -	 1	
-	
5 0.2	 1	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Total at the	 6	 0.2	 57	 1.4	 234	 6.3	 508	 21.1	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 67	 1.9
Free Port	 6	 0.2	 57	 1.4	 361 14.4	 507	 20.5	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 76	 2.2
American vessels	 -	 -	 46	 4.1	 -	 -	 -	 -	 37	 3.7	 38	 3.5	 21	 2.7	 81	 6.2
under proclamation	 -	
-	 44	 3.8	 -	 -	 30	 1.8 17	 1.8	 23	 2.1	 34	 4.0	 75	 4.2
Total of Foreign	 6	 0.2	 103	 5.5	 234	 6.3	 508	 21.1 37	 3.7	 38	 3.5	 21	 2.7	 148	 8.2
vessels	 6	 0.2	 101	 5.3	 361 14.4	 537	 22.3 17	 1.8	 23	 2.1	 34	 4.0	 151	 6.4
Source: P.R.O. - CUSTOMS 17/15, f. 55
(b) An account of the number of Spanish vessels.., which have entered inward in the several ports of Jamaica,





	 Thimber	 tons	 Number	 tons	 Number	 tons
Other small ports 	 2	 55	 8	 296	 1	 55
Total	 70	 2,595
	
98	 3,122	 84	 2,649
Source: P.R.O. : BT 6/76 - Miscellanea, West Indies : Leeward Islands (1787-91), f.47
APPFNDIX l2.	 366
SHIPPING RFTURNS - GE!ERAL : 1778; 1784-1801
(i) 'Account of number of vessels.... Entered inwards and cleared
outwards in the several ports of England...'






British Ships Hhipa	 Ships	 Ships
YEAR	 FROM/TO	 iTo.	 000t No. 000t No.
	 000t No. 000t
West Indies	 519
	 67.0	 2	 0.5 397	 73.7	 1	 0.3
1778 North America	 334	 59.3	 1 0.2 357	 47.9 1 0.2
West Indies	 497	 106.2 Nil Nil 422	 88.2	 4 0.7
1784 North America	 514
	
92.6 110 18,1 575
	
85.4 102 17.4
West Indies	 590	 130.7	 2 0.3 484	 104. 6 0	 0
1785 BritIsh North America 252	 28.2 0	 0 353	 41.7 0	 0
U.S.A.	 220	 39.5 120 20.6 211	 38.]. 112 20.3
West Indies	 513	 106.7 0	 0 417
	 83.9 0	 0
	






33.8 129 22.3 159	 30.2 118 18.3
West Indies	 506	 120.3	 1	 0.07 454	 1 1.044	 0.	 0
	
1787 British North America 228	 27.4	 1 0.1 514	 51.3	 1 0.2
U.S.A.	 227
	
44.6 136 22.9 165
	
36.3 129 21.5
West Indies	 546	 134.3
	
1	 0.08 452	 111.2	 2	 0.5
	
1788 British North America 231	 33.0 0	 0 467	 68.6 0	 0
U.S.A.	 184	 38.0 158 25.6 165
	 35.7 149 24.2
West Indies &)
1789 North Amerioa)	 1051	 212.5 180 29.6 1183	 239.9 162 27.4
British West Indies 	 498	 123.8	 0	 0 426 109.3	 0	 0
	
1 790 British North America 209	 26.2 0	 0 373	 46.1 0	 0
U.S.A.	 269	 55.5 226 42.1 188	 40.6 202 37.2
Foreign West Indies 	 11	 1.6 0	 0	 6	 0.8 0	 0
British West Indies 	 532	 129.5 0	 0 459	 114.1	 0	 0
	
1 791 British North America 239	 30.5 0	 0 369	 49.3 0	 0
U.S.A.	 20].	 44.7 297 58.9 192	 43.5 272 52.6




British West Indies	 544	 130.5 0	 0 482	 121.8 0	 0
	
British North America 211	 30.1 0	 0 351	 47.2 0	 0
1792 U.S.A.	 163
	
35.9 291 60.3 176	 41.6 264 56.0
Foreign West Indies	 19	 3.3	 0 0	 4	 0.4 0	 0
British West Indies 	 590	 139.6 0	 0 453	 114.4 0	 0
Foreign Wes.t Indies	 16	 2.6	 1	 0.2	 2	 0.3 0	 0
	
1793 British ITorth America 132	 17.8	 0	 0 265	 34,3	 0	 0
U.S.A.	 114
	
2_6.3 311 65.9	 27	 7.1 263 56.0
British West Indies	 571	 136.0 0	 0 572
	
143. 6 0	 0
Foreign West Indies 	 17	 3.5 0	 0	 2	 0.6 0	 0
	
1794 British North America 147	 18.2 0	 0 274	 35.0 0	 0
U.S.A.	 10	 1.9 231 50.6	 44	 9.7 300 64.3
British West Indies 	 480	 119.5 0	 0 348	 99.0	 0	 0
Foreign West Indies	 22	 4.0	 1 0.3
	
2	 0.6 10	 2.1
	
1795 British North America 180	 25.1	 0	 0 219	 29.1 0	 0
U.S.A.	 12	 2.1 367 74.2	 10	 2.1 450 89.7







British Shirrs	 Ships	 Ships	 Ships
TEAR	 FROM/TO	 iTo.	 000t No. 000t iTot	 000t iTo. 000t
Foreign West Indies	 26	 5:0	 4 0:9	 2	 0:2 11	 2.4
	
1796 British North America 139
	
18.1	 -	 - 138	 30,6 -	 -











British West Indies 	 383
	 104.9 -	 - 419	 117.5 -	 -
Foreign West Indies	 11	 1.9	 7	 1.5 4	 0.5	 4	 0.7
	
1797 British North America 188	 29.9 -	 - 216	 30.4 -	 -
U.S.A.	 9	 1.9 371	 81.8 16	 5.6 336	 73.5
Conquered Islands	 194
	
48.3 -	 - 1 75	 38.4 -	 -
British West IndIes	 457	 128.3 -	 - 446	 124.5 -	 -
Freign West Indies	 14	 3.1 2	 0.5 2	 0.4 2	 0.5
	
1 798 BritIsh North America 118	 17.9 -	 - 208	 28.1 -	 -
U.S.A.	 18	 4.1 297	 67.7 29	 6.4 296	 69.0
Conquered Islands	 198	 44.2	 1	 0.2229	 50.6 -	 -
British West Indies 	 604	 165.6 -	 - 488	 140.5 -	 -
Foreign West Indies	 52	 11.0	 5	 1.0 5	 1.1	 2	 0.4
	
1 799 British North America 136	 22.7 -	 - 199	 30.1 -	 -
U.S.A.	 27	 6.6 516	 69.9 43	 11.4 332	 74.2
Conquered Islands	 225
	
52.6	 6	 1.3208	 44.7 1	 0.2
British West Indies 	 502	 148.3 -	 - 407
	
126.9 -
Foreign West Indies	 21	 5.1	 5	 1.0 -	 -	 5	 0.8
	
1800 British North America 150	 27.2 -	 - 227	 34.1 -	 -
U.S.A.	 44	 11.0 503 114.9 37	 9.5 470 105.5
Conquered Islands 	 236	 54.1	 5	 0.5199	 51.8	 1	 0.2
British West Indies	 506
Foreign West Indies 	 -
1801 British Worth America 220
U.S.A.	 74
Conquered Islands	 331
154.1 -	 - 514
	 159.0 -	 -
-	 5	 0.8 -	 -	 -	 -
35.6 -	 - 271
	
43.4 .	 -
16.4 652 145.1 75	 17.4 652 145.5
86.1 17	 3.9283






















SHIPPING BETTJRNS - GENERAL : 1778; 178L-].801
(2)	 account of number of vessels.., including repeated voyages which
entered inwards and cleared outwards in the several ports of Great Britaint
Source: P.R.O. : BT/6/]41: Customs House accounts: 1780-1804
BRITISH	 DNIT)	 BRITISH	 CON(U)	 FOREIGN
NORTH	 STATES	 WEST	 WEST	 WEST
AIERICA	 OF AMERICA INDIES
	 INDIES	 INDIES
000	 000	 000	 000
tish 199 25.0 269
IN
	
eign -	 -	 226
1790
	
tish 362 44.2 189
ein -	 -	 201
(British 239 30.5 201
IN (Foreign -	 297
179].	 (British 369 49.3 192
OUT (Foreign -	 272
(British 204 29.2 164
IN (Foreign - - 291
1792	 (British 347 48.1 176













	(British US 17.1 18	 4.1 457
	
128.3 198	 44.2 34
	
3.1
	IN (Foreign -	 -	 297	 67.7 -	 -	 1	 0.2	 2	 0.5
1798	 (British 205 27.3 29	 6.4 446	 124.5 229	 50.6	 2	 0.4
	OUT (Foreign -	 -	 296	 69.0 -	 -	 -	 -	 2	 0.5
	(British 333 21.9 27	 6.6. 604	 165.6 225	 52.6 52
	
11.0
	IN (Foreign -	 -	 316	 69.9 -	 -	 6	 1.3	 5	 1.0
1799	 (British 196 29.2 43
	
11.4 489
	 140.5 208	 44.7	 5	 1.1
	OUT (Foreign -	 -	 332	 74.2 -	 -	 1	 0.2	 2	 0.4
	(British 147 26.4 44
	
10.9 502	 348.3 236	 54.1 2].	 5.1
	IN (Foreign -	 -	 503
	
134.9 -	 -	 7	 1.1	 3	 0.5
1800	 (British 223 33,3 37	 9.3 407	 126.9 199	 51.8	 -
-	 OUT (Foreign -	 -	 470	 105.5 -	 -	 1	 0.2	 5	 0.7
(3) Number of vessels clearing in and out, 1793 : England only
IN	 OUT	 IN	 OUT
No. 000t No. 000t	 No. 000t No. 000t
Antigua	 58 11.7 43 9.9 St. Kitts	 30	 6.8 45 10.8
Barbados	 55 11.2 52 11.1 St. Vincent	 39	 8.5 25	 6.2
Dominica	 33 6.3 29 6.4 Tobago	 10	 2.2 10	 2.0
Grenada	 73 15.3 57 33.]. Tortola	 12	 2.9 15	 3.2
Jamaica	 257 70.1 163 48.5 Total British West	 590 ]396 453 134.4
Indies
Monteerrat 10 1.9	 8 1.6 Honduras Bay	 37	 8.2	 6	 1.3
Nevia	 3.3 2.7	 6 1.5 Foreign West Indies	 16	 2.6	 2	 0.3
Source: P.R.0. : Customs 17/15 : 1793
RETTJ:RNS. 173'-4 - BY ISLANDS
bunt of number of vessels... inoluding repeated voyages, whicF have entered and cleared in the several British 'Test Indies islands
Yanuary 5, 1793 - January 5, 1794
Source : Public Record Office - CUSTOMS 17/15 : 1793
-- Antigua Barbados Dominica Grenada Jamaica Montserrat Nevis 	 St St.	 Tortola Tobago	 Total
Kitts Vincent	 British West md
IN No. 42	 50	 26	 54	 150	 7	 5	 30	 28	 6	 8	 406
Great	 000t 8.7	 10.2	 5.1	 11.2	 40.9	 1.8	 1.1	 6.7	 6.1	 1.3	 1.3	 94.3
Britain	
OUT No. 63	 61	 35	 97	 308	 12	 18	 42	 56	 19	 15	 726COOt 12.7	 13.9	 6.7	 20.1	 58.5	 2.4
	 3.4	 9.6 11.7	 3.8	 3.1	 145.8
IN No. 14	 8	 11	 4	 17	 -	 -	 3	 8	 -	 -	 65
Ireland	 000t 1.9
	
1.1	 1.6	 0.4	 3,0	 -	 -	 0,4	 1.].	 -	 -	 10.5







2.1	 -	 -	 0.2	 0.1	 -	 -	 5.1
1N N0.	 4	 -	 10	 7	 2	 1	 -	 2	 3	 -	 2	 31
Southern	 000t 0.8	 -	 1.5	 1.1	 0.5	 0.1	 -	 0,2	 0.5	 -	 0.2	 5.0
Europe	 No. -	 -	 -	 -	 1	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1
& Madeira OUT 000t -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
IN No,	 2	 11	 5	 26	 95	 -	 1	 3	 25	 -	 1	 169000t 0,2	 1.8	 1.0	 4.1	 19.5	 -	 0.4	 0.4	 4,4	 -	 0.2	 32.0
Africa	 No.	 -	 -	 1	 1	 -	 -	 -	 1	 -	 -	
-	 3
OUT 000t -	 -	 0,08	 0,05	 -	 -	 -	 0.09	 -	 -	 -	 0,2
IN No. 55	 43	 16	 41	 274	 6	 14	 22	 24	 1	 16	 512
U.S.A.	 000t 6.6	 5.7	 1.8	 5.6	 38.5	 0.7	 1.2	 2.8	 3.1	 0.3	 1.9	 68.4
(British	
OUT No. 35	 26	 12	 17	 181	 4	 8	 9	 19	 -	 -	 311vesse	 000t 4.0	 3.2	 1.5	 2.2	 23.2	 0.4	 0.8	 0.9
	
2.1	 -	 -	 38.2
IN No, 20	 42	 13	 27	 51	 6	 1	 6	 17	 -	 -	 183
British	 000t 1.8	 4.9	 1.5	 2.9	 5.8	 0.7	 0.1	 0.8	 1.8	 -	 -	 20.2
NoTth	 OUT No. 17	 36	 10	 19	 54	 2	 1	 7	 14	 -	 -	 160
America	 COOt 1.7	 4.2	 1.0	 1.9
	
6.8	 0.2	 -	 1.0	 1.5	 -	 -	 18.3
IN No. 20	 5	 4	 7	 12	 2	 -	 5	 19	 -	 -	 75
Bahama	 000t 1.6	 0.3	 0.4	 0.7	 0.8	 0.1	 -	 0.4	 1.2	 -	 -	 5.6
&	 OTNo.4	 13	 6	 8	 7	 3	 1	 8	 13	 -	 -	 83
Bermuda	 U 000t 1.7	 1.2	 0.6	 0.6	 0.4
	
0.2	 0.1	 0.7	 1.1	 -	 -	 6.7
No, 15	 57	 6	 52	 4	 35	 50	 179	 12	 1	 2	 413
Dutoh	 000t 1.2	 3.9	 0.4	 3.8	 0.5	 1.1	 2.0	 11.6 0.9	 -	 0.1	 25.4
settlements OUT No.	 2	 64	 8	 32	 2	 16	 11	 56	 14	 -	 2	 207000t 0.2	 4,4	 0,4	 2.7	 0,2	 0.5	 0.5	 4.4	 1.3	 -	 0.1	 14.8
No, 7
	
8	 2	 3	 -	 1	 .	 -	 3	 2	 11	 -	 37Danish	 IN 000t 0.5
	
0.4	 0.2	 0.2	 -	 -	 -	 0.3 0.1	 0.7	 -	 2.6
settlements
OUT	 '	 -	 -000t 0.2	 0.2	 -	 0.9	 0.1	 -	 -	 0.2	 -	 0.4	 0.1	 2.4
No. 14	 10	 11	 13	 29	 4	 -	 3	 15	 -	 1	 100
French	 IN 000t 0.9	 0.6	 0.6	 1.0	 1.9
	
0.2	 -	 0,4	 1,2	 -	 -	 6.9
settlemnts	 No.	 -	 12	 9	 27	 4	 1	 -	 1	 10	 -	 -	 64
OUT 000t -	 0.7	 0.6	 2.0	 0.4	 -	 -	 0.1	 0.7	 -	 -	 4.6
-	 INN0. 3	 -	 2	 22	 II	 2	 1	 3	 -	 1	 45
Spanish	 000t 0.2	 -	 0.1	 0.4	 1.3
	
-	 0.2	 -	 0.1	 -	 -	 2.4
settlements	 No.	 2	 -	 21	 17	 1	 -	 2	 6	 -	 2	 51
	
UT 000t 0.1	 -	 -	 1.6	 1.8	 -	 -	 -	 0.4	 -	 0.1	 4.1
IN No, 49	 -	 -	 -	 -	 4	 56	 29	 -	 -	 -	 138
Swedish	 000t 2.8	 -	 -	 -	 -	 0.2	 1,8	 2.4
	
-	 -	 -	 1.1
settlements




INNo.	 -	 -	 -	 -	 19	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 19
Honduras	 000t -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.7
	
-	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1.7
Bay
ITo.	 2	 -	 -	 1	 28	 -	 -	 1	 -	 -	 -	 32
OUT 000t 0.4	 -	 -	 0.2	 3,5	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 4.2
No. 246	 235	 106	 256	 664	 66	 129
	
285	 156	 19	 32	 2195
TOTAL	 IN 000-t 27.5	 29.0	 14.1	 31.3	 114.4	 5.0	 6.8 26.4 20.6	 2.4	 3.9	 281.2
	
T No, 189	 222	 85	 240	 647	 46	 49	 165	 134	 26	 20	 1823
000t 24.0	 28.6	 11.2	 33.2	 98.8	 4.2	 4.2	 20.2	 18.8	 4.2	 3.4	 252.0
No. 38
	
50	 37	 78	 12	 27	 39	 110	 39	 23	 44	 497
From one	 lIT COOt 3.4	 2.9	 2.5	 6.0	 0.6	 1.6	 2.5	 8,0	 2.6	 2.8	 4.1	 37.0
islandto another	 No, 80	 88	 52	 96	 -	 6	 62	 134	 71	 10	 48	 647OUT 000
	 6.6	 8,2	 5.3	 8.5	 -	 0.4	 2.8	 10.0 5.7	 0.5	 3.4	 51.5
APPS1IbIX K	 I•P PNGAGD IN CAPIBW'14N TFAD 	 : 1784 	 310









































































































































































































- t Kitte - Cork
1777 Cork - Barbados
1765 London-St Kitts
178].	 Tortola - London
1773 London - Barbados
1774 Dublin - Antlgua
174 0 London - Barbados
1774 Greenock-Jamaica
1774 Lancaster-Jamaica
1757 Cork- St Kitta
1782 Bristol - Jamaica
1774 London - Jamaica
1769 Greenock-Jainaica
1770 London - Antigua
177 6 London - Jamaica
1749 London - Jamaica
1766 St Vincent-London
1777 Cork - Jamaica
1770 Cork - Tortola
177 6 Tobago - London
1780 London - JaMica
1776 Liverpool-Jamaica
178 2 Jamaica - London




1772 Bristol - Jamaica
1765 London - t Kitta
1785 Waterford-amaioa
1782 London - St Kitta
1779 Liverpool-Jamaica
- Greenook-Antigue
1774 London - Antlgua
1781 London - Antigua
1774 London - Antigua
1781 London - Jamaica
1752 Jamaica - London
1764 London - Jamaica
-	
London - Jamaica
1782	 Greenock - St Kitt
1783 London - Tobago
1781 Whitehaven-Jamaica
1778 London - Jamaica
1774 London - Jamaica





Source: Selected extract from Lloyd's Register of shipping, 1784
APPENDIXI	 SHIPS ENGAGD IN CARIBBET' TRAD 	 : 1194
	 371
Ship	 type dis- where built when	 voyage
place-	 built
ment
Abby	 brig l44tons Lancaster
	 1787 Lancaster - Grenada
Abby	 brig 154	 U.S.A.	 1774 Liverpool - Barbados
Active	 snow 180	 Lancaster	 1785 Lancaster - Tamaica
Active	 snow 153	 Cowes	 1788 London - Jamaica
Aotive	 brig 140	 Chester	 1789 Liverpool - Chester
Active	 snow 165
	
New Brunswick 1789 Bristol - Jamaica
Adamant	 ship 320	 Thames	 1774 London - Tortola
Admiral Xeppel ship 314
	
U.S.A.	 1779 Cork - West Indies
Aeolus	 brig 153	 Philadelphia 1777 Cork - Jamaica
Agenoria	 ship 264
	
Whitby	 1787 Bristol - St Vincent
Agnes	 brig 189
	
Liverpool	 1788 Liverpool - Dominioa
Aid	 snow 209
	
Shields	 1785 London - Honduras
A1baoore	 brig 114
	
Britain	 1791 Cork - Jamaica
Albion	 ship 312	 Bristol	 1782 Bristol Jamaica
Albion	 brig 168	 Whitehaven	 1786 Jamaioa - Dublin
Aloyone	 ship 290	 Britain	 1775 London - West Indies
Uert	 snow 193
	
Liverpool	 1787 Liverpool - Dominica
Alethea	 snow 193
	
Liverpool	 1792 Liverpool - Jamaica
dexander	 ship 230	 Philadelphia 1769 Greenock - Jamaica
Alexander	 ship 243	 New York	 1772 London - Honduras
Alexander	 ship 304
	
Nova Scotia 1789 London - St Vincent
Alexandre	 ship 400	 Thames	 1786 London - Jamaica
Alexandria	 ship 157	 Liverpool	 1785 Liverpool - Jamaica
Alfred	 ship 305
	
Nova Scotia 1786 London - Jamaica
Alice	 brig 155	 Liverpool	 1792 Liverpool - Dominica
Alice	 brig 115
	
Liverpool	 1784 Lancaster - Grenada
Alice	 shIp 195	 New England 1789 LIverpool - Antigua
Allanson	 ship 182	 Liverpool	 1787 Liverpool - Barbedo
Amelia	 ship 250	 Thames	 1785 London - Jamaica
Amity	 ship 320	 Topaham	 1783 London - Jamaica
Amity Hall	 ship 316	 Thames	 1789 London - Jamaica
Ann	 ship 223	 Chester	 1792 Liverpool - Jamaica
Ann	 ship 199	 Scotland	 1786 Greenock - Jamaica
Ann	 brig 112	 France	 - Bristol - Grenada
Ann	 brig 159
	
Liverpool	 1791 Liverpool - St Vincent
Ann	 ship 320	 Bristol	 1792 Bristol - Jamaica
Ann	 ship 300	 Bristol	 1785 Bristol - Jamaica
Ann	 ship 238	 Bristol	 1791 Bristol - Barbados
Ann	 brig 126	 Sunderland	 1791 Cork - Jamaica
Ann & Susannah ship 425
	
Prance	 1789 Liverpool - Jamaica
Anna Bella	 ship 308	 Thames	 1782 London - St Xitts
AntIgua	 ship 350	 Liverpool	 1774 London - Antigna
Apollo	 brig 177	 Hull	 1784 London - Jamaica
Apollo	 ship 171	 France	 - Liverpool - St Vincent
Apollo	 brig 136	 Lancaster	 1784 Lancaster - Barbados
Arab	 ship 170	 Bristol	 1790 Cork - Jamaica
Are thusa	 ship 233	 Hull	 1791 London - Jamaica
Ar, ia	 ship 320	 New York	 1774 Liverpool - Grenada
)diel	 ship 245	 Hull	 1788 Hull - Jamaioa
Atalanta	 brig 194	 Cork	 1788 London - Jamaica
Atalanta	 ship 248	 Newcastle	 1788 London - Jamaica
Atlantic	 ship 336	 Dysart	 1791 Greenock - Jamaica
Atlantic	 ship 216	 Chester	 1787 Lancaster - Barbados
At1a	 ship 121	 Harwiok	 1792 London - Grenada
Augustus Caesarship 500	 Thames	 1786 London - Jamaica
Aurora	 ship 295	 Chester	 1793 London - St Vincent
Aurora	 ship 271	 Philadelphia 1779 Greenook - Jamaica
Aurora	 ship 217
	
Lancaster	 1793 Lancaster - St Kitts
Aurora	 ship 209
	
Wales	 1776 London - St Kitta
Aurora	 ship 201	 Cork	 1791 Cork - Barbados
Aurora	 ship 357
	
Thames	 1787 London - Jamaica
Alligator	 ship 305
	
Thames	 1793 London - Jamaica
Active	 sloop 41	 Bristol	 1794 Bristol - Nevis
Active	 ship 250	 France	 - London - Grenada
Anna	 ship 151	 Nova Scotia 1791 Bristol - Jamaica
Albion	 ship 255	 Newcastle	 1793 London - Barbados
Albion	 ship 270	 Bermuda	 1790 Liverpool - St Kitta
Albion	 ship 325	 Newcastle	 1793 London - Jamaica
















































































































































Bristol - St Vincent
London - Demerara







































Dublin - West Indies






London - West Indies
London - Antigua




APPEIDIXth. SHIPS ENGAGED IN CARIBBEAN TRADE : 180h.


















































































































































































































Cowes	 1795 london - Tobago
Spain	 - london - Barbados
Stuiderland 1795 london - Jamaica
Sunderland 1790 London - St Kitte
Bristol	 1786 Bristol - Tobago
Bristol	 1799 London - Ia Guaira
France	 - Liverpool - West Indies
Plymouth	 1801 Liverpool - Jamaica
Whitby	 1794 london Jamaica
Alnmouth	 1799 Iancaater - Jamaica
Whitby	 1794 london - Jamaica
Whitehaven 1800 Liverpool - Nevis
Bristol 1799 london - Barbados
Newcastle 1790 london - Honduras
Liverpool 1792 Dublin - Jamaica
Bermuda	 1799 london - Jamaica
Newcastle	 1783 Newcastle - Antigua
Chester	 1787 I&icaster - Trinidad
Rochester	 1795 London - Tobago
Newcastle	 1798 london - Barbados
Chepatow	 1797 Bristol - Barbados
Whitehaven 1799 Whitehaven - Jamaica
Shields	 1800 Liverpool - Jamaica
Yarmouth	 1798 London - Martinique
New Brunswick 1794 london - Trinidad
Shields	 1800 london - Barbados
Whitehaven 1803 Whitehaven - Jamaica
Whitby	 1796 london - .Antigua
Holland	 1789 London - Barbados
Thames	 1799 london - Jamaica
Thames	 1787 london - Jamaica
Sunderland 1798 London - Barbados
Chester	 1793 Liverpool - Antigua
(Foreign prize) - Greenock - Trinidad
Bermuda	 1794 London - Jamaica
Sources Selected extract from Lloyd e Register of Shipping, 1804.
1ffiMBER OF VESSELS
1796	 1797	 1798
Jan Feb M.r July Aug Sep Oct Nov Deo Jan Feb Mar Oot Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Entered 51 73 51 67 38 46 29 29 30 45 38 46 17 54 51 55 54 50 63	 61 40 - - -
KINGSTON
Cleared 50 41 53 92 44 38 32 26 27 36 31 32 24 15 42 52 45 31 75	 36 46 35 61 26
Entered 9 951311].]. 3 63 5441 72 91010	 5	 3	 1---
PORT
ANT ON0
C1eed 8	 3	 3	 7	 33 8	 2	 2	 2	 6 1	 3	 2 0 0	 5 216	 1	 0 010
Entered 9 912 8 12 4 6 8 2	 5 720 6 61512 1446
 9	 3	 4- - -
MONTE0
BAY
Clearedl2	 7183832871211639546213836	 6	 7475
Entered 2 4 5 1
SAVANNAH -
DEL -MAR
Cleared 6 2 8 24
Entered - - - 1
SANTA ________________
LUCd 3 6 7 20
2 0 0	 5 3 4 2 4 -1 1 3 5	 5 2	 0	 0- - -
6	 1	 0	 2	 6	 4	 1.	 1	 1	 1	 4	 2	 3	 115	 2	 20	 2	 1
0 0 1 2 2 0 0 4 - - 1 4 2 5 1	 -	 -- - -
1	 3 2	 2	 3	 2	 3 1	 2 1	 0	 6	 3	 2	 8	 0	 20	 2 1
Eitered 71 95 73 90	 63 61 39 50 40 59 51 78 24 68 70 83 85 116 80	 69 45 - - -
TOTAL
Ci.eared 79 59 89 181	 86 53 49 44 49 50 44 44 35 23 52 81 59 44 150	 45	 57 39 82 34












118	 Newfoundland	 fish & firewood
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(a) Returns from the Naval Office, Bridgetown, Barbados ehewing entries into
that port, including repeated voyages, between July 1st and September
30th, ].801
sate Ship	 Type	 Die-	 Where from	 Cargo
place-
ment
July Fame	 brig	 95tons Newfoundland 	 cod





	 231	 Liverpool	 beef & other provisions
Charming Eliza ship




Five Sisters	 brig	 123	 Alexandria	 shingles, bread





Benson	 ship	 256	 Lancaster & Cork provisions, dry goods
Isca	 snow	 157	 Liverpool & Cork provisions
Briton	 snow	 217	 Bristol & Cork	 stores, hoops, bricks
Eagle	 brig	 106	 Newfoundland	 cod & salmon
Mary	 schooner 68
	 Martinique	 cocoa & coffee









Pepperelboro	 lumber, shingles, staves
Demerara	 shingles, timber
Halifax	 luiuber,fish, hoops
Portland	 lumber, shingles, staves
Mississippi	 bread & flour
Alexandria	 bread & corn
Greenock	 herring,soap, pork
New Orleans	 bread & flour
New Providence	 mahogany,eedar posts
Barbados (Vice-Admiralty Court) in Ballast
Newfoundland	 cod




































Demerara	 shingles, cotton, coffee
New london	 stores & livestock
Demerara	 timber
Kennebeo	 lumber, shingles, staves
New london	 stores & livestock
Newfoundland	 fish
Barbados (Vice-Admiralty Court) in ballast
Liverpool	 provisions & stores
Liverpool	 Provisions & stores
Martinique	 molasses









































































































(b) Returns from the Naval Office, Bridgetown, Barbados, ahewing clearances
from... between July let and September 30th, 1801
Date Ship	 Type	 Die-	 Where from	 Cargo
place-
ment
July Margaret	 schooner l03tone Surinam 	 sundries
Liimet	 sloop	 67	 Surinain	 provisions, dry goods
•	 Lord Duncan	 brig	 109	 Martinique	 rum & provisions
Prude	 brig	 145	 Martinique	 aundrie(part of inward
cargo)
Little John	 hooner 71
































Surinam	 stores & dry goods
quebec	 sugar & rum





























































sundries (part of inward
cargo)
Sally	 brig	 113	 Rhode Island	 in ballast
Governor Rickette schooner 83
	
Martinique	 stores
Polly	 schooner 73	 Martinique	 provisions














































66	 Demara	 provisions & wine
	








80	 Demerara	 provisions & stores
	
112	 St Kitts	 sundries (part of inward
cargo)
	
4].	 Demerara	 lumber, provisions
	
69	 New Lndon	 rum, molasses
	
54	 St Vincent	 corn
	




79	 Norfolk,W.Va	 sugar & cocoa
	
297	 Liverpool	 sugar,coffee, cotton,
indigo
	














326	 Indon	 sugar, cotton, coffee
Source: P.R.O. : HO 76/2 - 1801
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Shipping Returns by James Laing, Assistant Naval Officer at Roseau, Dominica,
(a) Entries of British registered vessels : July - October, 1792






s].00p	 70 St Lucia	 in ballast
ship	 18]. Lancaster & Cork dry goods, plantation
stores
sloop	 135 St Kitte	 in ballast
ship	 183 Whitehaven	 plantation stores







14 Friends Adventure sloop 	 103 Cork














































































































































































in ballast10 Rebecca	 sloop
(b) Clearances of British reEistered vessels : July - October 1792
where bound
July 12 3.rift	 sloop	 84 St Vincent	 sundries
12 Fanny	 schooner 80 St Vincent	 sundries
12 Friends	 sloop	 53 Antigua	 in ballast
13 Two Brothers	 sloop	 135 St Kitte	 negroes
33 Commerce	 sloop	 70 Cayenne	 negroes
13 Betsey	 sloop	 74 St Eustatius	 negroes
14 William	 ship	 18]. St Kitta	 provisions,dry goods
3.6 Joyce	 brig	 152 New Brunswick	 naval stores
1PPE]DIX (contd.	 379
date	 ship
	 type	 tons whore bound	 cargo
July 19 Isabella 	 bark	 .O2 london	 part inward cargo from
Africa not landed here
T4+	 ft	 ftJdJ..5J U
2lHannsh














































	 120 Nova Scotia
sloop	 12.4 St Kitta
brig	 110 Africa
schooner 49 Bay Chaleura









sloop	 46 New York




schooner 74 St Eustatius
brig	 220 New York
ship	 23.1 london
sloop
	 84 St Vincent
sloop	 57 St Kitta
schooner 50 3 Lucia
brig	 80 North Carolina
sloop	 38 St Thomas
brig	 180 Liverpool
schooner 109 Mont serrat
sloop	 55 Newfoundland





schooner 50 St Lucia
schooner 67 Baltimore
brig 163 Baltimore
schooner 108 St Johns
sloop	 55 Grenada
schooner 52 St Eustatius
schooner 52 St Kitta
sloop
	 62 St Lucia























































c) Entries of POEEIGN : July — October 1792;
January — July 1793
i	 N1RIES, July — Octo'ber 1792
date	 ship	 nationality & tons where from	 cargo
tvte
July 1]. Belle Creole French schooner 6 Marie Galante cotton
11 Revenge	 French sloop	 20 Guadeloupe	 cotton
18 Ia Fortune	 French schooner 15 Guadeloupe	 cotton
18 Belle Creole French schooner 6 Marie Galante cotton
20 nanue1	 Spanish schooner 50 Oronoko	 hides (2,200)
2]. Pacquet	 French schooner 12 Martinique	 cotton
APPENDIX 1(contd.)
date	 ship	 nationality & ton8 where from	 cargo
te
July 23 Trois Enfants French sloop 	 20 Martinique	 cotton
23 Nepti.uie	 French sloop	 15 St Lucia	 cotton
23 Hazard	 French sloop	 15 Martinique	 cotton
27 Catharine	 French schooner 20 Guadeloupe 	 hardwood
27 Rosario	 Spanish schooner 55 Oronoko	 cotton,gum algarabo
30 Neptune	 French sloop	 25 St Lucia	 cotton
30 Dunkerque	 French sloop	 15 Marie Galante cotton
30 Betsy	 Dutch sloop	 37 St Eustatiun	 mahogany
30 Brigand	 French sloop	 25 St Lucia	 cotton
30 Venturier	 French sloop	 15 Guadeloupe	 cotton
31 Vanquier	 French sloop	 15 Marie Galante cotton
Aug. 3 Nostra Signora Spanish schooner 35 Cumanas	 mulea,cotton,
do la Rota	 cocoanxt
5 Dendoime	 French sloop	 30 Guadeloupe	 cotton
6 Nieuve	 Spanish schooner 52 Oronoko	 gum aigaraba, indigo
S Revenge	 French sloop	 15 Marie Galante bu.Uo eke
9 Marie	 French schooner 35 Cayenne 	 cocoa,cotton,turtlea
10 Intrepide	 French sloop	 10 Marie Galante cotton
Sep. 6 Rosette	 French schooner 30 Martinique	 indigo,Campeachy
logwood (is tons)
Oct. 3 Usage	 French sloop
	 6 Martinique	 cotton
5 Bourgeois	 French schooner 5 Trinidad
	
hides
7 Dorade	 French sloop
	 15 Guade loupe	 cotton
ii. ClEARANCES. July - October, 1792
July 12 Julie	 French schooner 15 Martinique	 beef
13 Brizard	 French sloop	 20 St Lucia	 butter
16 Neptune	 French sloop	 15 St Lucia	 butter
17 Dauphin	 French sloop	 15 St Lucia	 herring
18 Belle Creole French schooner 5 Marie Galante herring; candles
18 Lafortuno	 French schooner 15 Martinique	 butter
20 Vanquier	 French sloop	 20 Marie Ga].ante beef & butter
23 Dauphin	 French sloop	 15 Martinique	 beef
23 Catherine	 French schooner 25 Martinique	 butter
30 Hazard	 French sloop	 15 Guadeloupe	 wine
31 Dunkerque	 French sloop	 15 Marie Galante beef & butter
31 Labrieure	 French schooner 20 Guadeloupe	 porter & dry goods
3]. Brigand	 French sloop	 25 Guade].oupe	 butter
Aug. 3 Belle Rosette French schooner 15 Martinique	 butter & beef
3 Vengeance	 French sloop	 20 Marie Galante pork,butter & beef
8 Nieuve	 Spanish schooner 52 Oronoko	 beef
9 Vanquier	 French sloop	 20 Guadeloupe	 butter & beef
10 Intrepid	 French sloop	 10 Marie Galante dry goods
11 Belle Rosalie French schooner 15 Martinique 	 butter & beef
22 Rose	 French schooner 4 Guadeloupe	 20 negroes
22 Marie Catherine French schooner 15 Martinique 	 butter
25 !ercury	 French sloop	 25 Martinique	 butter
30 Rosette	 French schooner 15 Martinique	 porter
Sep. 7 Rosette	 French schooner 15 Martinique 	 wine
8 Marie	 French schooner 3 Guadeloupe	 butter
17 Catharine	 French schooner 25 artinique	 porter
17 Elizabeth	 French sloop	 15 Guadeloupe	 porter,dry goods
19 Rose	 French schooner 20 Guadeloupe	 candles
Qct. 8 Dorade	 French sloop	30 Guadeloupe	 beef & porter
iii • El TRIES • January - April, 1793
Jan. 21 Lorrasiana	 Spanish schooner 20 Barcelona	 20 mules
2]. Hermione	 French sloop	 20 St Lucia	 cocoa
22 San Juan	 Spanish 8chooner 22 Caracas	 indigo
28 Courrieur	 French sloop	 25 Guadeloupe	 cotton
3]. Marie	 French sloop	 30 St Thomas	 cotton
Feb • 2 Courrieur	 French sloop	 25 St Eustatius	 cotton
2 lafortune	 French sloop	 15 Guadeloupe	 cedar
2 N.S. de la Reta Spani8h schooner50 Oronoko 	 cotton & mules
25 Charmant	 French sloop	 15 Marie Galante cotton
Mar. S Spys	 French 1oop	 10 St Lucia	 cotton
Api. 1 Seraphine	 Spanish schooner 18 Barcelona	 21 mules
v. CLEA.RCE8. April - July , 1793
Apl. 10 Rosalie	 Spanish schooner
11 Elizabeth	 Danish sloop
11 Industry	 French sloop
12 Cayerreux Packet Swedish sloop
33 Sylph	 Swedish sloop
May 9 Delaide	 Danish schooner
14 Elizabeth	 Danish sloop
23 Swallow	 Dutch sloop
23 Ranger	 Dutch schooner
23 Felix	 Dutch schooner
June 4 St Eaperance French schooner
4 Ranger	 Dutch schooner
6 Ranger	 Dutch schooner
7 Elizabeth	 Danish sloop
7 Harriet	 Dutch sloop
8 Rosaire	 French. schooner
11 Esperance	 French sloop
11 Cayerreux Packet Swedish sloop
14 Syiph	 Swedish sloop
18 St Joseph	 French sloop
23 Elizabeth	 Danish sloop
25 Republican	 Dutch sloop
27 Diamond	 Dutch schooner
July 1 Sophia	 Dutch schooner





























date	 ship	 nationality & tons where from	 cargo
tvne
Api. 3 Rosiario	 Spanish schooner 55 Oronoko	 gum aigaraba
3 Rosalie	 Spanish schooner 62 Oronoko	 60 oxhidea
iv, CLEARANCES. January - Atril. 1793
Jan. 12 Induatrie	 French schooner 25
19 .Amirab].e Charlotte French schooner
19 Venus	 French schooner 4
19 Rosette	 French schooner 15
21 Catherine	 French schooner 20
23. Marie	 French schooner 15
28 Berger	 French schooner 25
28 Ann Charlotte French schooner 30
28 St Charles	 French sloop	 20
3]. Belle Creole French schooner 30
Feb. 4 Hermione 	 French sloop	 20
14 Marie Catherine French schooner 15
19 Hope	 French sloop	 50
20 Berneuse	 French schooner 4
20 Belle Jeanne French schooner 5
28 loreto	 Spanish schooner 25
(Mar.) Republicain 	 French schooner 25
Rosalie	 Spanish schooner 62
Industry	 Swedish sloop	 25
(Api.) Seraphim	 Spanièh schooner 18





























































































Source: P.R.0. : HO 76/2 - 1792 to 1793
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U) Shipping returns of Naval Office, St George's, Grenada (Joseph Beete)
shewixig	 entries into, January let - March 31st, 1795.
date	 ship	 tons where from	 cargo
January 2 Postchaise 	 65 Martinique	 herring
7 Plan F].an	 47 St Lacia	 in ballast
7 Commerce	 70 Demerara	 corn & lime
7 Plying Fish	 184 Madeira	 wine
7 Mercury	 26 Martinique	 provisions & stores
14 Lady Hammond	 61 Demerara	 cotton
16 Union	 279 St Lucia	 sugar & cotton
17 George	 102 Newfoundland	 cod
17 Fly	 12 Martinique	 in ballast
22 Commerce	 70 Demerara	 cotton
22 Rambler	 102 Martinique	 pork
23 Erakine	 160 New Brunswick	 boards & planks
26 Mercury	 26 Martinique	 bread
31 Lady Hammond	 113 Demerara	 cotton
31 Triall	 54 Demerara	 cotton
February 2 Lady Hammond	 113 Demerara	 cotton
































































25 Long Island Packet 47
28 Three Friends 	 58
28 Sally	 29
March	 2 Lady Hammond	 61 Demerara	 cotton
5 Britannia	 72 Oronoque	 livestock
10 John	 65 Martinique	 hardwood & staves
10 Rambler	 102 Demerara	 cotton
10 Huntingdon	 67 Martinique	 empty r'.un puncheone
15 Commerce	 70 Demerara	 cotton
16 Harcum	 80 Savannah	 staves,shing].es,boards,
ranging timber
17 Phynn	 404 Guadeloupe	 in ballast
24 Industry	 91 Port Glasgow	 provieions,dry goods,
stores
ii) Shinning returns... shewin clearances from, January 1st - Ilarch3lst 1795.
ere bound
January 3 Britannia	 72 Jronoko	 in ballast
6 Postchaise	 65 St Lucia	 provisions, fieh,stores
7 Mercury	 26 Martinique	 in ballast
7 Commerce	 70 Barbados	 65 new negroes
8 Plan Plan	 47 Berbice	 60 new negroes
10 Triall	 54 laguan Is.	 provisions, dry goods
12 London	 302 Martinique	 provisions, dry goods
17 Lady Harnniond	 61 Laguan Is.	 provisions




























date	 ship	 tons where bound
	
Cargo
January 23 Commerce	 70 laguan Is.	 110 seasoned negroes
26 Rambler	 102 Crab Is.	 70 new negroes
27 Mercury	 26 Martinique	 wine
3]. Speedwell	 90 Martinique	 in ballast
3]. Mary	 289 Martinique	 provisions,dry goods,
wine
February 2 lady Hammond 	 11.3 Lauan Is.
	
bagging
3 Trial].	 54 laguan Is.	 in ballast







10 Commerce	 70 St Lucia
17 Endeavour	 75 Martinique




25 Aurora	 196 Martinique
28 Peggy	 156 London
28 Sally	 29 Tobago
March 9 lady Hammond
	
61 laguan Is.
10 Trial].	 54 laguan Is.
U Rambler	 102 Tobago
2]. Huntingdon	 67 Martinique
28 Britannia	 72 Oronoko























































boarda,etaves & 12 spars
rice, ehooka, staves














































vii. From Britain and Africa
January 15 Diligence 	 sloop
20 Tom	 ship
22 St Vincent ship












snow	 132 Bristol & Cork
ship	 100 Africa
ship	 120 Africa
APPENDIX 21: COLONIAL SHIP?IITG BETIJENS - (5) : St VINCENT
Shinninc Returns from the Naval Office, Georgetown, St Vincent (Walter Walters),
January - Anril. 1787
(a) EITTRIE5
j. From British West Indies
date	 ship	 type	 tons where from
	 cargo
January 15 Stanley 	 schooner 50 .Antigua	 provisions, negroes
22 Swift	 sloop	 52 Barbados	 provisions
23 Swift	 schooner 62 Grenada 	 in ballast
26 Tom	 sloop	 54 Grenada	 in ballast
27 Adonis	 schooner 71 Grenada 	 negroes
29 Bess	 sloop	 63 Grenada	 herring
29 Molly	 sloop	 30 Bermuda	 logwood, lime
February 14 Polly	 sloop	 45 Carriaoou	 in ballast
19 Standard	 sloop	 44 Bermuda	 empty casks
22 Swift	 schooner 62 .Antigua	 oats, linen
26 Nancy	 schooner II St Kitta	 in ballast
March 12 Jean—Ann	 sloop	 88 Grenada	 lumber
12 Betsey & Ann sloop	 50 Grenada	 rum
15 Hermit	 cloop	 42 Grenada	 mules
23 Walter	 brig	 170 Grenada	 in ballast
24 Experiment	 sloop	 52 Antigua	 in ballast
28 Crowlane	 sloop	 58 Bermuda	 lime
29 Swift	 schooner 62 Antigua 	 Irish linen



































































































wax, ivory, gum, ebony
(Africa)
sugar, cotton
February 18 Hannah	 ship
22 Little Pearl brig










date	 ship	 type	 tons where from	 cpro
February 2 Isabella	 ship
2 Little Pearl brig
3 Backhouso	 brig
9 lord Stanley ship
9 Williams	 ship
12 Kingatown	 brig
























iv - v. Fror United. States and British North .America
January 16 Betsey 	 brig	 75 Halifax
February 6 Brothers	 brig	 60 Halifax
February 14 Colin	 sloop	 60 Philadelphia
February 19 Christopher ship 	 242 New York









ji. For United States and British North America
February 14 Lucretia
March 23 Colin




























































































































































































Decree of French lTational Convention of January 31st, 1793,
sanctioning Privateering.
'Article 1.
	 Lea citoyans frena1s pourront armor en course.
Article 2.	 La Ministre de la Ilerine pour accélérer lea armenients
en. course, s'ils on lieu, délivrera des lettres do xnarque ou
permissions en blanc d'arnier en guerre et courir sur les ennenils
do la ROpublique.	 Cos permissions seront conformés su modle
annexé au present décret.
Article 3.	 Ces lettres ou permissions en blanc, signóes du
Linistre, seront envoyéos par lul aux directoires des districtes
niaritinies, qul. no pourront los delivrer quo sous leur rosponsa-
bilité, at	 la charge do r6venir exacteinent le Mtnistre do
lour livraison.
Article 4.	 Ii no pourra tre employó aur los btimerits en
course qu'un sixizne dee matelots classes en état do servir
la République.	 Pour cot offet los preposes aux classes no
pourront recevoir d'enr1enients, ni déltvrer do penis
d'enibarquer pour la course qu'autant quo le nombre des rnatelots
enployés & ce service n'excédera pas le six1tne des gens
o1asss do bun arrondissernent. 	 lie seront ainsi quo los
anmatours responsables do toute contravention cette 101.
Article 5.	 Lea chefs, souschefs prôposós aux classes, at
lea cepitaines des bt1nients do la Rópubllgue no pourront
dans aucun cas forcer los capitalnes des b't1ments en course
en dObarquer aucun inatebot, qu'autant quo le nombre de
ceux classes excéderait la proportion deterininóe par l'artlole
ci-dessus.
(reprinted in: NORLIA.N, C.B. 'The corsairs of France',
appendix X, p. 404).
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APPENDIX 23
List of British merchant chips, bound to and from Jamaica, captured
by privateere, January let, 1795 to January let, 1796.
(extracted from issues of the Kingston "ROYAL GATTE" and reproduced in the
letter of Simon Taylor, eeq., of amaioa,to Messrs. Fisher & Hibbert, London,











(ship iSit. b: Nova Scotia 1791)
(ship. 305t. b: Thmee 1793)
sloop (320t. b: New York 1774)
ship (305t. b Nova Scotia 1786)
(ship 220t. b: Philadelphia 1769
(brig 168t. b: Whitehaven 1786)
ship (312t. bs Bristol 1782)
brig
Belle	 (brig 173t. b: Greenock 1784)
Bellona
Bellona	 (ship 240. b: Thames 1786)
Beilmount
Betsy	 (7 ship 335t. b: Thames 1782)
Betty Cathcart (ship 270t. b: Greenock 1787
Britannia	 (7 ship 355t. b: Yarmouth 1789
Carrier	 brig ç186t. b: America 1773)
Caesar	 brig (U6t. b: Newcastle 1784)
C ale donia
Charles
Chaser	 ship (201t. b: Philadelphia 1791)
Cleopatra
Courtney	 brig (].25t. bs America 1792)
Countess of Eglinton (l36t. b: Saltcoate 1785)
Curlew	 schooner
Dart
Diana	 (ship 353t. b: Bristol 1794)
Dorset	 ship (274t. b: Bristol 1794)
Douglass	 (ship 300t. b: Shields 1786)





















(ship 146t. b Portland 1788)
schooner (70t. bs Jamaica 1789)
(ship 308t. ex French)
brig
(ship 156t. b: Rhode Island 1769)
(ship 280t. b: Greenock 1784)
(ship 220t. bs Bristol 1787)
snow (120t. b: Nova Scotia 1789)
(ship 289t. b: Bristol 1781)
(ship 256 t. b Greenock 1792)
ship 205t. b: Liverpool 1786)
(ship 249 t. b: Glasgow 1791)
sloop (181t. bs Britain 1775)
George	 brig (102t. b: America 1789)
George	 (ship 161t. bi Lancaster 1787)
George
Gascoigne	 (ship 2Z3t. bs Liverpool 1791)
General Mathews (ship 351t. ex French)
Glasgow	 (? ship 220t. b: Philadelphia 1791)
Gibraltar	 sloop























Jamaica	 sloop (240t . bs Liverpool 17934
Jamaica	 packet (]34t. b: Shields 1791)
Jamaica	 ship (458t. bz Bristol 1790)
Jane	 ship (400t. bs Liverpool 1778)
Jane










Little Jane (brig 165t. b: Liverpool 1785)
Lord Sheffield (ship 350t. bs Ipswich 1789)
Lovely Peggy (ship l9'7t, b: s4merica)



















(ship 204t. b: Boston 1770)
(ship 400t. b: Whitby 178].)
(schooner 72t. b: St. John8 1788)
brig (126t. b Nova Scotia 1786)
(ship 300t. b: N. Brunswick 1792)
brig (186t. b g
 Philadelphia)
brig
ship (254t. b: Philadephia)
sloop
schooner
(brig 152t. b: Philadelphia 1782)
(brig l]4t. b: Whitehaven 1779)
(ship 320t. b: Wales 1783)




Oeolus	 ship (15t. b: Liverpool 1787)
Orient	 ship (262t. b: Whitby 1792)
Patomac	 (ship 212t. b Glasgow 1768)
Peggy	 (? ship 202t. bs America 1775)
Phoebe Ann (ship 235t. b: Liverpool 1792)
Phoenix	 (ship 573t. bs Thames 1790)
Phynn	 ship
Pomona
Port—au—Prince Packet (6t. ex French)
Prince William Henry packet (283t. b: Whitby 1780)

















(ship 230t. bs Bristol 1770)
(? ship 300t. b: Stockton l75)
sloop
sloop
(ship 235t. b: Bristol l76)
(ship 291t. b: Severn 1788)
sloop
sloop
Thames	 ship (360t. b: Thames l78J)
Thomas & Henry (ship 153t. bs Chester 1770)
Top Lady	 brig
Trimmer	 (brig 128t. b: Bermuda 1786)
Triton	 (ship 210t. b: Newfoundland 1782)
Two Liaries
Urania	 ship (244t. b: Whitby 1792)
William	 sloop
William	 brig (147. b: N. Brunswick 1789)
William	 brig




& 16 un—named vessels (5 ships; 3 shallope; 3 brigs;
Total - 159
2 sloops; 2 schooners; one snow).
N0T	 1. The main entries comprise the information published in the
Kingston "Royal Gazette" and in Simon Taylor's letter.
2. The entries in brqckets comprise additional information obtained
from LLO3D t S REGISTEt of 179L.
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